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THE

WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER

1870

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WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER 1870

ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY

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BY

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PREFACE.

MUCH literature has already been published in England on the subject of the war of 1870; but it has appeared to the translator that, however much may have been, or however much may in future be, written concerning the events of the seven months' campaign, there must always be a place for an English version of their history, as written by one of the most celebrated military historians of the Continent, in a work which is regarded throughout Germany, and even in France, as the most complete and authentic narrative of the whole war at present existing. The favour with which 'The War for the Rhine Frontier' has been received abroad is attested by the fact that even now, before the concluding volume of the work has been published, the first parts have gone through two editions in the original, and a translation is being published in Paris.

The author, Colonel W. Rüstow, was born in Brandenburg in 1821, and entered the Prussian service at the age of seventeen. He there distinguished himself by his rare military talents, and speedily rose to the rank of Captain in the Engineers. But the independent opinions which he formed, and the frankness with which he avowed them, especially in a pamphlet 'On the Military Organisation of the German Army before and during the Revolution,' drew upon him the unfavourable notice of the authorities; and quitting the army, he retired into Switzerland. He there soon became known as a professor of military science, and took a leading part in the organisation of the Swiss military system. In 1860 he joined Garibaldi's expedition as Chief of the Staff; and when Garibaldi crossed to the mainland, Colonel Rüstow commanded, with the rank of Major-General, the left wing of the Italian Southern Army. He was then detached in command of the Expeditionary Corps which crossed to the right bank of the Volturno, and in the battle of Volturno led in person the last decisive charge of the reserve on the Neapolitan centre.

At the conclusion of the campaign, Colonel Rüstow returned to Switzerland, and, devoting himself to military pursuits, commenced the publication of a series of works which have caused his name to become celebrated throughout Europe as one of the first, if not

the first, of the military historians of the day. Apart from their literary excellences, his writings have the rare merit of accuracy and strict impartiality; and these qualities are especially noticeable in his last work, in which he has shown that, although German by birth, family, and education, he yet rightly discerns the unhappy state of feeling which this disastrous war has aroused in Germany, and that the brilliancy of their victories does not prevent him from seeing clearly the faults of his former fellow-countrymen; and, on the other hand, while condemning the reckless haste with which the French Government plunged into the war, he yet fully recognises the many noble qualities of the great French nation.

STAFF COLLEGE, *August* 1871.

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THE WAR

FOR

THE RHINE FRONTIER.

CHAPTER I.

HOW THE SUCCESSES OF PRUSSIA IN 1866, AND THE LUXEMBURG QUESTION, AFFECTED FRANCE.

At the end of the year 1859 the Emperor Napoleon III. had reached the summit of his power. From that time the Second French Empire commenced to decline.

In the following year the issue of the events of Italy was for the most part not in accordance with the wishes of Napoleon, and thenceforth he strove in all his undertakings rather to dazzle the imagination of the French people than to attain material objects.

Towards the close of 1861 he plunged into the

Mexican war, an enterprise which was destined to be most fatal to himself and to the Empire. At the onset he acted in concert with England and with Spain; but when, early in 1862, these Powers, declaring themselves satisfied with the promises of the Mexican Republic, withdrew from the expedition, France remained alone in the quarrel, and by arbitrarily increasing her demands, showed her intention of entering at any cost into a combat with Mexico, and consequently with the United States of America, who were then themselves involved in civil war.

The Mexican war necessitated great exertions, which were altogether disproportionate to any advantages which France could derive from it. Still, as long as the Northern States of America, instead of gaining a rapid victory, seemed rather to succumb to the military talents of the generals of the South, the Emperor Napoleon could still hope that the Mexican war would end favourably for himself and for France.

But with the battle of Gettysburg, from the 2d to the 4th of July 1863, came the great change in the fortunes of the Southern States. By that time the French had ruled for four weeks in the city of Mexico; but how little had their sway been acknowledged throughout the territory of the Mexican Republic! And soon it became apparent that the material resources of the South were exhausted, and that the Northern States must gain the final victory.

These, it was certain, would in no way tolerate a settlement of French Imperialists on the borders of the Union.

And while in America threatening clouds thus gathered together on the heaven of the Second Empire, there was no lack of dark spots in Europe also.

The expedition of Garibaldi for the liberation of Rome from the papal dominion had certainly been defeated in the latter end of August 1862 by the troops of the Italian Government at Aspromonté; but the whole affair had shown that however obedient the Italian Government might be to the Emperor Napoleon, he had in future not to deal with it alone, but that there existed in Italy other elements which could not be altogether disregarded.

In the beginning of 1863, also, the Polish insurrection against Russia, which up to that time had only existed covertly, broke out openly and violently, and France, England, Austria, and Italy opened concerning it a war of despatches with Russia, which, however, could in no way lead to any result. Then, again, in the summer of the same year the Emperor of Austria attempted at Frankfort-on-the-Main to arrange with the small princes a plan for the unity of Germany, and his design was frustrated by the opposition of Prussia. Consequently on this and on the interchange of ideas between Prussia and Austria, the Schleswig-Holstein question, which had to all

appearances been buried in 1850, came again prominently forward.

In short, in the year 1863 the very air teemed with European questions of great importance. Such being the case, Napoleon III., towards the close of the year, proposed a European congress, which was to sit in Paris. But his proposition was rejected, for England was not willing that in any case war should arise.

Thus it came to pass that in the beginning of 1864 the war against Denmark broke out, in which Austria made common cause with Prussia; and the Danish dwarf, falling an easy prey to the military giants who had risen up against it, could not be rescued by diplomatic means.

It now became imperative for the Emperor of the French to resolve upon a course. Two ways were open to him by which he might maintain himself upon his throne. Either he must resolve to abandon the principle of Cæsarism and give to France internal freedom, or he must dazzle her with brilliant victories abroad and thus rescue the principle of personal government. And looking to the manner in which his Empire was founded, Napoleon was forced to give the preference to the latter course; and thus we see his policy after 1864 working mainly to two ends—to gain alliances abroad, and to concentrate the disseminated military force of France.

It was in furtherance of this last object that the Convention of the 15th of September was concluded

with Italy. By it the duty of protecting the Holy Father and the papal territory was substantially transferred to the kingdom of Italy, and thus it became possible for the Emperor to withdraw the French troops from Rome and from the Pontifical States.

Equally to the same end was the journey of Napoleon in 1865 to Algiers. Its main object was to establish in that colony a peace policy, which would lessen greatly the number of troops necessarily maintained there.

To free himself from the burden of Mexico had already been a subject of thought with Napoleon, and he had succeeded in finding a new Emperor for the Mexican Empire in the person of the romantic Archduke Maximilian of Austria. The Archduke, after it had been easily proved to him that he was called by the general voice of the people to be Emperor of Mexico, took upon himself the charge, and on the 12th of June 1864 entered the capital, Mexico, to begin there the unhappy war against Juarez, the President of the legitimate Republic. At first he was, it is true, to be supported in it by the French army, but this Napoleon calculated could soon be replaced by Austrians and Belgians, by men from the native land of the Emperor of Mexico, and from that of his wife the Belgian Princess Charlotte.

But however diligently and zealously Napoleon might apply himself to the task of concentrating his forces in France, its completion must necessarily be a

work of time; and whether he wished to prepare himself for defensive or for offensive action against the European Powers which threatened the Empire, it was equally important to him that meanwhile the peace of Europe should be preserved, and therefore at this time all the acts of his Government were of a peaceful tendency.

The most significant of his measures to this end was the reduction of the standing army of France, which was announced in November 1865. This reduction was not to be effected immediately, but the mere announcement of it created great discontent among the French officers—a discontent which was by no means completely allayed by the institution of the French Legion of Antibes for the papal service.

The reduction of the French army was quickly followed by the Convention of Gastein. After Prussia and Austria had, acting in concert, conquered the Danes, the old hatred between them had straightway broken out again, and the conquest which they had gained together but added new fuel to its flames. The Convention of Gastein only postponed the outbreak of hostilities between the two great German Powers, and in 1866 the war really came to pass.

Since 1859 Napoleon III. had foreseen the possibility of a serious conflict between Prussia and Austria. He pictured to himself Prussia in the same situation with regard to Austria as Italy was in 1859. Prussia, he assumed, would require his assistance;

and just as Sardinia had repaid the assistance which France had rendered her by the cession of Savoy and Nice, so also would aid rendered to the Prussians purchase for the Second Empire the left bank of the Rhine, the much-talked-of natural frontier of France. To this end there was much private and confidential correspondence carried on, but it was impossible that Prussia could adopt the French views on this subject. Still the French Government remained very confident, being firmly assured that the moment must come when Prussia could not dispense with the aid of France, and when she would gladly make the required concession to gain the assistance which would enable her to overcome the opposition of Austria and of the independent German States.

The Convention of Gastein therefore, which seemed for the moment to re-establish peace between Austria and Prussia, greatly irritated the Imperial Government of France, and it could scarcely find words bitter enough to express its condemnation of it. But with the threatenings of the war of 1866 the French hopes rose again, and in May the Imperial Government, which was at the same time treating with Italy, made Prussia an offer of a treaty of alliance. By this France was to assist Prussia against Austria with 300,000 men: Austria, having been defeated in the war, was to cede Venice to Italy, Prussia was to acquire new territory in North Germany with some 8,000,000 of population, and in return was to hand

over to France the country between the Moselle and the Rhine, with the exception of the fortresses of Coblentz and Mayence.

This offer was rejected by Prussia in June, but France still calculated that the events of the war would give her ample opportunities of attaining by some means or other her object; for that the Prussians would be so brilliantly victorious, and subdue Austria, in the way they did, was an event which before the war no one could have ventured to predict. The war of 1866 took a totally unexpected course. After the disastrous defeat of Austria at Königratz, the Emperor Francis Joseph offered Venice to the Emperor Napoleon as a present. His wish undoubtedly was that Napoleon III. should now take an active part in the war, but this seemed to the French Emperor to be a too hazardous proceeding. He wished certainly to separate Italy from Prussia. It was to neutralise the treaty of Prussia with Italy, which had only been concluded for three months, that he had proposed a European congress before the outbreak of the war, knowing that among the Italian Government he had many obedient servants, although even these could not carry through all they wished; but still, to engage actively in the war in July 1866 was to run too great a risk of total defeat. Prussia had developed a most remarkable military power; and the Italians had acquired great confidence in her. If France now took up arms, she would most probably only more

surely drive the South German States and the North Germans, who still opposed her sway, into the arms of Prussia. Napoleon knew better than any one else the weakness of the military organisation of his country, the blame for which must be laid chiefly upon his shoulders. The renown which the needle-gun had won in this war was also not to be overlooked, since France was still unprovided with a breech-loading or rapidly-firing arm. Viewing all these circumstances, it seemed to Napoleon to be most advisable to allow that which he could not prevent to take place quietly, and to patiently bide his time—displeased, certainly, with the course of events, but hoping still that that which Prussia had acquired in 1866 would bring with it many troubles, which might give France the opportunity later on to offer at some timely moment a useful intervention. In opposition to the doctrine, therefore, which he had preached before the war, the Emperor Napoleon now looked quietly on while Austria was, at the demand of Prussia, entirely separated from Germany, and was content that Prussia should still in some small degree at least respect the line of the Main.

Less cautious than the Emperor, Drouyn de Lhuys, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, raised at Berlin the question of the compensation which France, in the interest of the equilibrium of power in Europe, was to receive for the augmentation of the influence of Prussia, especially as she had allowed the Prussian

Government to carry out its views undisturbed. Under the existing circumstances, Count Bismark declined altogether to entertain these questions, and Drouyn de Lhuys was obliged to resign his seat in the French Cabinet. His place was temporarily filled by Lavalette, who, however, merely held it until Marquis Moustier, who was at that time ambassador in Constantinople, could arrive in Paris.

The most urgent question now appeared to the Emperor Napoleon to be a reorganisation of the French army, which should provide greater resources of trained soldiers than the existing institutions afforded. The preparation of a new law was therefore at once, in 1866, taken in hand; but the law itself did not come into force until the year 1868, and even then in a form which but feebly carried out the views of the Emperor and of his circumspect advisers. Of the details of this law we shall have to speak later in the course of our narrative.

The trials of breech-loaders had been diligently carried on in France since the year 1857. But there, as almost everywhere else in Europe, great doubts were entertained as to the utility of such a weapon in actual war, and this feeling had hindered any great advance being made towards their adoption. After the Danish war in 1864, the question was taken up in a more determined manner; and after the Prussian successes of 1866, the War Ministry decided at once to adopt a model which had been proved to be the

best, and to order large quantities of breech-loaders to be made on the Chassepot system. The Imperial decree which sanctioned this measure is dated the 30th of August 1866.

But the making of a sufficient number of Chassepots for the whole French army would manifestly require much time, for the machinery necessary to turn them out had yet to be constructed. Meanwhile complications with Prussia might arise, and the French army, destitute of breech-loaders, would combat with the Prussian at a great disadvantage. To remedy this to some extent, it was resolved to convert at once the large-calibre muzzle-loading Minie rifles with which the French troops were armed into breech-loaders, and to effect this change the Snider system was adopted early in 1867. These converted rifles were usually called in France "fusils à tabatière," owing to the manner in which the breech was closed. At the same time it was determined to construct a considerable number of the so-called mitrailleuses or machine-guns—a revolving firearm which was to operate with the infantry, and supply any lack which there might still be in rapidity of fire.

An immediate contest with Germany was a possibility which the Empire could not lose sight of. The successes of the Prussians had awakened in France a great feeling of disquietude and of alarm. It was difficult for the French mind to understand that every nation, and not France alone, had a right to

manage its own internal affairs independently and without foreign intervention. The French army could not pardon the Prussians because they had taken the liberty of beating the Austrians more rapidly and more thoroughly than it had done. The greater part of the press stirred up and excited public feeling in the same direction, and the Empire was reproached on all sides with want of foresight in regard to the recent events in Germany. Examining all these expressions of discontent carefully, it was manifest that they all tended to one of two things—the one division urged the introduction of a Parliamentary constitution in the place of the ruling Imperialism, the other pointed out that the Imperial Government should prove anew its right to exist by a brilliant foreign policy.

The latter course necessarily appeared the more agreeable to the Emperor and to the Imperial or Cæsaric party; and as even the Parliamentary party based their arguments chiefly upon the bad results of the foreign policy of France, it seemed doubly possible for the Empire to quiet all discontent, silence all its detractors, and assert itself anew by seeking a quarrel abroad and bringing it to a good end.

Therefore, side by side with the tasks of reorganising the army and of providing for it a new weapon, the work of concentrating the existing but scattered forces of France upon French soil was carried on. From Rome the French troops were withdrawn between

the 2d and 12th of December 1866, many months sooner than the terms of the Convention of September 1864 required. As regards Mexico, Napoleon had decided, owing to the determined attitude assumed by the Government of Washington, even before the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian war, to withdraw the French expedition in three divisions—one in November 1866, another in March 1867, and the third in November 1867. After the war of 1866 he resolved to bring back the whole force to France in one body during the first months of the year 1867, and he pressed the ill-fated Emperor Maximilian to justify this measure in anticipation, by resigning his crown before the departure of the French. But the Habsburg Prince was obstinate and disobliging, and had to be left to the fate which speedily overtook him. The transport fleet which was to bring back from Mexico the wreck of the expedition, sailed from the French harbours early in December 1866, and returned to France with the melancholy remains of the French army of Mexico in March 1867.

And while Napoleon thus on the one hand made ready for war, he nevertheless bethought himself on the other hand of providing for the contingency of peace by satisfying to some extent the demands of the Parliamentarians by placing on the Imperial structure a new "couronnement de l'édifice." In the fabrication of this "couronnement de l'édifice" a certain M. Emil Ollivier took some share—a man who

in 1870 played a most disastrous part in the history of France, which we shall hereafter more fully explain, and who was gained for the support of the liberal Empire first by M. Morny, and afterwards more thoroughly by Count Walewski.

On the 19th of January 1867, the Emperor wrote to his representative minister a letter which was meant to be published, and in which he explained how it seemed to him to be now feasible to give to the institutions of the Empire that development of which they were capable. Europe expected wonders, but in reality these great promises led to nothing. The members of the Senate and of the Legislative body were to be allowed a privilege which had hitherto been denied to them—the right of questioning the Government. But as a compensation, the address on the speech from the throne and the consequent discussion were to be abolished. Evil-minded men asserted that this was the main object of the Emperor, that he dreaded a discussion on his policy in the Mexican question and towards Germany, and that, not daring to abolish the debate on the address by a simple decree, he therefore granted the right of interpellation. Further, there was to be no longer a special representative minister. Every minister was henceforth to represent his department in the Chambers, but without taking upon himself any responsibility, which was to rest as heretofore with the Emperor. Finally, freer laws were promised for the

press, for political unions, and for assemblies of the people.

Owing to these changes in the constitution, the existing ministry was, for the sake of appearances, obliged to resign; but in reality the old ministers formed the greater part of the new ministry. The most important change that took place was that Marshal Randon, a man somewhat slothful and not very apt in speech, was replaced as Minister of War by Marshal Niel, a man full of energy, and a perfect master of debate. The new minister set himself at once vigorously to work to prepare for an immediate war; and, in truth, such a war seemed to be already close at hand.

The question of the day was the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. According to the treaties of 1814, 1815, and 1816, the Grand Duchy belonged to the King of the Netherlands, and at the same time to the German Confederation. Prussia had the right of garrisoning the capital, the fortress of Luxemburg. In 1839, after the southern provinces of the kingdom of the Netherlands had declared themselves independent, and had been formed into the kingdom of Belgium, the European Powers sanctioned also a division of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. The western part was apportioned to Belgium, while the position of the eastern division, as belonging on the one hand to Holland, and on the other to the German Diet, remained unchanged. The right of Prussia to garri-

son the fortress of Luxemburg was also not to be in any way affected by this division of the Grand Duchy.

But when Prussia, in June 1866, renounced her participation in the old German Confederation, the question was raised how it should stand with regard to the Prussian right of garrisoning the fortress of Luxemburg. This right Prussia insisted on, urging that it belonged to her by virtue of special treaties which were in no way dependent on the fact that Luxemburg belonged to the German Diet. She therefore still maintained her garrison in Luxemburg, even after the peace of Prague had formally annulled the connection of the Grand Duchy with the new creations in Germany; but nevertheless she made no attempt to incorporate it with the North German Confederation.

Neither the Dutch nation nor the King of Holland, William III., had ever placed much value upon the possession of the Grand Duchy. The king therefore entered willingly into an intrigue with Napoleon with the view of ceding Luxemburg to France, receiving in exchange a considerable round sum of money for his private treasury, which was always in need of supplies. Towards the end of March 1867, these secret negotiations between the King of Holland and the French Government had so far ripened that they could only be continued officially. On the French side, it was wished that the matter

should be kept secret from Prussia until the cession of Luxemburg to France was an accomplished fact; but this course seemed to the King of Holland too critical; and moved by this feeling, he, on the same day that he telegraphed officially to Paris that he had resolved to cede Luxemburg to France, informed the Prussian ambassador at the Hague of this determination. Prussia now naturally stepped into the transaction, and appealed at once to the Powers who were parties to, and guarantees of, the treaties of 1839, upon which the existence of the modern kingdom of Holland was based.

In Germany public opinion was outraged at the idea that Luxemburg—a province of the old German Empire—should be yielded to France; and on the 1st of April 1867, the affair was brought before the North German Parliament through a question by Herr von Benningsen, in a speech in which the old Hanoverian gave fierce vent to his excited feelings. Count Bismark answered him with satisfaction. He was not displeased at the question, but, declining to betray such warmth as the questioner had done, contented himself with appropriating this Parliamentary manifestation of the public feeling of Germany as a justification for making ready for a war with France. Military preparations were at once begun on both sides, but the war was nevertheless happily avoided. France for the moment did not feel herself strong enough; the French Government began to treat the

matter with caution; and thus the intervention of the European Powers was able soon to find a foundation for a peaceful settlement, which was brought about on the 11th May through the London Conference.

The Treaty of London was ratified on the 31st of May 1867. According to its terms, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was still to appertain to the reigning house of Nassau-Orange, and was declared to be a neutral state under the collective guarantee of all the Powers who were parties to the treaty, excepting only of Belgium, who herself enjoys the advantage of European neutrality. Consequently the town of Luxemburg was to cease to be a fortress. Prussia withdrew her garrison from it, and the royal Grand Duke undertook to raze the fortifications. The relation of Luxemburg towards the German Zollverein (custom-union) was not entered into by the London Conference.

It cannot be denied that in the French Court party a great desire prevailed to use the Luxemburg question as a means to bring about a war. The Emperor Napoleon, however, showed himself but little disposed for this, perhaps because he knew thoroughly that the French forces were not yet equal to those of united Germany. In Germany, also, there arose complaining voices, which condemned the concession of Prussia on this question. Men talked of the sacrifice of a German province, of the sacrifice of a bulwark of Germany. Hollow words, truly, for those

who knew thoroughly the state of affairs, and who took a correct military and political view of them. Others, again, said war between France and Germany is sooner or later inevitable. At this moment Germany is very strong, and far superior, as a military power, to her opponent. Such a favourable opportunity should not be allowed to pass away; for who can tell what aspect affairs may hereafter assume? But Count Bismark held that a war between Germany and France, however it might terminate, and whoever might be the conqueror, would be a great disaster for Europe. This opinion was shared by all far-seeing men. Bismark therefore deemed it desirable to at least postpone the war. Who could foretell what would happen in France after the death of the Emperor? Might it not come to pass that war, postponed until then, would then be altogether unnecessary? For such a hope it was well worth while to sacrifice—if it could be regarded as a sacrifice—the very doubtful advantage of retaining Luxemburg, especially as it could be given up in the manner and under the conditions that were now proposed. The less Germany urged on the unhappy war with France, so much the more united and so much the stronger would she step forward in the same if she was wilfully dragged into it by the other side.

Others said, again, that France would regard the yielding of Germany in the Luxemburg question as

the result of fear, and would therefore become herself all the more desirous of war. And with the superficial knowledge which prevailed generally in France as to German affairs, this might very possibly be the case. Still, a statesman should in no way allow the dread of being held to be afraid to influence his acts. The behaviour of Bismark in the Luxemburg question—his quiet yielding up to a certain point, where he stood firm—will always form one of the most beautiful chapters in the political history of this statesman. None of the men who, in the years from 1867 to 1870, laboured indefatigably to conciliate the two nations who sustain the civilisation of Europe, and who strove to postpone the unhappy war, will ever repent them of their work, whatever the inveterate French haters of Germany and German haters of France may think or say on the matter. Let us hope that in a few more lustres the two great nations will blush when they pronounce such names as Cassagnac, Emil de Girardin, or Menzel and Heinrich Leo.

CHAPTER II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-IMPERIAL TENDENCIES IN FRANCE DURING THE YEARS FROM 1867 TO 1870.

After the settlement of the Luxemburg question, public opinion in France gradually turned from the idea of glory, to which the Court party wished to lead it, and tended more and more to insist on the introduction of internal freedom—a tendency which was at the time greatly strengthened by the history of the foreign policy of France.

The Mexican drama wound up on the 19th of June 1867 with the execution, by martial law, of the Emperor Maximilian in Queretaro. The Emperor of the French had enticed the poor romantic archduke to Mexico, and had there left him to his fate. The whole of intelligent France felt that her honour was affected by the sad catastrophe; and the weak, suppressed opposition, which had from its commencement consistently condemned the Mexican war, as being undertaken for the good of a Jewish usurer and of his high-born accomplices, could at this sad moment with justice assert that the ill-fated expedi-

tion would never have been entered upon if a Parliamentary Government had existed, instead of that of the nominally responsible, but really irresponsible, Empire.

In November 1867, the Garibaldian rising to free Rome, and the ambiguous behaviour of the Italian Government, compelled the Emperor Napoleon to send back to Rome the troops which, in compliance with the terms of the Convention of September 1864, he had withdrawn from the States of the Church. The Chassepots worked wonders in the battle of Mentana against the brave but badly-organised and worse armed volunteers of Garibaldi. That circumstances compelled the Emperor Napoleon to act as he did, every honest man must admit; but still, the French opposition asserted with reason that the whole policy of France towards Italy since 1849 had been wrong, and that it would never have been carried out had not the country been enthralled by the Empire.

After the victory of Mentana, Napoleon again wished to originate a European congress, which should free him from the Roman difficulty. But the European Powers were not inclined to take part, for the pleasure of Napoleon, in such an assembly, unless guarantees were forthcoming that something useful would result from it; and the congress, therefore, did not take place:—another abortive design, which was duly written down to the debit of the Imperial Government.

Then in September 1868 came the Spanish Revolution, which cost Queen Isabella her throne; and, following it, the conflict of Greece with the Porte. This last difficulty was, it is true, speedily settled; but still the Imperial Government won no laurels in either of these affairs, and the open sympathy shown by the Court for the reverses of Queen Isabella, naturally sharpened the weapons of the opposition. And below these events, which were patent to all the world, a secret undercurrent of intrigue was flowing on, known to the Court circles alone, and which was only later on openly proclaimed. The result of these secret negotiations was equally unfavourable to the Empire.

After the shipwreck of the project to surprise France and the world by adding Luxemburg to the Empire, the French Court still continued to cherish plans for acquiring territory in the north, which should turn aside the French people, thirsting either for glory or for victory, from the pursuit of freedom. Count Benedetti, the French ambassador at the Court of Berlin, had, after the settlement of the Luxemburg question, frequent interviews with the Chancellor of the North German Confederation. In these Bismark observed a strictly passive attitude. The main subject of their conversations was that France and North Germany should form an offensive alliance, with the object of bringing about the acquisition of Luxemburg and of Belgium by France, and of removing the obstacles which prevented the entrance of the South

German States into the North German Confederation.

As early as the year 1867 Benedetti was ingenious enough to draw up with his own hand the sketch of a treaty to that effect, and placed the same in the hands of the Chancellor, in order that he might consider the scheme with King William of Prussia. Bismark, true to his ideas of postponing a war, did not disdain to converse on this project; but, guarding the writing carefully as a valuable document, of which later on at an opportune moment he might make good use, spoke no word on the subject to other people, as he was far from wishing to provoke a war with France.

When the French Court party found Bismark to be deaf to their plans for acquiring territory in the north through the support of Prussia, it did not, nevertheless, in any way abandon its design, but rather cast about for some way by which it might gain its ends, even at the risk of incurring the danger of a war with Germany, or, as would be more pleasing to it, a war with Prussia alone.

The Court party now bethought itself of making the small countries on the borders of France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Holland, dependent upon France by means of treaties of commerce and of customs, as South Germany was by the Zollverein dependent upon North Germany. The more thorough annexation of desirable portions of these countries was then to be

reserved for a favourable opportunity. But as neither Belgium nor Switzerland evinced any inclination to be ensnared by France, it was necessary to conduct these negotiations with the greatest caution, and at the same time to be prepared for a possible war with observant Prussia.

In January 1868 the French Eastern Railway Company made overtures to the Luxemburg "Wilhelm's Railway" with a view to purchasing the latter line, or, failing that, to leasing it. In September 1868, M. de la Guerronière, a zealous adherent of the French Court and war party, was sent as ambassador to Brussels, and shortly afterwards suspicious negotiations were heard of between the French Railway Company and the Belgian Companies of the Great Luxemburg and Liege-Limburg Railways. The basis of these negotiations was this: the Belgian railways were to be sold, or at all events leased, to the French Eastern Railway Company. The dividends which were guaranteed by the French Government to the Eastern railways were to be also secured by it to the Belgian railways which it sought to acquire. For the Belgian railway companies this arrangement would have been by no means bad; from a general commercial point of view it must also be regarded as good, as it would necessarily facilitate the communication in eastern France from Holland to Switzerland.

But to the Belgian nation this business was not pleasing. The gteat incorporated companies, in small

countries especially, have attained an influence which limits the power of the state in its most beneficial measures. By the projected treaties this influence was to be handed over to the French Eastern Railway Company, and behind this Company stood, as was well known, the French Government. The Belgian nation saw, therefore, in the proposed arrangement, the first step towards a complete annexation of Belgium to France, and remonstrated decidedly against it. The Belgian Government stood in this matter in complete accord with the nation, and, on the 23d of February 1869, was able to pass a law which rendered impossible the completion of treaties by incorporated companies without the sanction of the state, and prevented the state being overreached by such means.

In France there arose, at the instigation of the Court party, a loud outcry at this measure, as though by it a great injustice had been done to the Empire; and the Parisian newspapers asserted that the above-mentioned law was prompted by Bismark. Correspondence at once ensued between France and Belgium. The Belgians pleaded that if the proposed treaties between the French and Belgian railway companies had in reality no other object than that of facilitating international communication, their end could be gained by simpler means than by selling or leasing the Belgian railways to the French Eastern Railway Company—namely, by an agreement as to their management, without allowing it to lapse altogether into the

power of the French. The sensitiveness which was manifested on the French side, and which showed itself in various threats, only excited the Belgian Government to double its vigilance and caution. M. Frère-Orban, President of the Belgian Ministry, and Minister of Finance, came himself to Paris to take part in the negotiations; but before any result was arrived at, the time for the elections of 1869 drew nigh. The Emperor, who believed that these would give him full occupation, stepped personally into the business. The question was adjourned, and when it came on again subsequently, was tamely settled by an agreement of management much as the Belgians had at first proposed.

As we have seen, the foreign relations and policy of the Empire in their origin and in their issue were little calculated to divert the attention of France from internal questions. After the new Army Bill had been disposed of early in 1868, a new law for the press, and another for regulating political unions and assemblies, came on. The first was announced on the 11th of May, the latter on the 6th of June. Both laws teemed with repressive Draconic clauses, but still they gave somewhat more freedom than the former. The clause in the old law which made the publication of every journal dependent upon a concession of the Government was abolished. Every one might now publish newspapers without more ado: every one had now the right to ruin himself, if he

thought fit, through the press. The practical end which the newly-started newspapers undertook was, to prepare for the elections for the Corps Legislatif, whose period of legislature expired in 1869. The new press, therefore, was much prosecuted both by the law and by the administration; but still it was not deterred, to any great extent, from pursuing its course.

Since the beginning of the year 1868, a very influential party had sprung up, which, opposing itself to personal rule, urged the adoption of the principle of Parliamentary government. The views of this party were shared not only by the opponents of the Napoleonic dynasty, but also by some of its most devoted adherents. The repeated sicknesses of the Emperor had rendered even more important the question, What was to happen after the death of Napoleon III.? There would remain the Empress Eugenie, a good but somewhat narrow-minded woman, who clung obstinately to the prerogative of the crown, who was the real head of that Court party which ever hoped to renew the brightness of the dynasty by the brilliancy of its foreign enterprises, and who, lastly, was to be chiefly blamed for the shameful overgrowth of the clerical element, and with it for the foolish opposition to the intelligent education of the masses; there would be, further, if the Emperor should die soon, a boy, a minor in age, of whose talents, disposition, and character, nothing was known save that he was

weakly and badly brought up; then there remained Prince Jerome Napoleon, who, in spite of his Bonapartist face, was neither respected by the people nor by the army,—and this is taking no account of the civil family of the Emperor, the members of which were constantly causing him trouble and care by their behaviour.

Which of these persons, then, was to continue the personal rule of the Emperor after his death? Would it not be better to think in time of so changing the form of government that a too close inspection of the ruling personage would not be inevitable? Under these circumstances it was natural that the party opposed to personal government should increase apace, although composed of the most heterogeneous elements.

Coexistent with this party was the Republican, represented in the press mainly by two newly-founded newspapers—the 'Reveil' of Ch. Delescluzè, and the 'Lanterne' of Count Henry Rochefort, which latter strove especially to render the Second Empire personally ridiculous and hated; and touching it thus on its most sensitive spot, subjected itself to the most frequent and sharpest prosecutions. A great demonstration at the tomb of the Republican deputy, Baudin, who fell at the barricades on the 3d of December 1851, fighting against the *coup d'état*, and the invitation which followed to subscribe for a monument to be erected to him, led to the dismission of the Min-

ister of the Interior, Pinard, who had acted very unskilfully on these occasions, and brought on further legal processes, in the course of which the Empire was unavoidably discussed, a proceeding which was more painful to it than aught else.

From the beginning of the year 1869, all parties were preparing for the coming elections for the Corps Legislatif. The Republicans had increased considerably; still, every impartial observer knew well that they could not play any great part. But with the party opposed to personal government it was very different. The Government had, it is true, owing to the long-prevailing system of centralising the administration and of nominating official candidates, an unusual influence over the elections; but since even the adherents of the dynasty were opposed on grounds of expediency to the principle of personal rule, it could be foreseen that the Chamber, chosen by the elections of 1869, would, although perhaps but slightly different in its personal composition, still bring with it a very different vote to that of the former ones.

On the 28th of April 1869 the session of the old Corps Legislatif closed, and the elections for the coming period of legislature fixed for the 23d and 24th of May; for Corsica for the 30th and 31st of May. The election committees at once commenced their work, and meetings to consider the claims of the candidates were convened. The opportunity was seized in these assemblies to test the new law of the

6th of June 1868; and in this way many disputes, and even in some cases unimportant conflicts, ensued between the police and the citizens.

On the whole, the elections, as well as the meetings, passed off throughout France and in the large towns, especially in Paris, very quietly, and with good order. In Paris, at the first scrutiny, five of the nine candidates were selected: these were the young advocate Gambetta, who had made himself renowned by his fiery attack upon the Second Empire, when defending those implicated in the Baudin affair; Bancel, who had just returned from a long exile; the thorough Parisian Ernest Picard; the dulcet and shallow prattler of humanity, Julius Simon; and Pelletan. At the second scrutiny, on the 6th and 7th of June, were elected Thiers, the celebrated historian of the Revolution and of the Empire, to oppose whose election the Government strained every nerve, even to this extent, that to gain votes in his district they placed the regiment of *gendarmes* of the Guard who were quartered there, and who heretofore had been always regarded as field troops, upon the same footing as the *gendarmerie* of the departments; further, Garnier Pagès, Julius Ferry, and the eloquent advocate Jules Favre.

All the candidates elected in Paris were anti-Imperialists; but only one—Gambetta—was a declared Republican. Rochefort, for whose support a strong party had been organised, was thrown out by Favre,

and chiefly for this reason, that the newly-founded 'Rappel,' an organ of Victor Hugo's clique, had demanded the return of Rochefort as an absolute enemy of Napoleon III. Paris was ill-disposed towards personal rule, but it proved itself by no means personally hostile to the Emperor. Emil Ollivier had not been able to secure his return in Paris, solely because he was there regarded as a traitor to every opinion which he had formerly defended.

The 6th and 7th of June, the days of the second scrutiny, also passed by quietly, but on the 8th disturbances began. As the evening declined, groups began to assemble in the streets and on the Boulevards. These disturbances had been arranged by M. Rouher, and by the Prefect of Police, Pietri. The leaders of the groups were gallows-birds, engaged by Pietri to the number of about three hundred. It was calculated, and rightly so, that the curiosity of the Parisian public would soon enlarge these groups. Two points were selected as the foci of these disturbances — the environs of the Temple, and the neighbourhood of the Boulevard Montmartre. In the first days of these *émeutes* the troops of the Guard of Paris and the *sergents de ville* marched out to quell them; in the latter days, detachments of the cavalry of the line, hussars, and mounted rifles, and afterwards two regiments of cuirassiers, which were called in from Versailles. On the afternoon of the 11th of June, the Emperor, accompanied by the Empress, rode

in an open carriage along the Boulevards; on the evening of the same day the cuirassiers entered Paris; and on the 12th of June the disturbances ceased by command, as by command they had arisen.

The object of these arrangements was to instil into the mind of the good citizens a dread of "bad elections" and of their consequences, and this end was very completely gained. On the 8th and 9th of June, 40,000 strangers left Paris. These had come there, some on business, others, and these the greater part, for amusement, and they were by no means desirous of allowing themselves instead to be cut down by the *sergents de ville*. Business and commerce stood still. Independently of the departure of these 40,000 visitors, who gave much employment, the passages of the Boulevards were closed, and the *cafés* cleared at 9 o'clock in the evening. Destruction of every sort was wrought by the soldiers engaged by M. Pietri. The business population of Paris had learnt—not the truth—but exactly that which it was meant to learn, and was now ready to step forward personally against such disturbances. During all these *émeutes* not a single shot was fired, not a rallying shout was heard, not a barricade was erected; the cry of "aux Tuileries" was never raised, although the Boulevard Montmartre is not far distant from them. We only relate these things because there are yet people who regard the disturbances of June 1869 as a Republican demonstration, and who

will not believe that so great a *scandal* was purely a police affair. These *émeutes* were in truth nothing more.

From the 8th to the 12th of June 1869 many arrests were made. The greater number of those arrested were released within twenty-four hours. The *Fête* of Napoleon on the 15th of August, with its customary general amnesty, afforded an opportunity of getting rid of the remainder. Only a few poor wretches, about whom no human being cared, were reserved; and in the autumn processes were instituted against them to demonstrate to the "poor in spirit" that the Imperial Government was really justified in June in stepping in to quell the disturbances.

Of the 293 deputies elected throughout France, about 100, a good third, and more than was at first hoped for, belonged to the various opposition parties. A more important fact was, that the Government had not dared in some places to put forward official candidates, and in others had preferred to disguise them as so-called "independents," who in their election speeches did not hesitate to disown repeatedly and sharply the Imperial Government.

On the 28th of June 1869 the new Corps Legislatif was opened by an address from the Ministerial President Rouher, in which as little as possible was said. The session, which began on the 28th of June, was to be dedicated solely to proving the elections, and to the constitution of the Chambers. Those

deputies who had been returned for two or three districts could only declare which they would represent after the proving the elections had taken place, and therefore the after-elections could not be held until then.

The opposition in the Chambers would not at all acquiesce in the intention of the Government, that the present session should close after the elections were proved, and the "Tiers parti" especially opposed this. This party was the moderate Opposition, who were in favour of the Empire with Parliamentary forms, and its members were mostly they who had come forward in the elections as "independent" candidates, without belonging to the "Irreconcilables." The various sections of the "Tiers parti" held the most varied opinions as to how far the Imperial power should be limited and the influence of Parliament raised. But all were agreed as to the necessity for a constitutional limitation, and a question on this subject to be put to the Government soon found 116 supporters.

The Imperial Government was not at all pleased by this question; and as neither flattery nor threats had any effect upon its supporters, the Emperor determined to meet it by what he deemed to be a heroic expedient.

On the 12th of July 1869 he caused his Minister of State, Rouher, to read a message to the Corps Legislatif, in which he announced the reforms which

he intended to sanction. We cannot here examine more minutely this message. It will suffice to remark that these reforms were altogether illusory. The Emperor expressly stated that his concessions could not in any way affect the prerogatives conferred upon him by the French people through the plebiscite of December 1851, but that he should still maintain these prerogatives in their integrity. The Senate was to examine these Imperial propositions, and a *senatus consultum* was to give them the constitutional sanction. Of their ratification by a plebiscite there was this time no talk.

As this heroic expedient only influenced a very small number of the supporters of the question, the great bulk of them declaring that, after the Imperial message, they were constrained to hold but the more firmly to their intention, the Corps Legislatif was prorogued by an Imperial whim on the 13th of July, although fifty-eight elections still remained unproved. The Senate was summoned to assemble on the 2d of August to pass the proposed changes in the Constitution, and the Ministry at the same time tendered its resignation.

On the morning of the 17th of July the new Ministry was formed. By a decree of the same day the hitherto existing representative Ministry of State (Redeministerium) was abolished; and M. Rouher, who had hitherto filled the office, was appointed President of the Senate, and thus gained a position which

was all the more influential, as it was the Senate which was to deliberate on the proposed modifications of the Constitution.

Five of the old Ministry remained in office—Marshal Niel as Minister of War, Admiral Rigaut de Genouilly as Minister of Marine: and for the Colonies, MM. Forcade de la Roquette, Minister of the Interior; Magne, Minister of Finance; Gressier, for the Public Works. The newly-appointed were MM. Duvergier, Minister of Justice and Culture; Prince Latour d'Auvergne, for Foreign Affairs; Bourbeau, for Public Instruction; Alfred Leroux, for Commerce and Agriculture; the Marquis Chasseloup-Laubat, as President of the Council. Among the newly-nominated Ministers, two—Bourbeau and Leroux—had seats also in the Corps Legislatif. The hitherto existing inability of Ministers to sit as deputies was now formally abolished.

The new Ministry was essentially peaceful. Public opinion had also turned away more and more from the idea of war, and devoted itself to winning internal freedom. At first Paris tried to persuade itself that the Corps Legislatif was only prorogued for a few days, but the intention of the Emperor was very different.

On the 2d of August the Senate assembled to deliberate on the changes in the Constitution which were to be laid before it—changes which were represented by MM. Rouher and Duvergier as being the natural

fruit of the original idea which Napoleon III. had entertained and constantly brooded over since the year 1848 of giving liberty to France, in homœopathic doses certainly, but all the more surely on that account.

The Senate nominated by the Emperor, every member of which had an annual dotation of 30,000 francs, elected a commission, on the 5th of August 1869, to consider the Imperial proposal. The Senate was to have its *consultum* ready by the 15th of August, so that on that day, the *Fête* of Napoleon—which, being also the centenary *Fête* of Napoleon I., was to be celebrated with peculiar solemnity—the new gospel of liberty might be preached to France. But as that day approached, the heaven of the Second Empire gradually darkened on all sides.

The senators worked but slowly during these momentous hours. Marshal Niel, who had laboured bravely and perseveringly under the most difficult conditions on the reorganisation of the army, and who wished that it might be employed as soon as possible against Germany—a wish which we could not share, but can easily understand—fell sick, and by the 8th of August it was admitted that some months at least must elapse before he could be restored to health. On the 13th of August he died. The Emperor himself was seriously unwell, and had to be represented at Chalons by the Prince Imperial, who did not awaken any special sympathy by this

early appearance in public. The Emperor Napoleon is a fatalist, and not indisposed to listen to arithmetical prophets. These had long foretold that the year 1869 would be a fatal one for the Napoleonic dynasty, and this prediction did not ameliorate the state of health of the Emperor.

On the 15th of August, which passed away somewhat sadly in Paris, a great amnesty was proclaimed, which afforded an opportunity of quietly getting rid of the unpleasant affairs of the June *émeutes*. The Empress Eugenie and her son were obliged to represent the Emperor in Ajaccio, where a statue of Napoleon I. was to be unveiled, in celebration of his pretended centenary.

The continued sickness of the Emperor caused a great sensation, not only among the financiers and politicians of France, but among those of the whole of Europe; and thus it came to pass that the death of the Emperor, and what was to follow it, was more discussed than it ever had been before. Perhaps the Imperial Senate itself was the least affected by these considerations: why should not that which had lasted so long still last on till the death of the senators, who were collectively not in the bloom of youth?

On the 1st of September 1869, the Senate proceeded to deliberate in full house on the *consultum* prepared by its commission. Prince Jerome Napoleon, who presumably would one day play the leading part in the council of the regency, took the opportu-

nity to deliver an address, in which he condemned the *senatus consultum* and the whole system of the Imperial policy, and demanded an unconditional return to a Parliamentary government.

On the 6th of September the Senate had finished its deliberations; and on the 8th of September the Emperor could announce from St Cloud the *senatus consultum*, which agreed very closely with his proposition. On the 10th of September he drove, notwithstanding his sickness, along the Boulevards, to show the Parisians that it was not especially urgent for them to trouble themselves with the question of the regency. On the same day, also, Prince Napoleon started on a journey, which he certainly could have postponed without any material damage.

The discontent of the "Moderates" increased from day to day. The moderate oppositionists, the dynastic Parliamentarians, had believed that the Corps Legislatif was only prorogued for a few days, while the new Ministry was being formed. But when, even after the completion of the *senatus consultum* on the 6th of September, there was still no mention of the reassembling of the Corps Legislatif, M. de Keratry proposed that it should reassemble on its own authority on the 26th of October, supporting itself on the existing constitution by not regarding as a session the sitting which commenced on the 28th of June, and in which the proving even of the elections was not

completed. This proposition was at first received with much applause; but as time went by, more and more of the Opposition became apostates to it, especially after the Government, by a decree of the 2d of October, summoned both the Senate and Corps Legislatif to assemble on the 29th of November, for a session which was to be regarded as extraordinary until the proving the elections was finished, and should then become an ordinary one.

Nevertheless the Government took military measures of precaution on a large scale for the 26th of October. But the day passed quietly away. The Left throughout all this time behaved very badly. Devoted to pleasure, they availed themselves of every pretext not to appear at their posts. The 21st and 22d of November were fixed for the elections of the Corps Legislatif. Of the four which had to take place in Paris, after Gambetta, Bancel, Picard, and Julius Simon had declared their intention to sit for the departments, three took place on the 22d of November. Rochefort, the personal enemy of the dynasty, Crémieux, and Emmanuel Arago were elected. For the 4th Paris District, the old Glais Bizoin was elected on the 6th and 7th of December 1869 a Parliamentarian, but as bitter a foe to Napoleon III. as Rochefort. These elections also took place quietly. The speech from the throne, with which Napoleon III. opened the Senate and the Corps

Legislatif on the 29th November, was defeated, notwithstanding the admixture of several haughty and high-toned phrases.

The Emperor had entirely lost faith in the majority of the Corps Legislatif; and how absolutely insignificant his Ministry of the 17th July was, he knew better than any one else. The Empress Eugenie was not present at the opening of the Chambers—she was upon her journey to the inauguration of the Suez Canal; and the Emperor was in a better situation to follow the instincts of his reason than he had ever been before. He recognised, now that he was not incessantly tormented by the warlike Court party, that his interests demanded a yielding in the direction of liberty. The storm was lulled for the moment, but there was no doubt that it would rise again after the final completion of the proving of the elections.

Under these circumstances, the Emperor took counsel with himself, and thought it good, as the sole irresponsible Cæsar of France, to give to her, by his own free will, that Parliamentary Constitution which she demanded from him. But with this he wished to remain, as far as might be possible, the elected democratic Cæsar of France. On the 27th of December, after he had caused the old one to tender its resignation, he commanded M. Emil Ollivier to form a new Parliamentary Ministry. We must now introduce Emil Ollivier, the man who has exercised such a disastrous influence over the affairs of France, in order

to do justice to him and to the nation on which he has wrought such great injuries.

Emil Ollivier, son of the old Republican Demosthenes Ollivier, was born at Marseilles on the 2d of July 1825. In 1847 he commenced his career as advocate in Paris. In the following year the Revolution broke out, which overthrew Louis Philippe, and the young Emil Ollivier was sent by Ledru Rollin, a friend of his father, as Commissioner-General to the department of the Rhone. Not only has Emil Ollivier himself spoken well of his activity in this position, but also his flatterers, when he was in power, could not sufficiently praise it. But long before it was ever thought that he would be a Minister of Napoleon III., we heard from impartial observers of those times that Ollivier, owing to his youth and to his inordinate vanity, only wrought harm in his office. Cavaignac speedily recalled the prematurely-forced young hero from his dangerous post, and transplanted him to be Prefect in the more tranquil department of the Upper Marne.

With the election of Napoleon to the Presidency of the Republic, the administrative life of Ollivier closed suddenly, and he returned to his career of advocate. In this he gained himself a name, and justly so. He had true instincts of liberty, and as long as he allowed these to reign unchecked, possessed great influence. In consequence of these, he was elected in the year 1857 deputy for the third district

of the department of the Seine. He belonged to the small group of the "Five" who then alone among the mass of the Mamelucks of the Second Empire represented the opposition, and was the most brilliant orator among them, being still filled with the enthusiasm of youth and of liberty, which had departed from the older members of the group, who had more or less lapsed into advocates. Nevertheless it was even then noticed that Ollivier was not untainted with the desire to be pleasing to the majority. Popular applause was so pleasant to him that he showed himself ever more and more "moderate." After he had been re-elected in the year 1863, this tendency towards the "Right" became ever greater and greater. He had so talked and argued on "moderation," that he became now in reality inwardly persuaded of its justice, and in the session from 1866 to 1867 he separated himself entirely from the "Left." At this time his personal relationship with Napoleon commenced. After the letter of the Emperor on the 9th of January 1867, Ollivier openly supported the Empire. He believed, in the high opinion which he had of himself, that he could parliamentarise Imperialism. From this time forward, it was reported at every Ministerial crisis, either that he would be a member of the new Ministry, or that he himself would undertake its formation. But for a time it was so in report only. Although Ollivier had declared his separation from the Left, the odour of his former ideas of free-

dom still clung to him, and the man was regarded with suspicion by the Mamelucks of the Right, by the Court party, and by M. Rouher. They would willingly have employed him as their instrument, but they were unwilling to concede to him any influence upon the fate of the Empire.

In March 1869, Ollivier attempted in his pamphlet 'The 19th of January' to justify himself before the democracy of France, and to pave the way for his re-election in Paris. But he was not returned for Paris. Stigmatised everywhere as a traitor, he polled only 12,848 votes, while 22,848 were recorded for his opponent Bancel. On the other hand, Ollivier was returned for the department of the Bar. But he was not contented with this, and his discontent drove him into still closer connection with the Imperial surroundings. Upon the letter of the Emperor, dated 27th of December 1869, he undertook the formation of a new Ministry. In other matters besides police affairs, this is true, "cherchez la femme." Ollivier had, whilst still a young man, married the daughter of the pianist, and later Abbé Liszt, and of the Countess d'Agoult (Daniel Stern). Noble motives cannot be denied to Ollivier; but his wife, who, however, died in 1862, exercised, together with her kindred, a very pernicious influence upon him. In September 1869 he married the daughter of a rich merchant of Marseilles. In the year 1865 he received an appointment as Commissioner of the Viceroy (or Khedive)

of Egypt in the Suez Canal undertaking, with a salary of 30,000 francs, and for this he gave up his practice as advocate in Paris.

Ollivier had some difficulty in getting together his new Ministry, which was to be a Parliamentary one, as he was regarded with suspicion both by the Right and by the Left. But he succeeded finally, and by the 2d of January 1870 it was formed. It consisted of,—

M. Ollivier, Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice and of Culture;

Count Napoleon Daru, for Foreign Affairs;

Chevandier de Valdrôme, for the Interior;

Buffet, for Finance;

Lebœuf, for War;

Rigault de Genouilly, for the Marine and the Colonies;

Segris, for Public Instruction;

Marquis of Talhouët, for Public Works;

Louvet, for Agriculture and Commerce;

Marshal Vaillant, Minister of the Imperial Household;

Moritz Richard, for the Fine Arts;

De Parieu, President of the Council.

In this new Ministry, MM. Ollivier, Daru, Chevandier de Valdrôme, Buffet, Segris, Talhouët, Louvet, and Richard, belonged to the Corps Legislatif.

Count Daru, born in 1807, left the Polytechnic School in the year 1828, served with distinction as

an artillery officer, and attached himself with his whole heart to the cause of the house of Orleans. He accepted the Republic; but after Napoleon's *coup d'état* in December 1851, in which he did not escape arrest, he retired into private life, and only accepted a seat in the Corps Legislatif in 1869.

Chevandier de Valdrôme entered the Corps Legislatif in 1859, elected for the department of the Meurthe, as a Government candidate; afterwards he sat constantly, and always as a supporter of the Government.

Buffet, born 1818, advocate, man of order, decided opponent of socialism, was first elected as a representative of the people in 1848, was a Minister of the President Louis Napoleon, but separated from him when he was preparing the *coup d'état*, and for a long time took no part in public affairs. In 1864 he was again elected for the Corps Legislatif, and was there one of the chief representatives of the dynastic opposition, which demanded the Empire with Parliamentary institutions. He was very active in the question of the 116.

Segris, born 1811, advocate, was returned for the Corps Legislatif in 1859, where he belonged to the same party as Buffet.

The Marquis of Talhouët Roy, born 1819, is one of the three or four largest landed proprietors in France. A deputy since 1849, he protested in 1859 against the *coup d'état*, was imprisoned for several days,

but was nevertheless elected again in 1852, and without any protest from the Government. In 1869 he came forward at the elections as a member of the Liberal Opposition, and when the Chamber was granted the right to nominate its own bureau, he was elected Vice-President.

Louvet, born 1806, banker, was returned in 1848 as representative of the people. He was a constant supporter of the policy of Napoleon, both before and after the foundation of the Empire. Nevertheless he also was one of those who signed the question of the 116.

Maurice Richard, born 1832, son of a rich commercial agent, advocate, was first returned for the Corps Legislatif in 1863. He was a constant adherent to the policy of Ollivier, who in 1870 created for him the useless Ministry of the Fine Arts.

The declared object of Ollivier's Ministry was to ally the Empire to Parliamentary institutions, and to lead France to political freedom. At first little progress in that direction was apparent. Nothing was brought forward but a few well-meant but insignificant reforms in the administration of justice. At the very onset of its career, an event occurred which was unfortunate for the Ministry. Prince Pierre Napoleon shot in his own house the young journalist Victor Noir (properly Iwan Salmon). The radical press at once made capital of this event against the dynasty which it was the task of Ollivier's Ministry to re-establish.

The deputy Rochefort was particularly violent on the matter in the 'Marseillaise,' a paper newly established by him; and besides this, very tumultuous scenes took place on the occasion of the burial of Victor Noir.

Ollivier judged it expedient to display great energy on this occasion, in order to gain respect for himself among his adversaries about the Emperor, the most important and clever of whom was M. Rouher. He caused Prince Pierre to be arrested, and a process to be instituted against him before the State Court, which assembled at Tours. The trial ended in the acquittal of the Prince. With the deputy M. Rochefort it fared differently. Ollivier demanded from the Chamber the assent to his legal prosecution, which was gladly given by the majority, as the "Red disturbance-monger" was very distasteful to them.

Rochefort was condemned to six months' imprisonment, and to a fine of 3000 francs, and Ollivier did not delay to carry out the sentence. On the 7th of February 1870, Rochefort was arrested and incarcerated in St Pelagie. The comparison of the proceedings against Prince Pierre on the one hand, and against Rochefort on the other, created much bad feeling in Paris.

By the end of March 1870 the Ministry was unanimous as to the changes of the Constitution which seemed to be necessary, and it only remained to decide upon the form in which they should be sanc-

tioned and promulgated. The genuine Parliamentarians demanded that they should be laid before the Senate and Corps Legislatif for consideration, and that they should be proclaimed by the Government in the form in which they remained after the debate. The Imperialists—at whose head was M. Rouher—held a very different opinion, and it was they who, now as formerly, exercised the greatest influence over the Emperor. The opinion of these men—and women—was, that the project for the alteration of the Constitution should be constitutionally treated. The project, according to the existing laws, must be first laid before the Senate, and its acceptance then decided by a plebiscite. For the rest, whatever legislative rights the Emperor might cede to the Chambers, he must still reserve to himself the right to appeal to a plebiscite.

This view was pleasant to the Emperor. To M. Emil Ollivier it could not be acceptable, for he had often, in former time, both in his speeches and in his writings, pronounced against this plebiscite business. Yet he yielded to the wish of his opponents, who daily represented to him that he must first give proof by acts of his adherence to the Empire before the same could be believed in, and that up to the present he had not done this in the required degree. When Ollivier yielded, all—friends as well as foes—declared that he did so in order to keep at any price his post of Minister. We think otherwise. M. Ollivier is

suffering, he is afflicted with macromania, and as he, moreover, is imbued with the tendency of all advocates to believe that everything can be effected by dialectic dexterity, he was therefore persuaded that, even allowing the admission of the plebiscite, Cæsarism could be stifled in Parliamentarianism.

Not so lightly did some of the colleagues of M. Ollivier treat the matter. Count Daru and M. Buffet declared that they could in no case assent to the principle of the plebiscite, and signified their intention of resigning office if it was to be really recognised in the new Constitution. Talhouët was of the same opinion. Still he determined to remain in office until after the plebiscite, in order not to prematurely embarrass the Ministry.

On the 13th of April the Corps Legislatif was adjourned until after the plebiscite, so that no hindrance to the latter might arise. On the 14th of April the debate in the Senate commenced, its commission having constructed out of the changes proposed by the Ministry an entirely new and connected Constitution. On the 25th of April the 'Journal Officiel' announced the retirement, which had in reality long before taken place, of MM. Daru and Buffet from the Ministry. Their places were for the present now filled up. M. Ollivier undertook the Foreign Affairs, Segris the Finance, and Maurice Richard the Public Instruction, in addition to the heavy burden of the Fine Arts.

On the 23d of April the decree for the plebiscite

appeared. The 8th of May was named as the day on which it should take place, and, as had happened prior to the elections for the Corps Legislatif, so now again political meetings began to be convened. The entire independent press being unable to prevent the plebiscite, counselled men now either to abstain from voting, or to vote "No."

What was expected from the plebiscite? In the elections of 1869 the official candidates had only been returned by a very small majority. But then they were many in number, while now there was only one, the Emperor himself; and he certainly, for reasons easily recognisable, was not unbeloved by the country people. How could an uneducated rural population, whom the Government could not even trust to elect its own members for the Corps Legislatif without its guardianship, vote conscientiously with a "Yes" or a "No" upon a Constitution of forty-five articles? The vote was really demanded for or against the Emperor, and every impartial observer must see that the majority would be in favour of Napoleon.

The antagonists of Cæsarism could only strive to prevent the majority being too overwhelming, that the Empire might not by it be encouraged to commit fresh follies. The quiet, moderate, and sensible oppositionists attempted this only, and nothing more, but a good deal depended upon how much official influence might be brought to bear upon the sovereign people.

Ollivier had formerly pronounced very strongly against the official candidates, and against every official influence upon the voting, which, with the existing incredible centralisation of the administration in France, must necessarily exercise an enormous power. Condemned by his present fatal situation to do the exact reverse of all that he had formerly acknowledged as good and just, Ollivier now laboured assiduously for the plebiscite. The Ministry of the Interior now pressed the prefects more urgently than ever the Imperial, bureaucratic Forcade had done, to work with a "consuming" activity to insure a great majority of the "*Yes.*"

But in spite of all this the Emperor and his surroundings were not tranquil. The official newspapers explained from day to day that the vote on this occasion would virtually determine the question of peace or war. If a great majority voted "Yes," then peace would be assured; if the contrary took place, then the Empire must bethink itself of, and apply, other means to re-establish itself anew—as, for example, a war to gain the Rhine. This argument had an extraordinary effect, the best proof how much the whole of France in those days wished for peace.

The independent press called attention to the fact that the reverse of this was really the truth. A great majority for the new Constitution would give to Cæsarism new power to undertake other expeditions like the Mexican. A modest majority only would

render it also more modest, and dispose it to think seriously of the promised development of the Constitution, and would compel it to press this on.

By a dispensation of Providence and of the Prefect of Police, Pietri, a plot and an attempt to assassinate were discovered. On the 29th of April a certain Beaury, a dissolute man, a deserter from the French army, who had just returned from Belgium, was arrested and charged with intending to shoot the Emperor. As this did not appear sufficient, a plot was added to it, which had for its object the overturning of the whole French Constitution. On the 5th of May—that is, two days before the plebiscite, and at a time when popular meetings for discussion were no longer allowed—a report of the Procurator-General, Grandperret, to Ollivier, together with the decision of Ollivier and of the Emperor, was published, —a writing which well deserves to be distinguished as the most audacious deed of its kind that ever saw the light. The attempt, the plot, all possible things were mixed up in it; the testimony of police spies was mingled with a few scanty facts, and the international trades-union, were dragged into the plot in an unheard-of manner: in short, decency and common-sense were most shamefully outraged by the production of this work.

But nevertheless, or perhaps even on that account, the *coup* worked. The voting on the forty-five paragraphs of the new Constitution was thrust into the

background, and the question for the mass of the people was thus put, Would they on the 8th of May vote for Napoleon III., or for the deserter Beaury? who, it was pretended, had attempted to shoot him. They voted for Napoleon III. against the deserter Beaury.

But a few black clouds somewhat darkened this sereneness of the heaven. Paris, and nearly all the large towns, had refused to give the Emperor a majority; a good sixth of the army, which had been allowed to vote this time, in special military *comitias*, had voted "No," or against the Emperor; and on the occasion of the plebiscite in the army, scenes had arisen in the barracks which were not compatible with the ordinary notions of military discipline. Still the Empire had gathered together an overwhelming majority, larger than the greatest pessimists could have expected after the elections of 1869.

The fear entertained by the Liberal papers that a great majority of "Yeses" on the day of the plebiscite would signify war was not unfounded. Even before the plebiscite there had been much talk—in secret, certainly—of sending the Duke of Persigny on a mission to Berlin. He was there to demand the performance of the terms of the Treaty of Prague of 1866, and to behave with an audacity which might compel Prussia to declare war. After the plebiscite this affair lapsed for the time being, thanks before all to the Emperor, who must, in order that justice

may be done, be separated from the Court-party. He knew Germany better than it was generally known in France; and however willing he may have been to undertake a victorious war to establish anew his dynasty, still, up to the last hour he remained very doubtful of the capability of the French to conquer unconditionally the Germans.

After the plebiscite, the Ministry, which had been mutilated by the resignation of Daru, of Buffet, and of Talhouët, was recruited by the appointment of the Duke of Grammont to be Minister of Foreign Affairs; of the Deputy Mége to be Minister of Public Instruction; of the Deputy Plichon to be Minister of Public Works. It is remarkable that on the same day the management of the Studs was separated from the Ministry of the Fine Arts, and placed under the protection of the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. The addition which, in exchange, was made to the Ministry of the Fine Arts is also remarkable. Henceforth it was to have the title of Ministry of the Sciences and Fine Arts; and to it were apportioned, instead of to the Ministry of Public Instruction, the Imperial Institute of France, the Imperial Academy of Medicine, the service of the libraries in Paris and in the departments, the service of the learned societies, their journals, and all matters connected with them.

Of the newly-appointed Ministers the Duke of Grammont occupies the chief place, owing to the short, but, for France, terrible part which he was

destined to play in her history. The Duke Anton Agenor Alfred of Grammont, Prince of Bidache, was born on the 14th of August 1819. His education was thoroughly Legitimist, and by it he became much attached to Henry V., the Count of Chambord. In the year 1837 he entered the Polytechnic School, and from this, as sub-lieutenant, the *école d'application* of the general staff, but quitted it in 1840 to retire to his estates. He was drawn forth from this retirement by clerical influence, after the *coup d'état* of 1851, and followed henceforth in his diplomatic career, for which he had in no way prepared himself, the star of Napoleon. He was in succession ambassador at Cassel, Stuttgard, Turin, Rome, and Vienna. During this diplomatic life he had on two occasions the opportunity of proving his worth—at Rome in 1860, and at Vienna in 1866. On both of these he knew utterly nothing of what was happening, and like ignorance was to be for a third time manifested in a most terrible manner in 1870. The flatterers of the Duke boasted, when he entered this Ministry, of his corporeal strength: he could crush a Napoleon between his fingers. Of his intellectual ability, even, they refrained from speaking; and anxious people, friends of peace, were fearful, even on the 15th of May, that the mental strength of the Duke of Grammont would perhaps suffice to crush the Empire: besides this, many people believed that an alliance between Austria and France had been concluded.

M. Mége, advocate, friend of M. Rouher, born 1817, was first returned to the Corps Legislatif in 1863. He belonged to the Cæsarian Right, but nevertheless was one of those who, in July 1869, signed the question of the 116—a proof how even the most extreme Cæsarians despaired of upholding absolute Cæsarianism.

M. Plichon, born 1814, was deputy under the Kingdom of July. He is advocate, churchman, and protectionist, after the manner of M. Pouyer-Quertier. In the year 1857 he was elected, by a great majority, as an Opposition candidate for the department of the North; but in spite of all this he also undersigned the question of the 116.

Viewing all this, it must be said that by these three nominations Ollivier's Ministry received a large addition of the clerical-Cæsarian element. If M. Ollivier had resigned before the *plébiscite*, or even in view of these appointments, much could have been forgiven him. He would then have been justified in saying, "I believed that liberty and the Empire were compatible; in this belief I have submitted to much. I am now convinced that I deceived myself, and I lay down my Ministerial portfolio and paper-knife on the altar of my country!"

Emil Ollivier remained in office. Having thus related the political history of France up to this point, we will now turn to the history of her army from 1866 to 1870.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF THE FRENCH ARMY FROM 1866 TO 1870.

EVEN in the ordinary course of events, every army, however well organised, requires constant labour to be expended on it; for men and materials wear out, and must be replaced and kept in good order for real work.

Great political changes at home and abroad, new discoveries and inventions, increase and multiply this work. The *personnel* of the army must be recast in the form which has been proved to be the better; the existing *matériel* must be in part altogether laid aside, in part supplemented by other of a newer kind. Men talk, then, of a reorganisation, of a rearmament and a re-equipment of the army. These may be carried out without the State which undertakes them expecting or wishing for a war. No army of the present day, it matters not how much money may be expended upon it during long years of peace, can enter upon a campaign without *special* preparation. Each one requires special work to render it fit for war and to mobilise it, a work which, according as the organisation has been more or less thorough,

will require a less or greater time to complete, but which, under any circumstances, must extend over some weeks. The work of mobilisation and the work of reorganisation are easily distinguished from one another by experienced men, but just as easily are they confounded by the inexperienced.

In times of excitement this confusion occurs the more readily, as the work of reorganisation often assumes the appearance of a work of mobilisation. As early as the autumn of 1866, the reorganisation of the French army was commenced, and after Marshal Niel undertook the War Ministry, it was most assiduously carried on. During the Luxemburg affair the works of reorganisation and mobilisation became so intermixed that it was difficult to distinguish the one from the other.

In the state in which it was left by the reductions of November 1865—or, more truly, in the state in which those reductions should have left it, the infantry of the French army was composed, as before, of guard and line infantry.

The infantry of the Guard consisted of,—

1 regiment of Gendarmes.
3 regiments of Grenadiers.
4 regiments of Voltigeurs.
1 regiment of Zouaves.
1 battalion of Rifles.

After the reductions of 1865, the regiment of gendarmes of the Guard had two battalions of 6

companies, each company having 3 officers and 83 men. Each regiment of Voltigeurs and of Grenadiers had three battalions of 7 companies of 3 officers and 92 men each. The regiment of Zouaves retained its two battalions of 7 companies with the same establishment, the battalion of Rifles 10 companies of 3 officers and 79 men each.

The gendarmes of the Guard had never been counted as field troops.* Only in the regulations did they exist as such. Besides this, the numbers of the infantry of the Guard were never completed. We give a high estimate if we allow that it could send 15,000 men to the army. In 1866 the infantry of the line consisted of,—

100 regiments of Infantry of the Line.
20 battalions of Rifles.
3 regiments of Zouaves.
3 regiments of Algerian Skirmishers (Turcos).
1 Foreign Regiment.
3 battalions of African Light Infantry.
7 Discipline Companies.
2 Veteran Companies.
1 battalion of Sapeurs (Pompiers), and
1 regiment of the Municipal Guard of Paris.

The mass of the infantry consisted of the 100 regiments of the line. After the autumn of 1866 the Government was mostly occupied with these.

* 1869. The regiment of the gendarmes of the Guard was completely abolished.

Before the reduction of 1865, every line regiment of infantry consisted of twenty-four companies, which formed three peace battalions of eight companies each. Of the eight companies of a peace battalion, the first was a Grenadier company on the right of the battalion; the second, composed of the *élite* of the small men of the battalion, was called the Voltigeur company, and was on the left; the remaining six were the 1-6 Fusilier or centre companies. On mobilisation, the fifth and sixth centre companies were separated from their battalion, and these separated companies from the three peace battalions formed together the depot battalion of the regiment. The regiment then consisted of three field battalions, of one Grenadier, one Voltigeur, and four centre or Fusilier companies each; and of one depot battalion of six Fusilier companies, who were to garrison the fortresses, train the reserves, and perform other similar services. Through the reduction of 1865, the fifth and sixth centre companies of the third peace battalion of every regiment were abolished; the regiment, therefore, retained twenty-two instead of twenty-four companies.

When Marshal Niel commenced his work of reform, he proposed, by the decree of the 27th of February 1867, to place all the regiments upon a footing of two active battalions of eight companies each, and one depot battalion of six companies. Only the active battalions were to retain their *élite* companies of Grenadiers and Voltigeurs. On a war footing the

regiment was to be brought up to a strength of three field battalions of seven companies and a depot battalion of six companies—that is, to a total of twenty-seven companies. Only the first two battalions of a regiment were then to have *élite* companies. At the same time the companies were to be strengthened, and by that means the battalions brought up to about the Prussian strength of 1000 men each.

As a matter of fact, this increase of the battalions could not at once be effected on the French system of service. During the Luxemburg question, therefore, Marshal Niel simply fell back upon the old organisation as it had existed previous to the reductions of November 1865. By a decree of the 4th of April 1867, the two companies which had been reduced in each regiment were re-established.

By a decree of the 22d of January 1868, the *élite* companies were entirely abolished, and their soldiers distributed equally as soldiers of the first class among all the companies of the field battalions. This measure had always been intended by Marshal Niel; but it met with very great opposition, and even, after its execution, was violently blamed, although it was undoubtedly well-timed, as it put an end to the deterioration of the *personnel* of the central companies. The regiment consisted now of three peace battalions, each of eight equally-formed companies. On a war footing each battalion gave up its seventh and eighth companies to form a depot battalion, so that then

each of the three field battalions retained six companies.

The whole of the infantry of the line received the red epaulettes, which had formerly distinguished the Grenadiers, and, at the same time, a long instead of a short tunic. The war strength of each company of the line was fixed at 3 officers and 112 men. On being mobilised, therefore, a battalion would number, without officers, 672 men. The field battalions of the 100 line regiments consequently gave a total of 201,600 men—the depot battalions, 67,200 men.

A battalion of Rifles had, on a war footing, six field and two depot companies. The field battalions gave a strength of 13,440 men—the depot divisions, 4480 men.

Each of the three Zouave regiments had twenty-seven companies, in three field battalions of seven companies each, and a depot battalion of six companies. The three regiments placed in the field 5985 men, with 1710 at the depot.

Each regiment of Turcos, or Algerian skirmishers, had, before the reduction, twenty-one companies; but, while the European troops were being reduced, each regiment of Turcos was increased to twenty-eight companies, so that it might be possible to use the native Algerian population in a more elastic manner than formerly to recruit the army. Each regiment of Turcos, therefore, consisted of four field battalions of six companies, and of one depot battalion of four

companies; and the three regiments could place in the field 7660 men, having 1260 men at their depots.

The Foreign Regiment had been increased during the Mexican war to eight battalions, two of which were depot battalions. During the war it suffered severely; and afterwards it was, by a decree of the 4th of April 1867, reduced to four battalions, including one depot battalion. The Foreign Regiment, therefore, now stood on the same footing as an ordinary line regiment, with 2016 men for the field, and 672 men for its depot. The Discipline troops, the Veterans, the Paris Sapeurs (Pompiers), and the Municipal Guard of Paris, we may leave out of our reckoning.

It follows, then, that the collective French infantry could muster on its normal war footing 247,381 men for the field, and 75,592 men for the depots—a total of 322,973 combatants.

With a view to rearming the infantry, orders for Chassepot rifles were given in and after 1866, not only in France itself, but also in foreign countries. In 1868 the making of these rifles was brought to such a pitch, that the French gun manufactories of St Etienne, Tulle, Chatellerault, and Mutzig could together turn out daily 1600 Chassepots, besides 500 rifles *à tabatière*. As long as Marshal Niel lived, the manufacture of arms was carried on very diligently; but after General Lebœuf became Minister of War in

1869, this activity was for reasons of economy much diminished. In the beginning very different opinions were held of the value of the Chassepot rifle, and even among the French officers there were many who condemned it; but after 1869 it was universally allowed to be a most perfect arm, and regarded as a weapon decidedly superior to the Prussian needle-gun. It was originally intended to give to the Rifles the large-calibre *tabatière* rifle; but this design was soon abandoned, and they too received the Chassepot, so that their armament and that of the line infantry were now uniform.

As eleven rounds per minute can be fired with the Chassepot, the French officers were much troubled by the fear that their soldiers, possessing an excitable temperament, would very soon expend their ammunition, unless they were provided with a large number of cartridges. This anxiety was, in truth, by no means unfounded. To every man, therefore, ninety cartridges in ten packets were now given; and, in addition, small two-wheeled double-draught ammunition-carts were introduced, which were to follow closely one or two battalions. One such cart carried about 11,000 Chassepot cartridges in ten cases, which stood upright side by side, and each of which could be easily taken out. Further, it was sought to lessen the tendency to a too rapid firing by instruction in target-practice; but here, in practice, many of the higher officers deviated greatly from the principles

which in theory they acknowledged to be good and correct.

The French cavalry had been for a long time divided into three classes:—

Heavy or Reserve Cavalry—Cuirassiers and Carbineers;

Line or Medium Cavalry—Dragoons and Lancers;

Light Cavalry—Mounted Rifles, Hussars, Guides, and Spahis.

By the reductions of November 1865, which affected the cavalry very considerably, the cavalry of the Guard was placed on the following footing:—

Heavy Cavalry—1 regiment of Cuirassiers, 1 regiment of Carbineers;

Line Cavalry—1 regiment of Dragoons, 1 regiment of Lancers;

Light Cavalry—1 regiment of Mounted Rifles, 1 regiment of Guides.

In addition to these 6 regiments, there was also 1 squadron of Cent Gardes, which was a purely state troop; and 1 squadron of gendarmes of the Guard, who were also not intended to act as field troops.

Each of the 6 above-mentioned regiments had 4 field squadrons, but only the 2 regiments of Light Cavalry retained their 2 depot squadrons, while the depots of the 4 regiments of Heavy and Line Cavalry were reduced to 1 squadron. But on the 6th of February 1867, these curtailed regiments also received back their second depot squadron.

The remaining cavalry was placed by the reduction of 1865 on this footing:—

Heavy Cavalry—10 regiments of Cuirassiers;

Line Cavalry—12 regiments of Dragoons, 8 regiments of Lancers;

Light Cavalry—12 regiments of Mounted Rifles, 8 regiments of Hussars, 3 regiments of African Rifles, 3 regiments of Spahis.

In addition to the 4 field squadrons, each regiment of light cavalry retained its 2 depot squadrons, while the depots of the heavy and line cavalry were reduced to 1 squadron. Up to 1870 no essential change was made in this footing, except that, by a decree of the 6th of February 1867, a fourth regiment of African Rifles was formed. Accordingly, France had, including the Guard, 63 regiments of cavalry. A field squadron consisted of (excepting in the case of the Guard, Spahis, and African Rifles) 7 officers, 164 men, and 150 horses. The whole cavalry, then—the Guards, Spahis, and African Rifles included—gave a total number of 38,675 horses and sabres in the field squadrons, and of 15,687 in the depot squadrons.

Such a strength on paper is by no means inconsiderable, but in case of war very important deductions must be made from it. Various circumstances had in bygone days greatly lowered the breed of horses in France, and the Empire was unable, in spite of many well-designed endeavours, to remedy the evil at once.

In the Crimea, and in Italy in 1859, the cavalry regiments rarely mustered more than 400 horses. The neglect which followed, and the Mexican expedition, made the gaps still larger. In the year 1866, the 4 field squadrons of a regiment could hardly parade with more than 350 horses. From the autumn of 1866 these gaps were to be filled up. In August large purchases of horses were ordered, but as these did not give the desired results, the bands of the mounted arms—cavalry and artillery—which until then had been extraordinarily strong, were, during the Luxemburg question, by a decree of the 4th of April 1867, reduced to the necessary number of trumpeters, so that their horses might be available to mount the real combatants. As a matter of fact, the number of bandsmen in most regiments remained the same, but the musicians, now disallowed by the regulations, figured in the returns as simple troopers. At the same time the attempt was made to employ in part the horses of the heavy cavalry in the batteries of the artillery, while the place of the losses thus taken away was supplied by those of the mounted gendarmes. Wholesale buying up of draught and cavalry horses was commenced in August 1866; 23,500,000 francs were entered in the estimates for this purpose in the extraordinary budget of 1867, and during the Luxemburg question large remount-markets were instituted in all the departments of France. Purchases were made in great haste, and consequently

horses which were of very indifferent quality were frequently bought at exorbitant prices.

Meanwhile commissions were also given to buy in Hungary. The horses purchased there passed through Austria and Northern Italy towards the end of June, and the transport lasted until far into December of 1867, spite of the serious breach which was said to exist at that time between Italy and France. Moreover, both saddle and draught horses were bought up in England, in Ireland, in Holland, and in Germany. Finally, Algeria also was brought in as a source for obtaining remounts. The Barbary horses for the service are all stallions. These were already employed in all mounted troops specially instituted for service in Algeria, in the Spahis, and African Mounted Rifles, and now they began to be used as remounts for other regiments of light cavalry, for Mounted Rifles and Hussars. The prevailing scarcity of fodder in Africa had lowered the market, so that they could be obtained at a very cheap rate. The Barbary horses have great endurance, are affected neither by heat nor cold, contented with any forage, and but little liable to sickness; but they could only be employed for light cavalry, and as they are all stallions, could not be placed in one and the same regiment—scarcely in one and the same brigade—with European horses. Moreover, they necessarily make much noise; and this, though it may be unimportant in cavalry which has to work in the great deserts of Africa, would be very

detrimental to the utility of light horsemen who are to operate in the cultivated ground of Europe—who have to observe the enemy in their immediate vicinity, and at times surprise them unawares. The Hungarian horses, on the whole, did not please the officers of the French cavalry, and it was difficult to accustom them to French forage; they proved troublesome to groom, and easily fell sick. In 1869 only one Hussar regiment was completely mounted with them. In the greatest repute for the light cavalry were the horses of Tarbes (Pyrenees), of Arabic extraction, light, elegant, but spoilt by injudicious crossing with English blood in the reign of Louis Philippe—a deterioration which Napoleon III. strove to remedy. The horses of Brittany also, although less elegant and enduring than the Pyrenean, were also much valued for light cavalry and horse-artillery. The most mixed were the horses of the medium cavalry, drawn from the whole of France, and supplemented by remounts from Holland, England, and Germany. The heavy cavalry also were mounted to a great extent on horses from foreign countries, and from Normandy. As draught-animals for the artillery and trains, the horses of the Ardennes, of Normandy, of Brittany, and of Faverney, were in greatest request.

In the hasty purchases of 1866 and 1867 many very bad horses were bought, and in the calm which succeeded the peaceful settlement of the Luxemburg question, most of these were again got rid of; so that

the increase of horses in the French cavalry was by no means so great as it was supposed to be abroad. The total number of horses added to the French army, draught included, between August 1866 and the end of the year 1867, cannot be computed at more than 36,000; and this, allowing for the waste caused by wear and tear, which had to be made good, only enabled a regiment to take the field with its four squadrons of 500 horses complete, while the number of serviceable horses at the depots remained far below the prescribed strength. The sixty-three regiments of cavalry which altogether enter into the calculation, could, in 1869 and 1870, place about 31,500 horses in the field, leaving 12,000 at the depots, of which, at the most, the half only were serviceable, while of the other half part would never be forthcoming, part only in the course of the following year.*

In order to have a sufficient number of draught-horses ready at hand without increasing the estimates excessively, the arrangement has been for some time in force of lending out to farmers the serviceable draught-horses which became superfluous on a demobilisation. By an instruction of the 3d of July 1870 this plan was rearranged. Only draught-horses of over five years of age were to be thus lent to agri-

* In the year 1870 the regiments of the heavy and line cavalry, and of the African Rifles, were mobilised with four field squadrons; the other light cavalry regiments with five field squadrons; but each squadron had only 6 officers, 120 men, and 105 troop-horses.

culture, and they were never to pass into the property of the person to whom they were lent. If a horse became unserviceable, it was to be sold on account of the military exchequer. The supervision of the lent-out horses was intrusted generally to the remount depots; and fourteen days after the issue of the requisition, those to whom horses were lent were bound to deliver them up without fail to the several detachments of troops.

All horsemen carried as their weapon a sword. The Cuirassiers had, in addition, pistols; the Lancers, lances and pistols; the Dragoons, Mounted Rifles, and Hussars, carbines. The pistols carried formerly by the last three description of horsemen were abolished by a decree of the 14th of May 1867. The carbine introduced in 1870 was a rifle on the Chassepot system, shorter than that of the infantry, and with a lever bent down to the right with which to open and shut the chamber.

The artillery was considerably reduced in 1865. After the reductions, it consisted of the artillery of the Guard, of 1 regiment of field artillery of 6 batteries, 1 regiment of horse-artillery of 6 batteries, 1 squadron of artillery-train of 2 companies, and of the artillery of the line of 5 regiments (Nos. 1-5) of foot-artillery—*i.e.*, of garrison and siege artillery of 12 companies; 1 regiment of pontoniers (No. 6) of 12 companies, 10 regiments of field artillery (Nos. 7-16) of 9 batteries; 4 regiments of horse-artillery (Nos. 17-

20) of 7 batteries, and 6 squadrons of artillery-train of 4 companies. Shortly after the reduction had been completed, 2 batteries of each regiment of foot-artillery were equipped as field artillery—in all, 10 batteries. During the Luxemburg crisis, a new battery was added to each of the 14 field and horse artillery regiments, and at the same time 5 instead of 2 batteries from each regiment of foot-artillery were converted into field artillery.

Finally, on the 13th of May 1867, an entirely new organisation of the artillery was instituted, and it was arranged as follows:—

Guard.—1 regiment (field) of 6 batteries.
2 regiments (horse) of 6 batteries.
1 squadron of train of 2 companies.

Line.—1st to 15th regiments, each of 8 field and 4 foot batteries.
16th regiment, pontoniers, with 14 companies.
17th to 20th regiments, each of 8 batteries of horse-artillery.
2 regiments of artillery-train, at first of 12, afterwards of 16 companies.

By this organisation of 1867, a total of 164 batteries was established, of which 38 were horse-artillery.

After the mitrailleuse (25-barrelled) had been adopted as an arm that must be intrusted to the artillery, these 164 batteries, each of 6 guns, were thus distributed:—

38 horse-artillery batteries with rifled 4-pounders (*pièce de quatre*).

72 field batteries with rifled 4-pounders.

24 mitrailleuse batteries.

30 reserve batteries, 12-pounders.*

A great secret was made of the mitrailleuses. Only sworn officers, and the few artillerists who conducted the experiments on the range at Meudon, knew anything of the terrible weapon. We could relate, out of our own experience, most laughable anecdotes concerning this, if it were possible to laugh at all in this crisis for the whole of civilised Europe.† The equipped batteries of mitrailleuses were carefully guarded in the fort of Mount Valerien. When men talked of them to the initiated, and suggested that it was somewhat remarkable to intrust these weapons in the moment of danger to people who were utterly ignorant of their use, it was answered that the range-tables were worked out, and that the same course had been adopted with the rifled 4-pounders in 1859.

The French engineer troops consisted of 3 regiments. Each regiment had 2 battalions, each battalion 8 companies. Of these, 1 was a company of miners, the other 7 were sappers. Of the latter, 1 company in each regiment had in 1869 been formed into a railway company, and exercised as such. In

* The French 4-pounders correspond to our 9-pounders.

† This paragraph was written in December 1870.

the 1st regiment alone, 1 sappper company had also been formed into a telegraph company.

The general train of the army (*equipages militaires*) was composed, according to a decree of the 29th of January 1869, of 3 regiments of 16 companies each.

The French army, on the normal war footing of 1868, could thus place in the field 285,000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 984 guns; having in the second line, as depot troops, 91,000 men, infantry and cavalry. On a peace footing, the army could muster about two-thirds of these numbers; and as the calling in of the reserves was, in spite of the amendments introduced in 1868, not to be easily accomplished, the fact had to be accepted that, in case of the sudden breaking out of the war, only about 200,000 men, infantry and cavalry, would be disposable for active service.

The military preparations of France expressed by these numbers are terribly meagre when compared with her population, and with her moral and material resources. This evil state of things was to be remedied by the new Service Act, which, prepared since 1866, was published on the 1st of February 1868. But in reality this Act wrought no essential changes, for it created no new troops or *cadres* for the active army; so that, in the future as in the past, in case of a serious war breaking out, every addition would have to be improvised.

By the new decree of the 1st of February 1868,

the land forces of France were divided into,—(1.) the Active Army; (2.) the Reserve; (3.) the Mobile National Guard.

In principle every Frenchman is bound to serve in person either in the Active Army or in the Mobile Guard. Recruiting for the army takes place by calling in the annual levies, by voluntary entrances, and by re-engagements. In the Active Army substitution is allowed, but not in the Mobile Guard. Exoneration—that is, the simple purchase of freedom from military service by the payment to the Government of a certain fixed sum, in return for which the Government itself provided a substitute, or did not—was abolished. With it, the law of the 25th of April 1858, of the "army dotation chest," went out of force after it had existed nearly thirteen years, to the great detriment of the French army. A return was essentially made to the law of the 21st of March 1832, whereby every one who was drawn for the Active Army and did not wish to serve was obliged to provide a substitute at his own cost and trouble.

The contingent for the Active Army was to be determined each year by the Legislature, and was to be taken at an average of 100,000 men. The standard for the army was lowered 1 centimetre—from $1^{m.}$ 56 to $1^{m.}$ 55. The grounds of exemption from service for social causes were retained, with this additional relief, that even after his entry into the ranks, a young man should at once be placed in the Reserve, if

any of the social grounds of exemption—such as, for instance, the death of his father—should occur to his prejudice. The time of service, to count from the 1st of July of the year in which the conscript was drawn, was fixed at 9 years instead of at 7, as heretofore. Of the whole 9 years, 5 were to be spent in service in the Active Army, and the remaining 4 in the Reserve.

The division of the contingent into two portions was retained, and men belonging to the first were to serve their 5 years in the Active Army, the peace footing of which, including the soldiers by profession, and those temporarily on furlough for a longer or shorter time, was assumed to be 415,000 men. Those belonging to the second were only to be exercised for 5 months—3 in the first year, and 2 in the second—but were always to be in readiness when called in for service in the Active Army. The Reserve, in which the men of the second as well as of the first portion passed the last 4 years of their service, could only be called out in case of war, and by an Imperial decree, and these only by classes, to keep the Active Army at its full strength. During the last two years of their service, men could marry without special permission.

If an annual contingent of 100,000 men is assumed, 9000 of it join the marine, and 14,416 more must, as experience has proved, be allowed for volunteers who have already entered, and for those exempted on social grounds, so that a total of 23,416 men must be deducted from it. There-

fore only 76,584 men remain available for the land forces. Of these, about 63,000 were assigned to the first portion, and of these 63,000 again, about 20,000 purchased substitutes, which substitutes did not engage for the whole 9 years' service, but only for the 5 years with the colours, and therefore must be necessarily reckoned in the class of soldiers by profession. The conscripts, therefore, of the first portion, amounted in the course of 5 years to 215,000 men, and to 68,000 men in the second, leaving altogether out of account the diminution which would be naturally caused by deaths, sickness, &c. The 4 years of the Reserve give by the most liberal calculation 210,000 men.

From this it can be understood that the law of the 1st of February 1868 did very little to help the Active Army, especially as the evils which the Army Dotation Law had brought about could not be uprooted at once. Even in the circles of the French Government, men did not hope to be freed from them before the year 1877. Still, if the depot battalions could be mobilised; if they could be transformed, as was the intention of Marshal Niel, into marching regiments, if even of but two battalions; if increased levies could be obtained for this purpose at the commencement of a war,—it could certainly be still possible to reinforce the field army—only, in the first place, the greater part of the work must be improvised; and, secondly, it would be necessary to replace by something the depot battalions in the

duties which they now performed—that is, of training the new reserves, garrisoning fortresses, &c.

This something was to be the Mobile Guard, which was created by the law of the 1st of February 1868. It was, in case of war, to undertake the guardianship of the strong places and of the coasts, and to perform the duties of the Imperial police in the interior. This Mobile Guard, or Mobile National Guard, was to be recruited,—

1. From the collective male population liable to serve, who had been found to be capable of bearing arms, but were freed by lot from service in the Active Army;

2. From those exempted on social grounds;

3. From those who had been drawn in the contingent for the Active Army, but who had purchased substitutes.

The time of service in the Mobile Guard was fixed at 5 years. The real contingent for it cannot be estimated at more than 74,000 to 75,000 men, let the Government calculations be what they may. This would give, during the 5 years, about 370,000 men. The calling out of the Mobile Guard for war service could only ensue upon a law passed for each occasion; still, the Government was empowered, in cases of emergency, to collect the men in battalions and batteries at any points in their departments it might select, twenty days before the passing of the law. The officers of the Mobile Guard were to be nominated

by the Emperor, the non-commissioned officers by the military authorities of the departments. The Mobiles could be called out for exercise at the most fifteen times in the year, and no exercise was to oblige the Mobile to be absent more than twenty-four hours from his home.

These general instructions prove clearly that no great things could be expected from the Mobile Guard as a regular military organisation. The paper organisation was commenced by the Government in the north and in the east; in the south and in the west, even this was opposed with a resistance which developed into anti-Imperial demonstrations.

As long as Marshal Niel lived, the work of organisation was carried on, and the exercising of the Mobile Guard began in June 1869. After the death of the Marshal, when General Lebœuf undertook the Ministry of War, and to spare the citizens was declared to be the highest State principle in military matters, these exercises ceased. The appointment of officers still continued, but in direct opposition to the maxim which lays down that untrained troops require the best officers if they are to render good service.

The total number of the Mobile Guard was reckoned by the French Government—too high, as is clear from the foregoing—at 550,000 men. It was to be divided into 318 very strong battalions of 8 companies each, and into 128 batteries of garrison artillery—six

companies of pontoniers included. At the time of the death of Marshal Niel, there existed in tolerable formation on paper 142 battalions and 91 batteries. Clothing was ready for about 100,000 men; and the same number—namely, those of the two youngest annual classes in the eastern half of the Empire—had been slightly exercised. As from this time forward nothing more was done, these numbers give also the state in which the war of 1870 found the institution of the Mobile Guard.

After all the above related, our assertion must be agreed to, that in reality, and at all events at first, the French army did not receive any true addition of strength by the Service Act of 1868, much less such an addition as would make it numerically equal to the war forces of the North German Confederation.

The French have in time of peace no permanent large division of the army. Still, even then they had a number of Army Corps, which were formed, some for two years, others only for a few months, for exercising purposes, and there existed tolerably well-established data for their formation. The Army Corps or divisions which were formed were the Guard Corps, the armies of Lyons and of Paris, the Corps in the camps of Chalons and of Lannemezan, and the Cavalry Division of Luneville.

The rule for the formation of an Army Corps was: Three divisions of infantry (only exceptionally two or four); one division of cavalry; and a reserve of artil-

lery. A division of infantry had 13 battalions—namely, 1 battalion of Rifles, and 4 infantry regiments of 3 battalions each; these were divided into two brigades of 6 or 7 battalions. According to the ideas which prevailed in the year 1869, and which had been already partly accepted in 1868, a regiment of cavalry was attached to each division of infantry as divisional cavalry. The arrangement was actually carried out in the first series of manœuvres in the camp of Chalons in 1869. Finally, the division of infantry was to receive 3 batteries of 6 guns each—namely, 2 4-pounder batteries and 1 mitrailleuse battery. A division of cavalry had, as a rule, 4 regiments in 2 brigades, and 1 battery of horse-artillery, if it was not destined to operate independently. When this was the case, 2 batteries were assigned to it. The Artillery Reserve of the Corps consisted, until 1869, of only 2 batteries of rifled 12-pounders. By the latest regulations it received 1 horse, 2 4-pounder, and 2 12-pounder batteries—that is, a total of 5. To each division of infantry a company of sappers was to be attached; while to the Corps Reserve were added, according to its destination, companies of sappers, of miners, and of pontoniers with bridge-trains.

A complete Army Corps consisted, therefore, commonly of 39 battalions of infantry, 7 regiments of cavalry, and 15 batteries—that is, of about 26,000 infantry, 3500 cavalry, or a total of nearly 30,000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 90 guns. If 9 Army

Corps were established, and if to each one 7 regiments of cavalry were given, the total of 63 cavalry regiments would be thus distributed, and none would remain of which to form an Army Reserve, or large detachments for special enterprises. It follows, therefore, that some of the Army Corps, at least, could only have about 4 regiments of cavalry.

An army is composed of a greater or less number of Army Corps, and to it is then added a main cavalry and a main artillery reserve.

In old times France was uncommonly rich in fortresses; new ones were constantly built, and still the old ones were not allowed to decay. Until the reign of Louis Philippe, the French system of fortresses was essentially a cordon system, according to the theory of the triple girdle, and then under his government it was reduced to a network, with Paris as the centre.

In the year 1868 France had 88 proper fortresses, and 47 strong places (towns with old fortifications, isolated forts, and old castles). To keep this mass of fortified places in repair required a large expenditure of money, and this prevented much thought being given to the erection of new works. Under the Second Empire, with the increase in the price of all things, and also of building materials, the difficulty of constructing them increased also. Moreover, from the time of the Crimean war until shortly after the Italian campaign, Napoleon III. stood as the recognised arbiter and umpire of Europe. Therefore, con-

sidering the behaviour of the whole Continent, and the state of affairs in Germany, the French cannot be blamed if they believed ever more and more firmly that no cannon-shot could be fired without their permission; that circumstances might, indeed, compel France to attack, but that she could never be exposed to be herself attacked. Consequently, even the introduction of rifled guns into warfare did not at first cause the Government to occupy itself seriously with the question of the fortresses. It was only in the years 1863 and 1864 that the faith of the French Government on their decided ascendancy began somewhat to waver, and then first some works of improvement were undertaken on the more important fortresses with a view to covering better the masonry buildings, especially the powder-magazines, and of providing bomb-proof shelter for the garrison, ammunition, and supplies.

The works, by reason of the outlay which they occasioned, naturally led to the question, Whether it would not be more serviceable to give up completely a number of small places which were acknowledged to be useless, so that more money could be expended upon the remaining fortresses? This question was answered in the affirmative; and by a decree of the 26th of June 1867, many places were completely abandoned as strongholds, and others were reserved, only to be used, in case of war, as fortresses in a partial way. The places given up belonged mostly to

the fourth class, which for a long time had been of no military importance. Among those of the second and third class which were allowed to decay were Weissenburg, Boulogne, Lauterburg, and Carcassonne.

New works were especially undertaken from the beginning of 1868 on the strong places in the east. Particular attention was paid to Metz, Belfort, and Langres; while at Strasburg only improvements on the existing works were made, but these, it is true, on a very extensive scale. We propose, as soon as any one fortress begins to play a part in the history of the war of 1870, to describe its fortifications more minutely, and to give a military picture of their connection with one another, explaining the main idea on which they were planned, and the circumstances which exercised an influence upon the carrying out of this idea.

The events of 1866 and the introduction of the Chassepot did not fail to occasion much deliberation even in France as to what changes in tactics would now be necessary. These deliberations were reduced in some degree to a system by the so-called *conférences militaires* which Marshal Niel at first caused to be worked out by a commission of officers, who met under the presidency of General Jarras, Director of the War Depots.

As early as 1867 the infantry regulations were rewritten, then thrice revised, so that the last edition only appeared in 1870, shortly before the outbreak

of the war. But nevertheless there were no comprehensive changes from former times to be remarked. In opposition to the Prussian company column, the French held to the battalion as the only tactical unit —very likely with perfect right, with their purposely weak battalions. The skirmishing drill was somewhat better established; and, in addition, the divisional column (each of two companies) and the subdivisional (*peloton*) column (each of one company) came into frequent use in the advance or retirement of whole brigades or divisions in line.

In the camp of Chalons every Commander-in-Chief who governed there in succession during the years from 1867 to 1870, L'Admirault, de Failly, Lebœuf, Bazaine, Bourbaki, Frossard, manœuvred according to his own devices and fancies, without going deep into detail, so that it cannot with any justice be said that a new system was established by these exercises.

For the cavalry, the introduction of divisional cavalry and the adoption of the breech-loading carbine were especially important changes; a few formations—as, for instance, the squadron column, the four ranks of the squadron behind one another, while the squadrons are separated by the wide intervals thus formed—were copied from the Prussians. In the artillery, the introduction of the mitrailleuse and the increase of divisional and corps artillery, which partly resulted from it, although it did not take place until the time of the Ministry of Marshal Lebœuf, must be

remarked on. Moreover, the 12-pounder (12 kilogrammer) was to be replaced as a reserve gun by the 8-pounder; but this change was not, as far as we know, effected by 1870.

Marshal Lebœuf, who was called by a decree of the 21st of August 1869 to the head of the administration of the army, was born in the year 1809. He was a pupil at the Polytechnic School, then at the School of Artillery at Metz, was captain in 1837, squadron leader in 1846, and was then, as Lieutenant-Colonel, Second Commandant of the Polytechnic School from 1848 to 1850. In this position he acquired the fame of being a good Republican. In the year 1852 he became Colonel, in 1854 Brigadier-General, and in 1857 General of Division. He served in the Crimean campaign, and in 1859 commanded the artillery of the Active Army of Italy. In January 1869 he received the command of the 6th Army Corps at Toulouse, and was afterwards, as we have seen, in the same year Minister of War. In the spring of 1870 he was made a Marshal of France.

The Emperor was not at first much disposed to accept Lebœuf as Minister of War, partly, probably, because of the reputation he enjoyed as a Republican. In allusion to the name of the General, the Emperor, at that time very sick, said—"Il était trop longtemps sous le joug." Still, unless it was wished to make some great mistake, there was at that moment only the choice between Lebœuf and Trochu. The latter,

owing to his reputation as an Orleanist, to the shyness which he had always displayed towards the Imperial Court, and to his straightforward book on the French army, was not at all beloved in the Tuileries. In Lebœuf's favour weighed also, although as a by-matter, that he was an artillerist, and that really no artillery officer had been Minister of War since 1797 —Scherer. We know, we may passingly remark, that Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso (1834-1835), may by a great stretch be called an artillerist, and that the celebrated Francis Arago, Minister of War in April and May 1848, was, as pupil in the Polytechnic School, originally destined for the artillery.

Marshal Lebœuf accommodated himself very well to the Parliamentary *régime* which was to commence as he undertook his heavy task. He had rather *bourgeois* than courtier tendencies. Still he did not shun the Court life of the Second Empire, but took more part in it than was perhaps good for his health. Strange as it will now sound, the disposition of the Marshal was absolutely peaceful. He wished to economise in the army, and to raise its tone through less expensive institutions. For his own particular arm, the artillery, he did much, as he materially increased its strength in Divisions and Army Corps.

The French fleet, at the end of 1867, counted 343 steam, and 116 sailing ships of war; and on the slips, in a more or less advanced stage, were 33 steamers and 1 sailing vessel. Of ironclads there were alto-

gether 60, either ready or in a forward state of preparation. These were of the most varied construction. Some were monitors or turret-ships; others rams, with a mighty iron spur on the bow, to crush in the side of hostile ships; others mere floating batteries for coast and harbour defence, and for the attack on an enemy's coast and harbour fortifications; others were frigates and corvettes for cruising on the high seas, and with these latter were two of the older type of ironclad, the Magenta and the Solferino, partially-armoured line-of-battle ships.

In the latest days, after the principle had been accepted that it was preferable to arm a ship with a few guns of large calibre, rather than with a greater number of small-calibred ones, the frigates were generally built to carry 12, and the corvettes 8 guns; while the turret-ships, according to the number of turrets which each ship had, and accordingly as each turret carried 1 or 2 guns, were armed with from 1 to 6 guns. In the corvettes and frigates the guns were distributed in most diverse ways, in upper-deck, forecastle, and main-deck batteries of every imaginable construction, so that there could be no talk of uniformity; and each ship required special study on the part of those who were to fight her.

As soon as the fact was recognised that in future the fighting men-of-war must be ironclads, the duel between the iron plate and the ship's gun began. If the calibre was increased the iron plate became

thicker, then the calibre increased again, and so on. Men cannot yet say where this will cease, and which will first reach its limit, the shield or the gun; for modern industry is fruitful in new inventions, and Europe has for war untold mines of wealth. In the year 1858 a thickness of 8 centimetres (2½ inches), and even less, sufficed: in 1868 such a shield was as a tin plate; 18 centimetres (6 inches) were not then sufficient, and for the most vulnerable parts 24 centimetres (8 inches) were required. In 1869, those who studied the subject shook their heads doubtfully even of this thickness.

Then, as the iron shield cannot be extended over the whole surface of the ship, but usually covers at most 6 feet of the sides below the water-line, what security has the best-armoured vessel against torpedoes, against submarine mines? Who can say? Perhaps, after all, the ship will lay aside its armour altogether, now become too heavy for it, as centuries ago the armoured knight stripped himself of his coat of mail. The rifled guns which in the latest times have been supplied to the large French men-of-war have calibres of 16 centimetres, with a shell loaded with powder weighing 62 pounds, and a solid projectile of 90; of 27 centimetres, with projectiles of 300, and exceptionally of 400 pounds; and, between these two, of 19 and 24 centimetres.

More particularly in the last ten years, but generally since the time that England lost her acknow-

ledged leadership in all maritime matters, the clear perception of the very simple truth has spread more and more, that a naval war can now only be of importance in so far as it is undertaken in conjunction with a land war, and is brought into a certain connection with it.

Privateering on the high seas effects very little, even were it not considerably curtailed by the Paris Treaty of 1856. But troops must be disembarked on certain points of the enemy's coast which it is generally wished to seize, and to effect this a fleet of transports is necessary. A highly-developed mercantile marine renders essential aid here; but still, to insure the due working of such a fleet, many military preparations must have been made in the marine—such, for instance, as would be necessary to solve the problem of transporting horses in large numbers. Military transport by sea is here under the same conditions as military transport by the railway.

Since the autumn of 1866 the formation of a transport fleet had been worked at in France which should be able to convey at one time, with the assistance of so much of the mercantile navy as was on the average available, 40,000 men, with 12,000 horses, together with all requisite artillery, engineer, and train material, over such distances by sea as an ordinary mail steamer could run in three times twenty-four hours. Much, and we may say sufficient, had been provided for this purpose; but when there is no disembarka-

tion force left, the largest transport fleet is superfluous.

The sailors for the French fleet are obtained—entirely independent of the contingent for the land army—by the *inscription maritime*, the entering of suitable young men of the coast population, fishermen, and sailors. The number of men entered for the war fleet runs, with small variations, up to 170,000 men, a number completely sufficient for its requirements, especially in modern times, where steam essentially supersedes sails, especially in the moment of battle.

As we mentioned before, 9000 men of the annual contingent of 100,000, were set aside for the Marines, not in any way for the sailor crew of the navy of which we have just spoken, but to form the marine infantry, the marine artillery, and the marine administrative troops. The marine infantry and artillery are in no way considered as part of the crew of the ship; they are rather specially destined for colonial service and for disembarkation troops. Marshal Niel demanded in 1868 32,000 marine infantry and 7000 marine artillery, a total of about 40,000 marine troops, when the administration is included.

Up to 1868, by writing off annually 6500 men from the contingent, there had been only about 20,000 marine troops disposable; by the future arrangement of writing off 9000 men, and by increasing the time of service from seven to nine years, the required number of 40,000 marine troops could in time be obtained.

The marine infantry was divided into 4 regiments of a great and different number of companies, the marine artillery into 28 batteries. A combined regiment of marine infantry, of 2 battalions of 6 companies each, had been latterly annually sent to the camp of Chalons to be exercised in common with the land troops.

At the head of the marine administration in 1870, was Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, born 1807. In 1827 he entered the naval service from the Polytechnic School; was Captain of corvette in 1841; Captain of line-of-battle ship on the 22d of July 1848, under the Republic; Rear-Admiral on the 2d of December 1854; Vice-Admiral on the 9th of August 1858; and Admiral on the 27th of January 1864. In the year 1867 he was nominated Minister of Marine, and acted also provisionally for a few days after the death of Marshal Niel, in 1869, as Minister of War. He had from 1854 to 1864 held important commands in the Crimea, in China, and in the Mediterranean, without distinguishing himself in any way. He was always reputed to be a good Imperialist and churchman, and disposed to the forcible repression of civil war.

CHAPTER IV.

PROGRESS OF GERMAN HISTORY FROM THE YEAR 1866 TO THE YEAR 1870.

THE Peace of Prague, concluded on the 23d of August 1866 between Prussia and Austria, was the commencement of a new era for Germany, and with that for Europe also.

For the reconstruction of Germany, the terms of the Peace of Prague gave, essentially, the following conditions:—

1. The old German Diet was formally dissolved and abolished, and its name even disappeared.

2. Austria gave up for the future all interference in the affairs of those German States which were not directly subject to the Hapsburg Crown.

3. Prussia was increased by annexations in North Germany—Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Schleswig-Holstein.

4. Prussia formed a North German Confederation, which included the kingdom of Saxony, and reached as far south as the line of the Main.

5. The South German States, Bavaria, Würtemberg,

Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt to the south of the Main, remained unattached. But they might at the same time form a South German Confederation, and this might then enter into any relation it liked with the North German Confederation.

Prussia and South Germany had carried on war against one another in 1866, and yet they had raised the customs for foreigners on the common Zollverein boundary. Abroad, this characteristic circumstance was at once remarked; but to every German it was of itself so intelligible that it was never even mentioned in the belligerent papers on either side. That is certainly something remarkable. How much has the feeling of German nationality increased since 1848?

In suspense remained the former provinces of the Diet, Luxemburg and Limburg, and a not very exactly defined part of North Schleswig, which might possibly be given back again to the kingdom of Denmark.

The political work of Germany concentrated itself for the present, in consequence of the Peace of Prague, in consummating the direct enlargement of Prussia by annexations in North Germany; in indirectly increasing the strength of Prussia by the establishment of the North German Confederation; in establishing some satisfactory relation with the South German States, and in settling the complications which had arisen respecting Luxemburg, Limburg, and North

Schleswig. It was in itself manifest that the last two points could not be settled without the interference of foreign countries.

The annexations which Prussia had directly demanded were accomplished on the 24th of January 1867, without any difficulty arising on any side. Prussia on this day enlarged her territory from an area of 5086¾ square miles (German), with 19,305,000 inhabitants, which she possessed in the beginning of 1866, to 6395½ square miles, with 23,600,000 inhabitants. The foundation of the North German Confederation also occasioned no difficulties. By the end of August most of the Governments which Prussia principally wished to draw into the Confederation had announced their willingness to enter it; those who struggled against it were speedily forced to follow.

By the 12th of February 1867, the elections could take place for the first, or constituting, North German Parliament. By the 24th of June 1867, the constitution of the North German Confederation could be announced in Prussia. The Luxemburg complication aided undoubtedly more than a little in bringing about such a rapid consummation of the work.

The princes, certainly, whose lands were taken from them, were not contented with the annexation; and two of them especially, King George of Hanover and the Electoral Prince of Hesse, assumed a hostile attitude towards Prussia, which moved her to refuse to

pay them the compensation money which at first was to be granted. Both princes had, as can be easily understood, parties in their own countries. That of the Electoral Prince of Hesse was almost invisibly small; but that of the King of Hanover, or at least of "Guelphdom," was apparently greater and more stubborn. On this behalf it came even to a military formation. Of the so-called Guelphic Legion, which thus sprung up, we must here say a few words.

A number of Hanoverian soldiers, unwilling to subject themselves to Prussian discipline, left Hanover in the early autumn of 1866 and went into Holland, not altogether uninfluenced by some Hanoverian officers, stubborn partisans of King George, who had established his Court in Hietzing, near Vienna. Most of these secessionists had a doubly firm belief: they were enemies of Prussia, and they had a strong conviction that the order of things which had arisen in Germany through the war of 1866 would have no long existence, though in the beginning they could hardly have had any clear idea how the restoration of the old state of things was to be brought about. Meanwhile they subjected themselves in Holland to a sort of military organisation; and when, in the spring of 1867, the Luxemburg question arose, their affairs and intentions took a more decided shape. Formal recruiting for the Guelphic Legion was now set on foot in Hanover. Golden rewards were promised to those enlisting, and offers made which attracted not

only old soldiers and true adherents of King George, but also, though in lesser numbers certainly, many young people who had not yet served, and who wished to withdraw themselves from their liability to service in the Prussian army,—pure vagabonds, who thought to avoid their duties at home in a comfortable and glorious manner by joining the Guelphic Legion. The Headquarters of the Legion were at Arnheim, and its organisation was at this time tolerably regular. By the side of the victorious French it was shortly to conduct King George back again to Hanover. But things took another turn. The London Conference brought about a peaceful settlement of the difficulty which had arisen between France and Prussia. At first the Dutch authorities had not troubled themselves about the Legion: now they were obliged to devote to them a disagreeable attention. The leaders of the Legion held their followers together by the proverb "Postponed is not finished," and by the wholesome dread of Prussian military service; and in the middle of the year 1867 they migrated to Switzerland. Here the Hanoverians conducted themselves quietly and peaceably. Still, whoever took even a superficial glance at the localities which they rented, received the impression that these dwellings were barracks. The men neither wore uniform nor did they bear arms, but they were under a military discipline which was carried out with great authority by old under-officers.

Suddenly, in the beginning of February 1868, the

Hanoverians quitted Switzerland. The report was spread, and it was even asserted by some of their officers, that they had been expelled by the Federal authorities. This was not true. The Guelphic Legion had been certainly watched, which was unavoidably necessary, as Switzerland, in accepting the neutrality guaranteed her by Europe, accepts also the obligation to frustrate any attempt which may be prepared in her territory to break the peace of Europe. The Hanoverians went now into France; and this they did with Austrian passes—a proceeding which occasioned various reflections and much diplomatic correspondence. Although it was at that time by no means to the interest of Napoleon to war with Germany, still men had indubitably a right to think singular things of this migration; and it was under these circumstances that the sequestration ensued of the property of King George, or of the compensation which had been granted to him for the loss of his throne.

At the same time that the Guelphic Legion settled in France, the Hanoverian royal pair celebrated, on the 18th of February 1868, their golden marriage. Numerous partisans of Guelphdom repaired to this festival at Hietzing, to which, as appears to an impartial observer, more importance was attached than it really merited. The Legion, meanwhile, composed altogether of fine young men, made itself, in a short time, very useful by the assistance it rendered to agriculture; and this aid was the more timely, as in

the north-east of France the "May beetle pest" was this year especially troublesome. Very few of the Legionaires availed themselves of the permission which was now granted by Prussia to return, unpunished, to their native land. The poor people were very isolated, spoke no French, received no German newspapers, and were therefore easily led by the committee, which sat in Paris, and was animated by Major von Düring and Herr von Meding; and it was rumoured and bemoaned over that the men who had returned to Hanover had been prosecuted by the Prussian authorities, in spite of their promises, and severely treated.

As the year 1869 closed in, and the hope of a speedy war between Prussia and France seemed ever to fade away, men began to talk in the Hanoverian camp of a change in the position of the Legion, which, as it then existed, cost King George painful sacrifices. The Court party at Hietzing counselled King George to dissolve the Legion altogether; but the leaders of it in Paris had another project in their mind, which was this: King George was to acquire from France a considerable territory in Algeria, and the Legion was to form a colony there, but was still to retain its military organisation under its leaders, something as do the inhabitants of the Austrian military frontier. Thus an African Hanover would be formed, which would further offer to all distressed Hanoverians a new home, and thus continually increase. But as

France was not at all disposed to cede such a territory in Africa at a nominal price, and as such a military colony must always be, at the outset at least, a very costly affair to those who have to support it, the project was rejected at Hietzing; and as some of the leaders in Paris still urged its execution, they incurred the displeasure of King George.

On the 15th of April 1870 the Guelphic Legion was formally dissolved. Every Legionaire received a sum of 400 francs on discharge, and, moreover, travelling money to repair whither he would. Many went to America, and but few returned to Hanover or remained in France. The Legion is said to have been 1400 strong when dissolved. If this be true, it must have increased numerically in France, for in Switzerland it numbered at the most 700 men. When the war broke out, a certain Herr von Malortie offered to organise anew the Guelphic Legion in and for France, and promised a considerable concurrence of recruits. The French War Ministry at the time declined his offer, but the decree which shortly afterwards appeared ordering the establishment of a fifth battalion of the Foreign Regiment was essentially a result of it.

The South German States were left, according to the theory of the Peace of Prague, separately independent, but could agree among themselves to form a South German Confederation; and this again could bind itself by an international treaty with North Germany. Practically, the state of affairs was very different.

When Prussia concluded peace in 1866 with the South German States, Bismark had caused them to conclude at once offensive and defensive alliances, which assured to the King of Prussia, in case of war, the command-in-chief of the South German forces. He had persuaded the southern Germans to make these treaties in their own interest, by telling them of the tempting offers which France had repeatedly made to Prussia; and which she could easily avail herself of by sacrificing to some degree South Germany, were she minded to act for her Prussian, not for the German, interest. Another bond of union existed in the old custom treaties (Zollverein) which had never been annulled, and practically had never been violated, and the amendment of which, with a view to a better unity, Prussia had already alluded to in her treaties with the southern Germans. In the third place, Hesse-Darmstadt was most peculiary situated, with one foot within the North German Confederation and the other outside of it. It was impossible that the small State could retain this position permanently; and by the law of political gravitation, there was no doubt that she would be compelled, in any decisive affair, to take part with Prussia, or with the North German Confederation.

The composition of a South German Confederation had from its very origin difficulties to encounter. In Baden the people and the Government desired to be taken into it, as the simplest way to escape from the

existing confusion. In Würtemberg the democratic or people's party worked especially against Prussia, and for a South German Confederation. The so-called Prussian party was only very weakly represented. Besides the democratic and Prussian parties there existed another, the Government party, without any definite aim, brought and held together, as such parties are in all small States, more by personal and family interests than by general political objects.

If a South German Confederation was to be brought about, Bavaria, as the greatest of the South German States, must manifestly play the chief part in it, somewhat as Prussia did in the North German Confederation. But neither Hessian, nor Badenser, nor Würtemberger, to whatever party they might belong, had any desire to cede such a part to Bavaria. In Bavaria itself there were three parties to be distinguished—the patriots or ultramontanists, essentially particularists, but still not disinclined to a South German Confederation, under certain circumstances; the German party, who were for annexation to North Germany; and the so-called "Wilden," who were but weakly represented. These were the former "great" Germans, who could not at all resign themselves to falling into the arms of Prussia, but who had still a degree of holy respect for the Confederation, as had the patriots, who, in the elections of 1869, sent 24 Catholic clergy as members to the Chamber of Deputies. The German party were particularly

strong in the north of Bavaria, with the exception of the old bishoprics of Bamberg and Wurzburg, and in the great industrial and commercial towns. The patriot party was more strongly represented in the old Bavarian south, and in the former ecclesiastical provinces. A bond of union between the democratic party in Würtemberg and the patriot party in Bavaria was formed by their common hatred of military sway. Still the internal differences in the two parties on vital matters were so pronounced, that a union between them even on this point seemed scarcely to be possible. A certain German shame prevented either party from approaching the other when this question was brought forward.

Thus it is evident that Prussia's game in South Germany was in reality already played for her. Baden wished for annexation to the North German Confederation; Hesse-Darmstadt would then be carried with her, forced along in spite of all the enemies of Prussia, who still retained the upper hand in the Ministry.

Bismark wished for peace; he did not even wish it to seem as though he would provoke France. The entrance of a single solitary South German State into the North German Confederation was in reality immaterial to him. The military treaties of the autumn of 1866, and the old and to be amended custom treaties, had rendered it possible for the North German Confederation to wait quietly. But

still separate demonstrations by the Prussian national liberals, who demanded a decided movement for the unity of Germany, could not be altogether displeasing to the Chancellor, although they always in a very unskilful manner followed as it were upon his command. As soon as the completion of the North German Confederation seemed to be assured, the Prussian Government entered into negotiations with the South German Governments upon the new arrangement of the custom union (Zollverein). By the 4th of June 1867 a preliminary agreement, and by the 8th of July 1867 a more complete treaty, was signed.

In the North German Confederation, the Governments of the separate component States and their Diets still existed, sometimes with two very contradictorily composed Houses or Chambers, limited only in military matters and in a few administrative details; and not merely theoretical was the comparison of the Diets of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (there were two of them!) with the Diet of mighty Prussia. Over all these stood the Parliamentary government of the North German Confederation, consisting of the King of Prussia as President; the Chancellor of the Confederation, who was essentially Count Bismark; the Council of the Confederation (half an assembly, half a ministry), sent by the North German Governments; and, lastly, the North German Parliament, which was directly elected.

To this North German Government the general German Zollverein was to be annexed. For this was formed a Custom Confederate Council, consisting of the representatives of the Council of the North German Confederation, then of 6 voices for Bavaria, 4 for Würtemberg, 3 each for Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt. Altogether the Custom Confederate Council had 58 voices, 17 of which fell to the presidential power, Prussia. Beside the Custom Confederate Council was placed the Custom Parliament, consisting of the members of the German Parliament and delegates from the South German States, who were chosen by direct and secret election. The whole Custom Parliament was to be composed of 382 members, of whom 297 came from the North German Parliament, and 85 from the South German States.

It will be confessed that the constitution of the modern German Empire, with all these Parliaments and Landtags enveloping one another, was a most complicated affair, just as involved at the least as the old German Diet. But it was so only in its outward form, for inwardly a desire for simplification had arisen throughout Germany. Moreover, the old liberal veto was abolished, if not at once, at all events very shortly, by the introduction of Parliamentary assemblies; and the very confusion of the newly-introduced forms must itself lead men to believe that it, the confusion, would not continue permanently, but that out of it simplicity would arise in some way or

other. This view in the main gained the day. The only opposition offered to the new organisation for the Zollverein was that of the Bavarian Chambers, and they naturally were soon forced to yield.

In February 1868 the elections for the first Customs Parliament took place. A certain mistrust of Prussia prevailed thereby, and in South Germany, excepting in Baden, the word was only to return such men to the Customs Parliament as would decidedly oppose any overstepping of its duties or of its objects which might be attempted with a view to bringing about a more intimate connection between South Germany and North Germany, or any subjection of South Germany to Prussian dominion.

The first Customs Parliament assembled in Berlin on the 27th of April 1868. The results were, when compared to the expectations cherished in North Germany, extremely small. The glowing North German national liberals were frustrated in all their endeavours to gain their end by surprise through debates, addresses, banquets, and festivals, by the unconquerable distrust which animated the South Germans; and this state of affairs received no essential change even until the year 1870, in the spring of which the flag of the battle against the military system was raised in South Germany, and especially in Würtemberg and Bavaria.

We have now to consider how Prussia settled her foreign relationships—namely, with Luxemburg, Lim-

burg, and North Schleswig. As regards Luxemburg, all that is necessary has been already related; Limburg, which had only been given to the German Diet in 1839 as a compensation for the loss of the western part of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, was, by the London Treaty of 1867 simply and unconditionally restored to the kingdom of Holland. A restoration of North Schleswig districts to Denmark had been provided for in the Peace of Prague. France and Austria on this occasion took the part of Denmark, and the former especially asserted that she had a right to interfere in this European question, an assertion which was always politely but decidedly denied by Prussia. The deputies of North Schleswig protested continually in the Prussian Landtag and in the German Parliament against the forcible diminution of the Danish element.

But the question was more difficult than is generally supposed. There is in Schleswig no easily recognisable natural frontier. A frontier of nationality is the more difficult to find, as the Danish Norwegian is only a dialect of German spoken in innumerable ways, and in every possible form, in Schleswig, in addition to which pure German and Danish are much used. The towns are, up to the extreme north of Schleswig, thoroughly German. The Danes would naturally have wished to obtain again the whole of Schleswig. The Germans could not possibly desire to retain it altogether, but they did wish

to keep all the German towns; or, if concessions must be made on this point also, to obtain guarantees for the protection of the German element in the portions of North Schleswig which were to be given up. This question of guarantees it was which the two contending parties fought about in every form and on every occasion, naturally without arriving at any result, except to give to foreign Powers, especially to France and to Austria, an opportunity of stepping into the question in an "unselfish" manner, at such time as might seem to them to be favourable.

CHAPTER V.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMY FROM THE YEAR 1866 TO THE YEAR 1870.

EVEN during the war of 1866, Prussia, in view of the annexations which she was about to make, had commenced preparations for the enlargement of her army; and after the termination of the war it was easy for her to draw into her military system not merely the annexed provinces, but also the States of the North German Confederation.

Before the Peace of Prague, Prussia had 1 Guard Corps and 8 provincial Army Corps. All these 9 Corps were, if we disregard a few unimportant differences, organised alike. The line troops—active and permanent constituents—of an Army Corps were:—

9 infantry regiments of 3 battalions each;

1 battalion of rifles;

6 regiments of cavalry;

1 brigade of artillery, which was divided into a field and a garrison artillery regiment;

1 battalion of pioneers; and

1 battalion of train.

Each Army Corps on a war footing had about 30,000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 96 field-guns.

The reinforcement of each separate body of troops was not attended with any difficulties, owing to the number of trained men available, and to the thoroughly proved and well-organised institutions. New companies, battalions, and squadrons were easily formed; the reserve troops gave the basis in the first line, and the landwehr troops came forward in the second line, to supply the garrisons for the fortresses and military places, and to form strategical reserves for the line army which was fighting abroad.

In consequence of the direct annexations, the Prussian Government determined to form 3 new Army Corps, so that the Prussian army contained 11 provincial corps, besides the Guard Corps, which was reunited from the whole State. As a matter of fact, instead of the 27 new regiments of infantry which could properly be required to form the 3 new Army Corps, only 16 were raised; the gap was to be filled by the contingents of the small States of the North German Confederation. A 12th Army Corps was supplied by the kingdom of Saxony on its entrance into the Confederation.

We shall first consider the organisation of the different arms as it was completed in the year 1868, and that only for the North German Confederation, leaving out of account at present the landwehr and the Grand Duchy of Hesse.

The strength of the North German infantry, then, was as follows:—

Prussian Guard Corps—

4 regiments of Foot Guards;
4 regiments of Grenadiers of the Guard;
1 regiment of Fusiliers of the Guard;
1 battalion of Rifles of the Guard;
1 battalion of Chasseurs of the Guard;

altogether, 29 battalions of infantry.

Provincial Army Corps (including the 12th Saxon)—

88 Prussian regiments of infantry, numbering from 1 to 88—of which 12 were grenadier regiments, Nos. 1 to 12—and 8 fusilier regiments, Nos. 33 to 40; and

17 Confederate infantry regiments—namely,

2 Mecklenburg regiments, No. 89 (Grenadiers) and No. 90 (Fusiliers), belonging to the 9th Army Corps.

1 Oldenburg, No. 91 (10th Army Corps).

1 Brunswick, No. 92 (10th Army Corps).

1 Anhaltian, No. 93 (4th Army Corps).

1 Thuringian, No. 96 (4th Army Corps), provided by Saxe-Altenburg and Reuss.

1 (fifth) Thuringian, No. 94 (11th Army Corps), provided by Saxe-Weimar.

1 (sixth) Thuringian, No 95 (11th Army Corps), provided by Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Saxe-Meiningen-Hilburghausen-Saalfeld.

9 regiments (Nos. 100 to 108) of the Saxon or 12th North German Army Corps, of which 2 were grena-

dier regiments (Nos. 100 and 101) and 1 a fusilier regiment (No. 108).

The Nos. 97, 98, and 99 are absent from the series of North German provincial regiments. In pursuance of several special military conventions, Prussia provided regiments for some of the smaller States, or rather removed regiments into their territories. At first this new condition was not completely arranged, and therefore for a time the numbers 97, 98, and 99 remained open.

Of provincial Rifle battalions there were

11, with Nos. from 1 to 11 for the Prussian Corps;
2 Saxon (12th Army Corps), Nos. 12 and 13;
1 Mecklenburg (No. 14).

Recapitulating the infantry, we have—

	Battalions.
9 regiments of the Guard, of 3 battalions each,	= 27
88 Prussian infantry regiments of 3 battalions,	= 264
17 Confederate infantry regiments of 3 battalions,	= 51
2 battalions of Rifles of the Guard, . .	= 2
14 battalions of provincial Rifles, . .	= 14
Total,	358

The battalion may be taken as having an average strength at the commencement of a campaign of 1000 men, who are divided into 4 strong companies. On mobilisation, a reserve battalion of 1000 men is formed for each regiment of infantry, and a reserve company of 200 men for every battalion of Rifles.

Within two months at the latest, every reserve

battalion can double itself in this way, that it first prepares a fourth battalion for service in the field, and then forms a new reserve battalion. Accordingly, the North German infantry can, without improvising, place in the field—

In the first line (infantry and Rifles),	358,000 men.
In the second line (infantry and Rifles),	117,200 ,,
Altogether,	475,200 men.

In the cavalry, the campaign of 1866 and the subsequent annexations brought about important changes. The cavalry regiments of the Guard were not increased after 1866, but numbered afterwards as before—

1 regiment of Body Guard.
1 regiment of Cuirassiers.
2 regiments of Dragoons.
1 regiment of Hussars.
3 regiments of Uhlans (lancers)—that is, a total of 8 regiments.

The number of cuirassier regiments of the line also was not increased after the annexations. The 8 old regiments still remained.

But it fared very differently with the dragoons, hussars, and Uhlans. The 8 old Prussian dragoon regiments were in 1866 increased to 16. To these were added by the North German Confederation the 2 Mecklenburg dragoon regiments, with the Nos. 17 and 18; the Oldenburg dragoon regiment, No. 19; and the

4 old Saxon cavalry regiments, which retained their names and numbers from 1 to 4. The North German Confederation had now, therefore (including the Saxons), 23 dragoon regiments. The 12 old Prussian hussar regiments were increased after the annexations to 16, and to these came in the North German Confederation the Brunswick hussar regiment, No. 17. The Confederation had therefore 17 regiments of hussars. The 12 old Prussian Uhlan regiments were also increased after the annexations to 16, and to these were joined 2 newly-formed Saxon Uhlan regiments; so that now the North German Confederation had 18 regiments of these troops.

Recapitulating, we find the North German cavalry composed of (Hesse-Darmstadt not included)—

Prussian Guard,	8	regiments.
Line—Cuirassiers,	8	„
„ Dragoons,	23	„
„ Hussars,	17	„
„ Uhlans,	18	„
Altogether,	74	regiments.

Each of these consisted, according to the latest formation, of 5 squadrons, of which 4 were field squadrons and 1 a depot squadron. This latter, also, is even in time of peace fully organised. With the aid of the reserve and landwehr systems, it is easy to swell out this squadron considerably, so that it may form the germ of new reserve field squadrons

and of garrison squadrons, for the fortifications, for coast defence, and for strategical reserves in rear of the operating army. Each squadron takes the field with 150 combatant horses; the 74 cavalry regiments therefore place in the field—

In the first line, . . .	44,400	horses.
In the second line (depot squadron),	11,100	„
Altogether,	55,500	horses.

Artillery.—As a rule, each brigade of Prussian artillery consists of a regiment of field artillery and of a regiment of garrison artillery. But up to the present time the brigades of the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Army Corps had only a division of garrison artillery and their regiment of field artillery. Each regiment of field artillery consists, on a war footing, of 5 divisions—namely, 1 horse, 3 foot, and 1 column division. The *matériel* of the foot divisions has been lately so changed that they have been really transformed into field batteries. Each foot division has now 4 batteries, 2 of which are rifled 6-pounders and 2 rifled 4-pounders, all breech-loaders. Each horse division consists, since the end of 1866, of only 3 batteries of rifled 4-pounders. All batteries have six guns. Each of the 13 regiments of field artillery places therefore in the first line 15 batteries, with 90 guns. To this must be added the column division, which consists of 9 columns—namely, 4 for infantry and 5 for artillery ammunition.

A regiment has 3731 men (without officers), 3358 horses, and, without counting in the guns, 385 carriages. The 13 regiments place in the first line 1170 guns. Each regiment of field artillery forms, in case of war, a reserve division of two foot-batteries and 1 horse-battery, with a total of 18 guns. This gives for the 13 regiments of the North German Confederation 234 guns in the second line. The two Oldenburg batteries—a 6-pounder and a 4-pounder—and the Brunswick rifled 6-pounder battery, belong to the 10th regiment of field artillery; the 4 Mecklenburg —two 6-pounders and two 4-pounders—form the 3d foot division of the 9th regiment of field artillery.

A division of garrison artillery has 4 companies: therefore, as there are 22 garrison divisions, the 13 North German Corps have altogether 88 companies, which in war can, by calling in the reserve and the landwehr, be doubled, and would thus give 176 companies, with a total of about 36,000 men. The garrison artillery does not serve merely to garrison strong places and coast defences, but it also supplies men for the equipment and service of the siege-trains, which are formed in case of a war of invasion being undertaken.

Engineers.—The engineers consist of the engineer corps, composed entirely of officers and of 13 battalions of pioneers, each having in peace time 4 companies—1 of miners, 2 of sappers, and 1 of pontoniers. A mobilised pioneer battalion is in time of

war divided into 3 companies of equal strength, to each of which is added, according to its destination, either a column of pioneer implements, a train of advance-guard bridges, or a pontoon column. Moreover, the pioneer battalions supply the *cadres*, and the nucleus of men for the railway and telegraph detachments. Each pioneer battalion forms, when mobilised, a reserve company.

Train.—Each army corps has its battalion of train, which, in contradistinction to the other branches of the service, receives recruits twice in the year, on the one occasion only for a service of six months. Very weak in time of peace, the train battalion assumes, on mobilisation, colossal dimensions, quite independently of those soldiers of the train who are specially attached to the separate divisions of troops: it consists then of—

5 provision columns of 32 waggons each.

1 field battery of 5 waggons.

1 horse-depot of 170 horses and 1 waggon.

3 sanitary detachments (ambulances), together with the corresponding company of sick-bearers for each, of 10 waggons each.

1 squadron of train escort of 120 horses and 1 waggon.

1 park column of waggons, answering to the provisional companies of the French train of *équipages militaires*, which can be formed as required, but which numbers, on the average, 5 divisions, each of

80 waggons. As the cavalry, owing to its high peace footing, only requires to draw in a comparatively small proportion of its reserve and landwehr when mobilised, it is always able to give to the train a very sufficient contingent to complete the requisite number of drivers and of grooms.

For purposes of recruiting, administration, embodiment of landwehr, and of mobilisation generally, the whole territory of the North German Confederation (Hesse-Darmstadt not included) is divided into 12 Army Corps Districts, one for each of the 12 provincial army corps, while the Prussian Guards Corps, the 13th of the North German Confederate army, is recruited from the whole Prussian State. Each Army Corps District is further divided, as a rule, into 9 chief districts of a lower class, among which is one Reserve Landwehr Battalion District, and 8 Landwehr Regimental Districts. The Reserve Landwehr Battalion District exists in every corps district; the number of Landwehr Regimental Districts is, as a matter of fact, various in different Corps Districts. In the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 11th, and 12th Army Corps Districts there are 8 Landwehr Regimental Districts; in the 9th and 10th Army Corps Districts there are 6; in the 4th Army Corps District there are 9.

In each Landwehr Regimental District, the corresponding infantry regiment of the line is recruited; the Fusilier regiment, the battalion of Rifles, the regi-

ments of cavalry, the brigade of artillery, the battalion of pioneers, and the battalion of train of the corps, are recruited from the whole army corps district without regard to the special subdivision. Two landwehr regimental districts form as a rule a Brigade District. Each landwehr regimental district is subdivided into two Battalion Districts, each of which can supply, in case of mobilisation, a well-formed garrison battalion (of landwehr, independent of any other formations). A landwehr battalion district is again subdivided into 3 or 6 (exceptionally only into 12) Company Districts. But it is not to be understood from this that on mobilisation the landwehr battalions are composed of different numbers of companies, for, on the contrary, every mobile landwehr battalion is divided, as is a line battalion, into 4 companies.

A peculiar part is played by the Reserve Landwehr Battalion Districts. In their numbers they correspond to the fusilier regiments, which are drawn from their corps districts. But they serve specially to render uniformity in the formation of the garrison battalions possible, and they are the more necessary as the landwehr arrangement could not all at once be put into force in the provinces annexed by Prussia, and in the small States of the North German Confederation. It will therefore not be by any means superfluous to enumerate here the 12 Army Corps Districts of the North German Confederation, pointing out in each the reserve landwehr battalion territory. Every one

can then arrive at such conclusions on the matter as he is minded to. Therefore :—

1st Army Corps.—East Prussia and a great portion of West Prussia; reserve landwehr battalion district, Königsberg, No. 33. (Fischhausen, Königsberg town and country.)

2d Army Corps.—Pomerania, parts of West Prussia and Posen; r. l. b. d., Stettin, No. 34. (Randow, Usedom Wollin, town of Stettin.)

3d Army Corps.—Brandenburg; r. l. b. d., Berlin, No. 35. (Town of Berlin.)

4th Army Corps.—Province of Saxony, Anhalt, Schwarzburg, Reuss; r. l. b. d., Magdeburg, No. 36. (Town of Magdeburg, Magdeburg and Wanzleben.)

5th Army Corps.—Lower Silesia and the Government district Posen; r. l. b. d., Glogau, No. 37. (Glogau and Fraustadt.)

6th Army Corps.—Middle and Upper Silesia; r. l. b. d., Breslau, No. 38. (Town of Breslau.)

7th Army Corps.—The Government districts Münster and Minden in Westphalia, the Government district of Düsseldorf in the Rhine provinces, and Lippe Detmold and Schaumburg Lippe; r. l. b. d., Barmen, No. 39. (Elberfeld, Barmen, and Meltmaun.)

8th Army Corps.—The Government districts of Aix-la-Chapelle, Cologne, Coblenz, Treves, in the Rhine provinces, and Hohenzollern; r. l. b. d., Cologne, No. 40. (Town and district of Cologne.)

9th Army Corps.—Schleswig-Holstein, with the

Oldenburg Enclaves, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Strelitz, the north-eastern portion of the province of Hanover, the free towns Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen; r. l. b. d., Altona. (Pinneberg, Stormarn, Seegeberg, and the town Altona.)

10th Army Corps.—The main part of the former kingdom and present province of Hanover, the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, and the Duchy of Brunswick; r. l. b. d., Hanover, No. 73. (Wennigsen and Hameln, town and district of Hanover).

11th Army Corps.—The Government district of Arnsberg in Westphalia, the former Electorate of Hesse, the former Duchy of Nassau, the former free town of Frankfort, the Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar, the Duchies of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and of Saxe-Meiningen-Hilburghausen-Saalfeld, and the Princedom of Waldeck; r. l. b. d., Frankfort-on-the-Main, No. 80. (Frankfort, Upper Taunus, and Hanau.)

12th Army Corps.—Kingdom of Saxony; r. l. b. d., Dresden, No. 108. (Town of Dresden.)

On this division into Landwehr Districts the whole formation of the garrison army is founded.

Of garrison troops there are:—

1. Two landwehr regiments of the Guard, each of 3 battalions.

2. Two landwehr grenadier regiments of the Guard, each of 3 battalions.

3. For every provincial landwehr battalion district, 1 battalion of 4 companies.

4. For every line battalion of Rifles, 1 company.

5. For every army corps district, 2 cavalry regiments of 4 squadrons each.

6. For every field-artillery regiment, 3 batteries, to be used as sortie-batteries, and for disposal elsewhere afterwards, when not required in the fortresses.

7. The companies of garrison artillery are doubled in number, and therefore in total strength.

8. For every battalion of pioneers 3 fortress companies, but to be distributed, not by companies, but by detachments, as the size of the fortifications may require.

The garrison troops can also, if requisite, be concentrated in regiments, brigades, and divisions, to form strategical reserves for the active army during an offensive war, to supply garrisons abroad, and to furnish siege-corps for fortresses left behind by the army.

The battalions of landwehr regiments of the Guard, and of the landwehr grenadier regiments of the Guard, have each, on a complete war footing, about 800 men; the provincial landwehr battalions about 700 each; a landwehr Rifle company about 250; a landwehr cavalry regiment about 600; and a landwehr sortie-battery, 6 guns. To these must be added the 8 to 16 companies of garrison artillery.

The garrison infantry of an army corps consists, on the average, of 17 battalions of

700 men, . .	=	11,900
1 company of Rifles,	=	250
Total, . .		12,150

or in round numbers, 12,000, which for the 12 corps gives a strength of 144,000 men. The garrison cavalry of an army corps consists of about 1200 combatants; therefore for the 12 corps 14,400 men. The sortie-batteries of an army corps contain 18 guns; for the 12 corps, 216 guns. To the garrison infantry must be added the 12 landwehr battalions of the Guard, with a total of 9600 men. The garrison army, therefore, comprises a total of 168,000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 216 guns.

By the constitution of the North German Confederation, every North German is bound to serve in the army, and cannot provide a substitute to fulfil this duty. Every German liable to serve serves seven years in the active army—as a rule, from the completion of his 20th year to the commencement of the 28th year of his age; he then serves other five years—that is, as a rule, until the commencement of the 33d year of his age, in the landwehr. Of the first seven years he spends three in actual service with the colours; the remaining four, during which he is generally on furlough, in the reserve. In case of war, the operating army is first completed to a full war footing by calling in the reserves; the remainder of the reserves, newly-raised recruits, and, where necessary, the landwehr,

are then formed into reserve troops; and, finally, from the landwehr men, save where exceptions are made for special arms, the garrison troops are formed.

The peculiar position of the Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt, with one foot in South Germany and the other in the North German Confederation, led at once to the treaty of the 17th of April 1867, by which the whole Hessian army, not merely the contingent for Upper Hesse, was placed as a special division, the 25th, in the 11th Army Corps, and incorporated into the North German Confederate Army.

The Hesse-Darmstadt or 25th Division places in the active army 4 regiments of infantry of 2 battalions each, 2 battalions of Rifles, 2 cavalry regiments of 5 squadrons each, 2 divisions of artillery, with a total of 6 batteries (two 6-pounder, three 4-pounder foot-batteries, and 1 horse-battery), 1 company of pioneers, and 1 division of train; therefore, for field service, 10 battalions and 8 squadrons, or 11,200 men, infantry and cavalry, with 36 guns. The reserve troops consist of 4 battalions of infantry, 2 companies of Rifles, 2 batteries with 8 guns, 1 division of pioneers, 1 detachment of train, and the two 5th squadrons of the cavalry regiments. Thus there are in the second line 4800 men, infantry and cavalry, with 8 guns.

Of garrison troops there are 6 landwehr battalions: the State is divided into four regimental districts, every two of which furnish together 1 regiment.

According to the Prussian system, there must be also 2 companies of Rifles and 1 regiment of cavalry, as well as a sortie-battery of 6 guns. This gives 5100 men, infantry and cavalry, with 6 guns.

The three South German States, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, received essentially, in February 1867, the Prussian institutions into their armies. Baden had really for some time adopted them, and also the needle-gun. Würtemberg also soon afterwards armed her infantry with the same weapon; but Bavaria followed her own way in this respect, by introducing first of all the converted Podewil rifle as a very imperfect breech-loader, and afterwards, in 1869, by ordering the manufacture of a new and most excellent breech-loader, the Werder rifle. The fabrication of the whole number requisite was not completed when the war of 1870 broke out. In uniform also, as in the exercise regulations, the Bavarians had rather important differences from the Prussians; but, as a whole, the formation of their army was in imitation of the Prussians.

The Bavarian army had in field troops:—

16 regiments of infantry, of 3 battalions each;

10 battalions of Rifles;

10 regiments of cavalry, of 5 (of which 4 were field) squadrons—namely,

2 regiments of cuirassiers,
6 regiments of light horse,
2 regiments of Uhlans;

4 regiments of artillery, of 8 field and 5 foot (fortress) batteries each; the 2d and 3d regiments had each among their field batteries 2 horse-batteries;

1 regiment of engineers, with 2 field divisions of 3 companies, and 4 fortress companies.

The 58 infantry and Rifle battalions give a total of 58,000 men; the 40 field squadrons, 6000 men; infantry and cavalry together, 64,000 men, with 192 guns.

Of reserve troops there were, according to the Prussian arrangement, 16 battalions of infantry, and 10 companies of Rifles, or together, 18,500 men; 10 fifth squadrons, or 1500 horsemen; 8 batteries, and 2 companies of engineers,—that is, 20,000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 48 guns.

The garrison troops were composed of 32 landwehr battalions, or 22,400 men; to which must be added the before-mentioned companies of garrison artillery and engineers.

The Würtemberg Corps had in field troops 8 regiments of infantry, of 2 battalions, and 3 Rifle battalions each; 4 regiments of cavalry, of 4 squadrons each; 1 regiment of field artillery, with 3 divisions of 3 batteries; 2 companies of pioneers,—therefore 21,400 men, infantry and cavalry, with 54 guns. Of reserve troops, 4 battalions of infantry, 1 battalion of Rifles, 3 squadrons, 3 reserve batteries of 4 guns each; or 5200 men, infantry and cavalry, with 12 guns. Of garrison troops (in the beginning of 1870), 6 landwehr bat-

talions (4200 men), and a division of fortress artillery of 4 companies.

The Baden Corps had of field troops 6 regiments of infantry, of 3 battalions each; 3 regiments of dragoons, of 5 (4) squadrons; 1 regiment of field artillery with 9 batteries, 1 division of pioneers, and 1 of train; or 19,800 men, infantry and cavalry, with 54 guns. Of reserve troops, 3 battalions, 3 squadrons, 1 battery; 3450 men, infantry and cavalry, with 6 guns. Of garrison troops, 10 landwehr battalions and 1 squadron, together with a detachment of fortress artillery of 5 companies; therefore about 7000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 7 field (sortie) guns.

It will be interesting now to review the collective forces which Germany could muster, thoroughly organised and equipped, and to compare with them, in each class, the numbers which France could bring forward.

Germany could muster in field troops 518,000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 1506 guns; France could oppose to them 285,000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 984 guns—that is, but little more than the half. Germany had as reserve troops 161,000 men, infantry and cavalry; France had as depot troops 91,000 men. Germany had as garrison troops 187,000 men; France could show nothing as an equivalent to this, for the Mobile Guard which was to fill their place was simply not organised. We believe that in these round numbers we have given a true comparison of the land

forces of the countries which, in the year 1870, were about to engage in an unhappy war. These numbers distinctly express the enormous military superiority of Germany on the land. Later on we shall frequently have to refer to this.

It is truly said that France has as great, or even a greater, population than Germany—that is, than the North German Confederation and South Germany taken together; the soil of France is, on the average, rather richer than poorer than that of Germany; current money is more plentiful in France than in Germany; and in many other material respects she has the advantage. This is all very true and correct, but it by no means proves that military organisation is there also. There may be steam enough generated in a town to drive a hundred locomotives, but if it be allowed to escape into the streets it will begrime the people and darken the sun, but will yet drive no locomotive.

By organisation of forces we do not mean the perpetual presence of every soldier with the colours; in Germany, even, such is not the case: but every man who is to render service as a soldier must be exercised in military matters, and must know his place in the army. This condition was not carried out in France. The Second Empire had done too much for the standing army, which can never be anything but weak; but too little in the way of providing resources with which to increase this army in case of war.

Even under Louis Philippe the organisation was better arranged for this end. There was then established throughout France a sedentary National Guard. If this even was nothing better than a citizen army, it nevertheless indubitably offered a possibility of giving an elementary military education to the whole male population, especially to the richer and more educated classes, who had purchased freedom from service in the standing army. Moreover, there existed a law providing for the formation of mobile detachments of the National Guard. These were easily formed; and, with the great supply which the collective National Guard offered, these mobile detachments could furnish a very tolerable reserve army, especially for the interior. Napoleon III. had abolished the National Guard. It was retained only in a few towns, and there only in a ruined state. The good adherents of the Empire did very scanty duty as soldiers of the National Guard, and even for that little they provided substitutes. The master who was ordered on guard dressed up his servant in the pretty uniform of the National Guard and sent him on duty in his place.

For the great division of a mobile army, the following rules, which are essentially based on the peace divisions, are observed in Germany. Slight variations from these are sometimes met with, but none of any great importance.

A mobile Army Corps is divided into 2 divisions

of infantry, 1 division of cavalry, and 1 reserve of artillery. A division of infantry consists of 2 brigades of infantry, 1 regiment of horse, as divisional cavalry, and a division of field artillery of 4 batteries. A brigade of infantry consists, as a rule, of 2 regiments or 6 battalions. A division of cavalry consists of 2 brigades, each of 2 regiments, and of a battery of horse-artillery: in 1870, cavalry divisions, in some cases of considerable strength, and of as many as 9 regiments, were formed quite independently of the army corps, and in less numbers. The reserve of artillery consists of 2 horse-batteries and of 1 division of field artillery — therefore altogether 6 batteries.

Germany is by no means so abundantly supplied with fortresses as France, but among the German fortresses there are a proportionately greater number of important ones. North Germany has not neglected to do much to improve its works to meet the changes introduced into firearms; still, in the new erections, its main efforts have been made in fortifying the coasts. In this class we may specially mention Alsen-Sonderburg, Wilhelmshafen (in the Jahde bay), the fortifications of the estuaries of the Ems and of the Weser, Kiel and Friedrichsort.

The North German navy is still too young to have as yet acquired any great importance; still, in the last few years much has been done for it. The ironclad fleet is to be increased to 16 ships, and perhaps

this war of 1870 will bring about the opportunity to reach this strength. In the beginning of this year* the North German steam fleet comprised 45 ships, of which 3 were ironclad frigates and 2 ironclad vessels. The nominal strength of sailors for manning the whole fleet was about 4600 men. To this must be added 1 battalion of marine infantry of 6 companies, and 3 companies of marine artillery. For the rest there existed for every part of the fleet, as for the land forces, a proportionate reserve of men liable to service (reserve and seewehr).

* Written in 1870.

CHAPTER VI.

THE SPANISH THRONE QUESTION, AND THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST PRUSSIA.

After our digression concerning the German forces, we can now return to follow the course of events.

In May 1870 the aspect of affairs was, as we have seen, altogether peaceful. In Germany, nobody wished for the war, and nobody expected it immediately. Ministers and generals were employed making their plans for the summer season of the year. The same peaceful disposition prevailed apparently in France also; a just appreciation of the position of Germany, the recognition of her right to unity and to regulate her own affairs independently, gained ground more and more. There was certainly a warlike Court party, who wished to renew the Empire by the shedding of blood, and who took advantage of the repeated sickness of the Emperor to impress this necessity upon him. The war for the Rhine frontier was, according to a long-received belief, the only one which could be held to be serviceable for this end. But the French army, as a matter of fact, had not, as we have shown,

been as yet increased in numerical strength by the law of the 1st of February 1868; the law itself had never been practically carried out in one essential point—the institution of the Mobile Guard—unless, indeed, we regard as an organisation the nomination on paper of officers of all ranks, who provided themselves with uniform, because they thought that so clad they presented a more beautiful appearance. Regarded from any point of view, it could but be held that the only gain to the French forces had been the introduction of the new armament, the Chassepot and the mitrailleuse.

Whoever simply compared the military situation of France on the one hand with that of Germany on the other, must have been constrained to declare to himself that France could in no way think of declaring war with Germany without having some allies. Even the Emperor Napoleon, who certainly could not have wished for a war in which he would be beaten, must have acknowledged this to himself. Where, then, was France to seek in those days for allies against Germany? The party in France who were thirsting for war naturally turned their glances towards Austria and Italy.

But Austria? Herr von Beust—one of those fortunate ones who are always imperially rewarded for all services rendered, even when they are of but questionable value, until at length the leaf unexpectedly turns over—regarded as his masterstroke the

consolidation of Austria and Hungary, the foundation of the dual empire of Austrian-Hungary or Hungarian-Austria. For such an empire the commencement of a war always brings with it considerable difficulties; and, moreover, the great work of Herr von Beust existed as yet only on paper. The desire for new settlements had arisen in all the countries of the Austrian Empire; and the Austria of 1870 presented rather a picture of Belcredic system of groups than of the dualism of Beust. The finances of Austria were improving but slowly, and a war is never the means to raise the financial condition of a country. Moreover, it was certain that if Austria took part with France, Russia would array herself on the other side, and seek compensation at the cost of Austria.

In Italy, certainly, the Court party inclined greatly towards France. The war of 1866 had rather estranged than drawn into closer union certain members of it, as Lamarmora. On the other hand, the people were for the most part on the side of Prussia. Young Italy had, since 1859, always had her share of the prey which was captured by others, and she expected that such would again be the case. The booty upon which it was now more immediately intent was the territory which still remained to the Pope. But Prussia could concede this to her just as well as France could. The Italian finances were in a still worse state than the Austrian, and careful economy had become by necessity an imper-

ative law. All this must make even the Italian Court party itself hesitate, if it were required of it, to join the French Empire in a war against Germany.

Therefore the prospect which France had of gaining allies was at that time by no means consolatory.

And indeed in June the tokens of a peaceful disposition seemed, if that were necessary, to increase in France. An extraordinary drought prevailed—we ourselves experienced in France no single drop of rain from the 9th of April to the 28th of June; the grass crops were destroyed, and extraordinary measures had to be taken to render it possible for the farmers to keep up to some extent their stock of cattle. The Minister of War also, viewing the scarcity of forage, ordered the sale of a great number of military horses.

M. Ollivier has certainly done, as a Minister, everything in word and deed that he had in former times condemned; but of his love of peace there could certainly be no doubt, especially as his interest lay in it. As soon as he could bring about the downfall of one of his opponents of the Court and war party, this must necessarily be recognised as another token of the ascendancy which the party of peace was attaining. Such a downfall of a certain importance took place in the middle of June 1870. The man who fell was a certain M. Clément Duvernois. This talented journalist, born in 1836, was, until the year 1867, in the most decided opposition to Imperialism.

In the latter year he published a book on the Mexican expedition, which, written cleverly and in a purposely moderate style, still contained a most distinct condemnation of Cæsarism. The book was originally published in French, but a German translation shortly appeared. Immediately afterwards, men remarked that M. Duvernois gradually drew near to the Government of the Empire. At first it could be asserted that he had been won over to the Empire by the Parliamentary tendencies which it proclaimed in its letter of the 19th of January 1869, although his enemies said that the suppression of his book on the Mexican question had been dearly bought. But M. Duvernois made the excusing of his secession every day more impossible. From the 1st of February 1867 he undertook the editorship of a newly-founded journal, 'Le Peuple Français,' a paper which was sold for about the price that its stamp cost. Naturally this *journal entretenu* must have an *entreteneur*, and this subsidiser was no other than the Emperor Napoleon himself. This journal was the journal of Cæsarism. M. Duvernois had become the intimate friend of Napoleon. But he did not content himself with being the popular exponent of the thoughts of the Emperor, he speedily became his counsellor. As Napoleon III. became bodily weaker, so much the louder was the outcry of M. Clément Duvernois. He was one of those who whispered ever more resolutely into the ear of the Emperor that he must do some

great thing—naturally make war on the Rhine—"to revenge the affront of Sadowa." Through the well-merited celebrity which the 'Peuple Français' enjoyed, Clément Duvernois convinced France that the Emperor himself desired nothing more earnestly than to do some great thing. In the year 1869, Duvernois was returned as official candidate for the Upper Alps. As soon as Ollivier had undertaken the Presidency of the Ministry on the 2d of January 1870, he was attacked by Duvernois with a persistency which is without parallel—attacked for his lukewarmness, for his want of energy, for his swaying to and fro—attacked from the Cæsarian point of view. Public opinion said also that the Emperor himself had no sympathy with this Ministry. All this was more than Ollivier could submit to, the more so as other provocations were not wanting. He complained to the Emperor, and demanded either that he should be allowed to retire, or that the work of M. Clément Duvernois should be stopped. On the 16th of June, Napoleon III. offered up his friend Duvernois by causing him to resign the editorship of the 'Peuple Français.' It was long before this decision was arrived at, but the final determination only acquired greater weight thereby.

For the 20th of June 1870, M. Mony, a man of seventy years, and long celebrated in France as an engineer, gave notice of a question to the Government about the Gothard Railway. For many years a tun-

nelling of the Alps had been thought of in Switzerland, which would bring the northern plains of the country into direct communication with the plains of Italy. To effect this a long tunnel was unconditionally necessary, and the undertaking must be enormously costly. In Switzerland, strife had long prevailed about the road to be adopted, and many local interests had pushed into the foreground. Some demanded the Simplon route, other the Lukmanier or Splügen, and others again the Gothard. Arguments of all kinds, technical, commercial, and even military, had been freely used in this fight of rival routes. When on the one side the Mont Cenis tunnel was approaching completion, and on the other the Brenner Railway was already completed, there remained, as can be readily seen, only the Gothard line for the Alpine railway—unless, indeed, the execution of three or four Alpine tunnels simultaneously was to be thought of.

But this one line alone would be so costly an adventure that a private company could hardly undertake it without guarantees from the States interested. The resources of Switzerland unaided would also be insufficient to commence so great a work; and as both Italy and Germany were equally interested in its completion, negotiations were set on foot between Switzerland and Italy on the one hand, and between these two States and Prussia, and the North German Confederation, on the other. These arrangements were

successfully terminated by the Convention of Varzin, of the 20th of June 1870.

From various expressions which Count Bismark had before this uttered in the German Parliament concerning these matters, M. Mony took occasion to give notice of his question. It was clearly to be foreseen that in the discussion which would arise thereupon on the 20th of June, political matters, and especially the pretended threatened violation of the neutrality of Switzerland by Prussia, would be more debated on than the commercial interests of France. Thoughtful politicians were afraid that some of the speakers would harangue with great warmth, and use the opportunity to inveigh against Prussia, and then if perhaps not war, at all events useless diplomatic complications would arise.

Dr Kern, the Swiss ambassador at Paris, as soon as he was informed of the intention of M. Mony to persist in putting the question, of which notice had been given, repaired forthwith to the Duke of Grammont, and with the documents in his hand, explained to him that there could be no question of any threatening of the neutrality of Switzerland by the Gothard treaties; but that, on the contrary, Switzerland, in all the dealings, had had most careful regard to its preservation, and by a variety of clauses had carefully obviated any misunderstanding which might later on lead to its violation or to that of her sovereignty. For the rest, the ambassador added it would be very pleasing to

Switzerland if she could—with like conditions and reservations—conclude similar treaties with France in favour of a Simplon railway.

Before M. Mony on the 20th of June put his question, he also had taken counsel with himself, and concluded his long speech with the assurance that France had in no way anything to fear from the Gothard Railway. Thereupon he was justly asked why he had put the question; to which he made answer, that he had done so in order that the French Government might dig canals to assist the commerce of Marseilles. The Duke of Grammont also treated the matter, in his answer to the question, in accordance with the views which the Swiss Federal Council itself entertained—thoroughly peacefully. And now from the left of the Chamber the Minister of War was asked whether the Gothard Railway, and the way in which it was to be completed, did not affect the balance of military power in a manner unfavourable to France? To which he replied that such might be the case, but that it would be so in so small a degree that it could not be taken into consideration; and that for the rest the Gothard Railway was not yet completed—that its construction would last from fifteen to sixteen years, so that there was yet sufficient time to thoroughly weigh the matter. The majority of the Corps Legislatif was satisfied; and their peace was not even materially disturbed when M. Ferry made some remarks, in which he said that those who now quietly

allowed the Gothard Railway to be constructed, were they who had permitted Sadowa to be fought.

The interlude was played out—the anxiety had been in vain.

In the camp of Chalons, only one series of troops was encamped in the year 1870 instead of two, as usual. This single series was placed under the command of Frossard, General of Engineers, and great siege exercises were to be carried on. A temporary work was constructed to this end in the neighbourhood of the farm of St Hilaire; but only three bastioned fronts were built in 1870. These could be finished by the middle of July, and then the siege exercises were to be commenced. Many officers from foreign armies were to attend them. Nothing in the Camp gave notice of the smallest preparations for a war.

On the 30th of June the Corps Legislatif debated on the law by which the contingent of recruits was to be reduced from the usual number of 100,000 men to 90,000. The law was passed. Ollivier declared on this occasion that the peace of Europe had never been more assured than it then was—that no impending question menaced it. We have here purposely narrated in succession the tokens which seem to us the most important of the peaceful disposition of France. Ollivier was right. Even on the 30th of June no man could dream that the French Government would, within a week, look out for a pretext for a war against Prussia;—and yet such was the case.

We will now follow the details of this unhappy affair.

In Spain, Donna Isabella II. of Bourbon, born 1830, daughter of Ferdinand VII. and of the Neapolitan Princess Marie Christine, reigned as constitutional queen since 1843. She was a good-natured woman, but brought up from childhood in bigotry and dissoluteness. Her Government was composed of an unceasing change of favourites and generals, who, raised to power by military *pronunciamientos*, were, in the name of the queen, the real rulers. Civil war was in Spain an institution. In the year 1868, the President of the Ministry, Narvaez, Duke of Valencia, who was a *moderado* — which in its Spanish translation signifies a bloodthirsty reactionist —died. With a few honest counsellors at her side, the queen might perhaps even then have struck upon a path which would have been beneficial for Spain; but as there were none of these near her, she failed to do this, and commissioned Gonzales Bravo to form a Cabinet—a passionate man, of whom she was afraid; a man who had chastised her corporeally, when she was a child of twelve years old, to obtain her signature to a command.

Gonzales Bravo conducted himself in office perfectly after the manner of Narvaez. After he had, in his imperiousness, committed many other follies, he, on the 7th of July 1868, caused Generals Serrano, Dulce, Zavala, Cordova, Letona, Echague, Caballero

de Rodas, who did not belong to the extreme reactionist party, to be arrested, in order to intern or transport them. At the same time the intriguing Duke of Montpensier and his wife, the Infanta Louise, younger sister of Queen Isabella, were exiled from Spain. They repaired to Lisbon. The Duke of Montpensier,—that son of Louis Philippe who was by no means beloved in Spain—mean, covetous, cautious—"the duke with the umbrella,"—found at first in this banishment a certain relief. To the greater number of the above-named generals the same feeling came also. But each of them had a certain number of followers in the army, and after their arrest no one any longer enjoyed a feeling of security for himself. All, therefore, began to conspire against the queen and her favourites, Marfori and the real regent Gonzales Bravo.

In August 1868 an uneasy feeling prevailed throughout Spain. In the Court also this was felt. Still Queen Isabella trusted in her relations on the other side of the Pyrenees, the Emperor Napoleon III. and the Empress Eugenie. With them she sought to conclude an intimate bond for her own protection and for that of the Holy Father, who had given her the consecrated rose as the testifying seal of her universally acknowledged virtue. In August she sent to the Emperor Napoleon Count Girgenti, a younger brother of the exiled King Francis of Naples, with his wife, her eldest daughter Isabella, whom she

had given in marriage to him only in the May of that year. The young pair were received at the French Court with the greatest distinction. But the good Queen Isabella herself repaired in September to St Sebastian, to take there sea-baths, and to be at the same time near the French frontier, so that a meeting with the Emperor Napoleon might be easily brought about. During this time the exiled generals had put themselves in communication with the leaders of the different parties of the opposition; and the *pronunciamiento* of 1868 was no longer made in the name of the queen, but against the dynasty. The banished generals placed themselves at the head of the movement. The troops of the Government, as many as remained true to the queen, were soon beaten. Isabella had dismissed Gonzales Bravo, and had placed General Don José Concha at the head of the Ministry; but even he pronounced against her, and demanded the dismissal of her favourite Marfori.

After much hesitation, the queen determined, on the 30th of September, to fly to France, and carried out her resolve forthwith. Accompanied by her singular secular-ecclesiastical retinue, she saw for a moment the Emperor Napoleon III., the Empress Eugenie, and the Prince Imperial, in Biarritz, and then continued her journey immediately to the old castle of Pau, once the residence of Henry IV., which had been pointed out to her as her resting-place by Napoleon III. The meeting in Biarritz was mournful.

Had Napoleon forebodings? Who can tell? He scarcely thought, though, that the 1st of September would be near to the 30th of September, as it proved to be.

On the 3d of October Isabella hurled from Pau at Spain a protest against her deposition, which, however, was properly only her flight. In Spain provisional "juntas" had everywhere arisen. An administration must finally be formed, and men knew not where and whereof this should be gathered together. The junta of Madrid claimed a preference, and demanded of Marshal Serrano, who had vanquished the royal forces at Alcolea, and had entered Madrid on the 3d of October, to form a provisional government. Serrano undertook without hesitation the commission assigned to him.

There were in Europe many people who pictured to themselves that Spain must be glad to have freed herself so cheaply from a rooted dynasty, and to be able now to acknowledge, unhindered, a republic. There existed also in Spain a republican party, and its members were not the worst men. But the provisional government of Serrano consisted mainly of adherents to a constitutional monarchy; and therefore, in the times which immediately followed, the history of Spain turns essentially upon the search for a king for that country. There was, strangely enough, no lack of candidates, and each of them had his followers and supporters.

Very prominent among them in the first moments was the Duke of Montpensier, who, in spite of his avarice, allowed his candidateship to cost him much. The Spanish monarchists, who were striving for the unity of the Iberian peninsula, for the union of Spain and Portugal, bethought themselves of a Portuguese king, either in the person of the reigning King Louis, or of his father Ferdinand, who had withdrawn with the title of king from political affairs, and now lived quietly in Oporto. But both of these manifested but small desire to take upon themselves the burden of the Spanish crown. The old Carlists took courage, and brought forward a pretender of the old stem. According to their apprehension, the present legitimate king must be the third son of the old Don Carlos, Don Juan. But this man had made his election impossible, even with the legitimate party, by his behaviour in the year 1860. Then, during the Morocco war, which for a time had united all parties in Spain, and was there regarded as a holy war, he had taken up arms. His general, Ortega, was taken prisoner and shot, but he himself escaped, hastily disguised, in a hackney, and thenceforward he bore the nickname of "Fly-Don-Juan" (Don Juan alla tartana). Now he gave heed for once to the counsel of his advisers, and abdicated in favour of his son, who, under the name of Charles VII., entered upon his reign *in partibus* on the 3d of October 1868, and announced it to the sovereigns of Europe on the 28th of October.

In Italy, also, the constitutional Spaniards sought for a prince, but here too they found hesitation and doubt. In short, a king could not be found, and this was principally the fault of the French Government. This calculated upon leading back to the royal throne of Spain, not in any way Queen Isabella, but her son, the young Prince of the Asturias, born on the 20th of November 1857. It believed that it would then be able to govern him, and therefore it intrigued against all other candidates for the throne; at the same time constantly working upon Queen Isabella, who soon found beautiful Pau monotonous, and removed her residence to Paris.

In spite of the candidateship of the young Prince Alfonse, which was in the main faithfully supported by the French Government, there arose, nevertheless, in the summer of 1869, much talk of another, which was not altogether displeasing to the circles in Paris which were near to the Tuileries. This was the candidateship of a Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. The Princes of Hohenzollern-Hechingen and of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen had, in 1849, resigned their lands to those Hohenzollerns who for centuries had ruled in Brandenburg and in Prussia, and who are Protestants. The Hohenzollern-Sigmaringens very distantly related to the Prussian branch, have always remained Catholics.

The head of this family was now Prince Charles Anton, born 1811, General in the Prussian army.

He is the son not only of his father, the old Prince Charles, but also of the French Princess Marie-Antoinette, a niece of Murat, once King of Naples. In 1834 he married the Princess Josephine, a daughter of the Archduke Charles Frederic of Baden and of the Princess Stephanie, sister of Hortense de Beauharnais. The head of the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family had, by his wife, between 1835 and 1845, five children—namely:

The Hereditary Prince Leopold, born 1835;

Prince Charles, born 1839, and now the elected Prince of Roumania;

Prince Anton, born 1841, who, a brave young officer in the Prussian service, was severely wounded on the 3d of July at Königgratz, and died early in August 1866;

Prince Frederic, born 1843;

Princess Marie, born 1845.

The Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who was at this time (in 1869) talked of in Paris as a candidate for the throne of Spain, was the young Prince Frederic, born 1843. At that time nothing was said against the candidateship of this prince of a Catholic line which, as is shown by the foregoing, was more closely allied to the Emperor Napoleon than to King William of Prussia. It was asserted that the Empress Eugenie decidedly favoured it, and that Prince Frederic was to marry some relation of the Empress.

It was precisely this last idea which was, as it

appears, displeasing to the leading men in Spain. They had no objection to a Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, but they had much to say against the proposed marriage. The project to elect as King of Spain the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Leopold, was only brought to light in the autumn. If France, who had opposed all former candidates for the throne, had accepted Prince Frederic, why should she not equally accept his elder brother Prince Leopold? The latter had, in the eyes of the supporters of the Iberian union, this additional advantage, that he had married in the year 1861 the Princess Antonie, daughter of the old King Ferdinand of Portugal. The intriguing Marshal Prim, to enter upon any project with whom is certainly almost fatal, was empowered to enter into negotiations with the Hereditary Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. If Prince Leopold had known what manner of man Marshal Prim was, he would probably never have entered into any dealing with him. However, this is for the present indifferent.

There is no doubt that the French Court party heard immediately all that was necessary of these negotiations; and although the candidateship of Prince Frederic had been by no means unpleasant to them, the candidateship of his elder brother, the Hereditary Prince Leopold, was now all at once most displeasing to them. From this time may be dated

all the endeavours of the French Court party to move Queen Isabella to abdicate in favour of her son, the young Prince Alfonse of Asturias. These endeavours were at the end of June 1870 crowned with success. Queen Isabella formally abdicated in favour of her son, Prince Alfonse, and reserving to herself all rights, announced it to the Spaniards in a "manifesto." But very nearly at the same time it became known in France that, in consequence of negotiations which had been concluded, the Hereditary Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen had declared himself ready to assume the Spanish crown if he were elected to be king by the majority of the Cortes. In a council of the Ministry in Madrid, held on the 5th of July, it was resolved that the Cortes should be reassembled on the 22d of the same month; that the election of king should take place on the 1st of August — it was calculated that there would be a great majority for Prince Leopold;—and that the elected king should enter Spain on the 1st of November. On the same day on which this council of the Ministry took place in Madrid, M. Cochery moved a question in the Corps Legislatif on the Spanish affair. Cochery, advocate, born 1820, was after the Revolution of February 1848 chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Justice; retired, however, very soon afterwards from public life, and returned to his career of advocate, and with it of journalism. In the year 1869 he was returned to the Corps Legislatif,

although violently opposed by the Government, by the democratic opposition in the Department Loiret. He signed the question of the 116. His seat was in the Left Centre. When M. Cochery proposed his question, the Court party had in reality already determined to make use of the occasion either to humble Prussia or to bring on a war with her. In a council of Ministers on the 5th of July, an answer to the question of M. Cochery was agreed upon, which could be read as peaceful by one part of the Ministry, but was meant to be warlike by the other. The Duke of Grammont delivered this answer to the Chamber on the 6th of July. He said:—

"It is true that Marshal Prim has offered the throne of Spain to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and that the offer has been accepted. Meanwhile, on the one hand, the Spanish people have not yet pronounced their vote; and on the other, the details of the transaction—which have been concealed from her—are not yet known to France. It will be therefore well to adjourn the debate on this question. The Government has never ceased to testify their sympathy with the Spanish nation, and to avoid every appearance of interference in the affairs of Spain. It has observed the strictest neutrality in regard to the various candidates for the throne. It will continue to act in this sense. But," continued the Duke, "we do not believe that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people obliges us to endure patiently that a

foreign Power, by placing one of her own princes upon the throne of Charles V., should disturb to our prejudice the existing balance of power in Europe, and endanger the interests and honour of France. This contingency, we firmly hope, will not occur. We calculated in this respect upon the wisdom of the German and the friendship of the Spanish people. But should it be otherwise, gentlemen, we all know, strong by your support and by that of the nation, how to do our duty without fear and hesitation."

This declaration was received with loud applause by the Right, the Right Centre, and even by a part of the Left Centre. The Left demanded that the documents should be laid upon the table; their orators, especially Picard, Cremieux, and Arago, scented the war from afar. They protested that it was wished to plunge France into it before she had time to consider and declare her opinion; that it was, under existing circumstances, quite unnecessary to continue the discussion on the budget—which was just then the business before the house—as this budget had only been framed in view of a completely assured peace, and that the war which was being prepared would overthrow it completely and render it ridiculous. Ollivier strove to conciliate: he believed in peace; he held that it was only necessary for France to show herself strong and energetic, and she would obtain everything which she required and demanded.

But meanwhile what could a declaration such as

that of the Duke of Grammont, delivered on the public tribune, signify—unless it signified, indeed, nothing at all — other than a war against Germany? The Duke of Grammont declared that France did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain. Therefore, if the Spaniards elect Prince Leopold to be their king, what had France to do with it? He said also that she had nothing to do it. But—the Government will not suffer a foreign Power to place one of her princes upon the throne of Charles V., and thereby disturb the European balance of power.

The foreign Power was Prussia. With her, therefore, the French Government would have to deal, and not with Spain. How it stood with regard to the position of the Hereditary Prince Leopold to "the foreign Power" we have already explained. The French Government could have known it as well as we do. If they had said through diplomatic means to the actual Spanish Government, We do not wish to see the Prince of Hohenzollern upon the throne of Spain —that would then have been its affair, and it would have been at the option of the Spanish Government and of the Spanish people to yield or not to yield to the wishes of the French Government. But how Prussia could determine upon a king for Spain, how Prussia could be made answerable for the choice of the Spaniards, must necessarily remain an unsolved enigma to sound common-sense. Equally enigmatical is it to discover how, if even a Prussian prince had

been nominated to be King of Spain — assuming, therefore, the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen to be a Prussian prince—the balance of power in Europe would be disturbed.

Weighing well all this, no other conclusion can possibly be drawn from the declaration of the Duke of Grammont on the 6th of July, than that—we will not say the French Government—but the French warlike Court party had found, or believed they had found, a pretext for a war for the Rhine frontier. The behaviour of the whole official press in the days which followed the 6th of July, leaves no doubt on the subject. The old peace-disturber, Girardin, declared very soon, "If France steps forward boldly, Prussia naturally will stoop; but that will not suffice: if she will not do more than that, France must simply advance into the Rhenish provinces, and with the butts of her muskets in their backs, drive the Prussians back across the Rhine." So said all the Imperial or Court party. The reasonable, liberally-conducted journals, 'Debats,' 'Temps,' 'Siècle,' and a few others, could soon make no way against the enormous swindle which was preached by the greater part of the Paris press. As since 1814 and 1815 the people of Paris and the troopers have used the word "le Prussien" to express also that portion of the body upon which a human being is accustomed to sit down, the affair with Prussia soon gave the humorous weekly

papers much food for agreeable pictures, and for more or less appropriate witticisms.

We strive in all this to give as true a picture as possible, short though it may be, of the events which actually took place; but it is more important to describe more minutely the conception which the Court war party had of the situation of Germany. It had taught itself, namely, to believe firmly that the present opportunity was an especially favourable one to engage with Prussia alone. It was here a question of a Prussian dynasty. South Germany, it assumed—where, in truth, Prussia was not greatly beloved—would seize with pleasure upon the opportunity to separate itself from her. And not only there, but in the North German Confederation also, Prussia would behold enemies spring up. Hanover would arise. Saxony, whose Crown Prince had in 1866 declared that he would rather be an Austrian corporal than a Prussian general, would, supported by Austria, lend her assistance to the French cause. All these were in truth destined to be but imaginary pictures, for the simple reason that the French ambassadors knew perhaps the German courts, but were utterly ignorant of the German people.

The debate upon Cochery's question was adjourned, but the French Legislatif showed itself impatient in the highest degree in its wish to know how matters stood concerning this affair.

The French Government had forthwith applied to all the European Governments to ascertain what they severally thought about its right to interfere in the question of the candidateship of Prince Leopold. The European Governments, as can be easily understood, could not be unpolite; they answered that they wished peace to be maintained. The Prussian Government especially declared that it knew nothing officially of the candidateship of Prince Leopold, and that this candidateship in no way concerned it.

Upon this the French ambassador in Berlin, Count Benedetti, was instructed to place himself in direct communication with King William of Prussia, and to demand of him that he should forbid Prince Leopold to accept the Spanish crown. King William was just at this time taking the baths in Ems. Thither Count Benedetti repaired, and on the 9th of July he had an audience with the King. The King replied to the demands which Benedetti made of him, that as King of Prussia he knew absolutely nothing of the candidateship of Prince Leopold, only as the head of the Hohenzollern family had he been informed of it. He could just as little command Prince Leopold, who was of age, to accept as to refuse the Spanish crown. In a second audience, on the 11th of July, Benedetti was still more urgent; but it was impossible for King William to give an answer other than he had made on the 9th of July. Only he now added that he did not even know where Prince Leopold, who had in-

tended to make a journey in the Alps, might be at that moment.

Prince Leopold, as soon as he was informed of the complications which his candidateship had evoked—of which he had not before thought, and which he could not have anticipated—determined to renounce his candidateship in order that he might give no occasion for a war between the two representative nations of civilisation in central Europe,—in order that by no fault of his should even a pretext for such a war be forthcoming. He prayed his father to announce this intention at all places where it might be necessary, and his father in all haste did all that was possible to fulfil his request. On the 12th of July, Don Salustiano Olozaga, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, announced officially to the French Government that Prince Leopold had renounced the throne of Spain. With this, according to all reasonable calculation, the cause of quarrel must be assumed to be removed. Such also, at noon on the 12th, was the view of Emil Ollivier. After the withdrawal of the candidateship of Prince Leopold, he declared to a number of Deputies in the "Salle des pas perdus," in the Palais Bourbon, that the quarrel existed no more—that everything was arranged.

But this 12th of July was a memorable day. On it commenced the transport of troops and of munitions of war to Metz, and to the north-east frontier of France. On it Clément Duvernois, the adversary

of Ollivier, put the question to the Cabinet, What guarantee France had that other complications, such as the candidateship for the Spanish crown, might not be again stirred up by Prussia? On it the Ministry instructed Count Benedetti to demand of the King of Prussia that he would forbid the Prince of Hohenzollern for all future time to come forward again in any way as a candidate for the crown of Spain. On this same day the Prussian ambassador, Baron von Werther, who had been absent since the 5th of July on leave granted him long before, and who had just returned, had a conversation with Grammont and Ollivier, in the course of which the French Minister of Foreign Affairs insinuated that the King of Prussia must write a letter of apology to the Emperor Napoleon, in which he must state in substance that by his assent to the candidateship of Prince Leopold he had neither intended to give offence to the Emperor Napoleon nor to France, and that "he would not do it again." Baron Werther communicated this to Count Bismark, who made answer that he was hard of hearing, and could not well understand this language; but that the French Government might make communications of like nature to the Prussian Cabinet through their ambassador in Berlin.

On the 12th of July Emil Ollivier yielded yet again to the will of others, and determined to defend a cause which he had ten times and until this very day fought against: he formed his resolution—if so noble

a word may be applied to such an unworthy proceeding. Henceforth he was the declared servant of the Court war party.

The history of the 13th of July followed—let us not grudge following out the course of events by single days—and on that day the drama was continued at Paris and at Ems. In Paris the Duke of Grammont communicated to the Corps Legislatif that the French Government had received from the Spanish ambassador official information of the withdrawal of Prince Leopold. The negotiations of the French Government with Prussia were not, however, yet brought to an end, and therefore no communication about them could be made to the Chambers. But for the Mamelukes of the Second Empire, matters were progressing even now much too slowly. One of them arose to put a question as to the causes of the slow proceedings in her foreign policy, which endangered not only the public welfare, but also the national dignity of France.

This Deputy was Baron Jérôme David, son of the old King Jérôme of Westphalia, and grandson of the celebrated painter Louis David. Born in the year 1823, he was destined by his family for the sea, and was a ship's boy from 1835 to 1837. But a sea life was not pleasing to him; he preferred service on land, and received the necessary preparations in the military school of St Cyr, which he left in 1844 to become a sub-lieutenant in the Zouaves. In Africa, whither

he was sent, he learnt Arabic, and found many and distinguished protectors, who, as was natural, accompanied him under the Empire. During the Crimean war he was orderly officer to Prince Napoleon (Plonplon), his brother, and came back with him to France, when the bodily and mental condition of the Prince prevented his remaining any longer with the army. In the year 1857, Baron Jérôme David left the military service with the rank of captain, and devoted himself partly to idyllic and partly to civil-political studies. In the year 1859 he was elected to the Corps Legislatif as Government candidate for the Department Gironde, and distinguished himself in it by his pronounced Cæsarian views, and his great power of talking.

While in Paris the Mamelukes of the Empire had lost patience, Count Benedetti had behaved in accordance with his instructions from the Ollivier-Grammont or Grammont-Ollivier Ministry. On the 13th of July he addressed the King of Prussia during his morning walk, and delivered a harangue to him. The King answered that he was informed of the renunciation of Prince Leopold, and perfectly agreed with it; he had, however, only acquired the information from newspapers, which he showed to Count Benedetti, taking them from his pocket. At breakfast, at 1 P.M., the King of Prussia received a letter from the old Prince Charles Anton of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, in which the latter confirmed in a detailed narrative

the news of the withdrawal of his son from the candidateship for the Spanish throne. At 2 P.M. the King sent this intelligence, and an explanation that he looked upon the matter as concluded by this, by an adjutant to Count Benedetti.

This poor man, meanwhile, had to withstand all manner of pressure from Paris. He said to the adjutant of the King that he had been instructed by telegraph to demand a fresh audience with the King. In it he was to lay before the King the definite wishes of the French Government, which amounted to this: That the King, in the first place, should consent to the renunciation of the Prince of Hohenzollern; and that, secondly, he should give an assurance that this candidateship should never in future be taken up again. The King replied by his adjutant to Count Benedetti that he consented to the renunciation of Prince Leopold in the same way that he had accepted the fact of his becoming a candidate for the throne of Spain, as a matter which concerned neither him nor still less Prussia or the North German Confederation. It followed, then, that it was absolutely impossible for him to give on his side assurances for the future in this question, which in no way concerned him. The King could only appeal to that which he had that morning said by word of mouth to Count Benedetti.

Benedetti, nevertheless, now demanded a personal interview with the King to discuss the second point—the assurances for the future. The King, at 5.30 P.M.,

sent his adjutant yet again to Benedetti, and caused it to be told him that after the earlier explanations there was nothing new to be said on the second point. Benedetti then made inquiries to ascertain where Bismark was. The Chancellor had certainly been called by the King to Ems, but when on his journey from Barzin he heard in Berlin of the renunciation of Prince Leopold, he turned quietly back, as he held that with this the affair was settled. On the 13th of June only was his attendance again ordered, and using all speed, he could not possibly arrive in Ems before the 15th of July.

On the 14th of July the King made a journey to Coblentz, and on this occasion greeted Count Benedetti, who displayed the greatest haste to depart from his presence, at the railway station. The Germans had opposed a wonderfully calm behaviour to the challenges of France, for in Germany no man really thought that from this candidateship for the throne of Spain even the pretext for a war could arise.

Could anything more frivolous be thought of?

The German newspapers spoke in those days with an extreme moderation, which contrasted wonderfully with the expressions of the Paris journals, 'Liberté,' 'Paris Journal,' 'Gaulois,' 'Figaro,' 'Patrie,' 'Constitutionnel,' 'Peuple Français,' and others.

On the 14th of July the die was cast in Paris. War was determined on, come what might. The preparations, as we have before related, had been already

begun, but still without the sanction of the Ministry, by the Court party, who were busy behind the scenes. Benedetti had sent several reports of the occurrences of the 13th of July in Ems, and the North German Confederate Government had also sent telegraphic accounts of the proceedings to their diplomatic agents, and these were published by the French Court war party as "diplomatic notes," in which form they were certainly decided affronts. During the Cabinet council, the Emperor—to whom the idea, not of the war, certainly, but of defeat in it, was abhorrent—left the Chamber, but returning in great haste repeated what he had already often before said: "But, gentlemen, I require surety, surety" (naturally meaning thereby surety that the French would gain the victory—a surety difficult to give). Marshal Lebœuf answered proudly: "Sire, not a single trouser-button is wanting." With this assurance from a competent judge, everything was concluded: the wished-for war could now begin, and it was proclaimed on the 15th of July.

On the same day M. Emil Ollivier demanded an extraordinary credit of 500 millions of francs, and making himself the faithful interpreter of the views of the mighty Duke of Grammont, proclaimed the war with Prussia. He announced that the calling in of the reserves had been already ordered on the 14th. The decree for the credit of 500 millions was declared to be urgent. The Left abstained from voting; but

the only man who dared now, even in the twelfth hour, to speak a word of reason, was the old M. Thiers. This man, to whom France is principally indebted for the fortifications of Paris, of whom it certainly cannot be asserted that in general a war by France against Germany, and especially for the Rhine frontier, would be displeasing to him, declared, nevertheless, against this war—against a war now, and under the present circumstances. He described it as imprudent; the occasion was badly chosen; France was not prepared; and, moreover, she stood alone in it. Certainly it required courage to speak the truth in such a manner to this assembly, in the face of the senseless roar of jubilation from the Imperial Mamelukes. It was the pure truth; but just on that account was courage required to proclaim it.

Ollivier did justice to the courage of M. Thiers, but he took upon himself the full responsibility in history of this war—a burden which was soon to be made light enough for him. He asserted that the war was necessary, and appealed to justify this assertion to the affront which had been offered to Count Benedetti. The refusal of the King to hold further intercourse with Benedetti might perhaps in itself have been more leniently judged, although the Prussian Government had before declared that it was in no way concerned in the candidateship of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, thereby forcing the French Government to apply directly to the King of Prussia.

But the matter had been made worse and irreparable by this, that the Prussian Government had expressly informed the foreign Courts, in a note of the 14th of July, of the refusal of the King to receive the French ambassador. The Left demanded to see the talked-of note; but the Right forbade, at first by tumult, and afterwards by their vote, its production. Such a prohibition was certainly extremely necessary in the interest of M. Emil Ollivier, for the note simply did not exist. There existed nothing more than a simple telegraphic despatch from the Prussian Government to its diplomatic agents abroad, in which it shortly communicated to them the real history of the events of the 13th of July. The majority of the Chamber assented to everything that the Government demanded for the war.

From day to day men waited now for the appearance of the declaration of war against Prussia. The proclamation, however, was still delayed. England made a feeble attempt to prevent the war. She offered to this end her good services of mediation to the French as well as to the Prussian Cabinets. From France an answer politely declining them was at once sent back. Prussia, already informed of this, declared that she would thankfully accept the intervention of England, but only on condition that France should first equally assent to it. With this, England's last attempt was shipwrecked.

At 1.30 P.M. on the 19th of July, the French ambassador in Berlin handed to the Prussian Government the declaration of war. His name happened to be Le Sourd, a name characteristic of the situation. The declaration of war runs thus :—

"The undersigned agent of France has, in accordance with the orders of his Government, the honour to bring the following communication to the knowledge of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of his Majesty the King of Prussia.

"The Government of his Majesty the Emperor of the French could only regard the plan to raise a Prussian prince to the throne of Spain as an undertaking against the territorial security of France, and saw itself therefore compelled to demand from his Majesty the King of Prussia the assurance that a similar combination should never arise again with his sanction.

"As his Majesty the King of Prussia refuses to give this assurance, and, on the contrary, has declared to the ambassador of his Majesty the Emperor of the French that he intends to reserve to himself the possibility of acting according to circumstances in this eventuality as in any other, the Imperial Government must perceive in this declaration of the King an *arrière pensée* which is threatening to France, and to the balance of power in Europe.

"This declaration has acquired a more earnest significance through the communication which was made

to the Cabinets of the refusal to receive the ambassador of the Emperor, and to enter with him upon a new explanation.

"Consequently the French Government has regarded it as its duty to think without delay upon defending their injured dignity; and determining to adopt every measure for this end which the present situation offers, it regards itself to be from the present time in a state of war with Prussia."

Germany was forced into the war by the light-minded French Government. But it is unjust to make the French people answerable for it. The French people desired this war just as little as did the German. Germany was forced into the war. The King of Prussia, representative of the North German Confederation, had been affronted by the demands which Count Benedetti had made of him. The King had been insulted. The majority of the Paris newspapers—the 'Gaulois,' the 'Figaro,' the 'Paris Journal,' the 'Constitutionnel,' the 'Liberté,' and others — proclaimed this aloud. As long as monarchical governments exist, intentional offence given to the monarch who stands at the head of his people, must be equivalent to an affront offered to the whole nation. A republican also can well say this. No republican would hesitate for a moment to consider it as a personal affront if the president of his republic was officially insulted by a foreign nation.

The affair was so simple, that in Germany every

child comprehended it; and many of even the most moderate people could not understand how, after the 15th of July, the Government of the North German Confederation retained its moderate tone. Certainly it might well be asked how an affront to the King of Prussia affected South Germany. But on that point the above-named Paris journals gave the most telling answer: they counted upon a duel between France and Prussia; they speculated upon division in Germany—speculated upon this, that the Germans, more than sixty years after the death of Schiller, nearly forty years after the death of Goethe, in spite of all their acquisitions in the fields of science, of arts, of commerce, and of manufacture—acquisitions which were in common, and could only have been won by their united powers—could be divided in a war against foreigners, who demanded from them one of their territories.

This must be answered vigorously and energetically. It was an insult to every German. They must answer it not with, "We wish to be a united nation of brethren," but with "We are a united nation of brethren. You think that we will now divide against ourselves? No; a thousand times, no!" And such a result came to pass. Throughout all Germany but one voice rang. One voice drowned all party cries: they may arise again, but in that moment they dared not make themselves heard. South Germany and North Germany rose up with one thought and

with one mind. And the German provinces of Austria, although separated by statecraft from Germany, had no other thought than the remaining German countries had, and had the necessity arisen, would have rendered it very difficult for Herr von Beust to follow out his peculiar political ideas.

On the 14th the command was given for the mobilisation of the North German Army, and the South German States did not delay to declare their adherence. At the same time, the North German Parliament was summoned to assemble at Berlin, the 19th of July, on the same day on which the Corps Legislatif was sent home that it might not be able to interfere. When the King of Prussia opened the session at noon on the 19th of July, the French official declaration of war had not been communicated to him, but he knew that it was already in Berlin. His speech from the throne was a pattern of moderation, and we select from it those parts which seem to us to be characteristic of the existing feeling in Germany, because, when once such a senseless war has commenced, all ideas become perverted. When once two great nations who are equal to one another have allowed themselves to be plunged into such a war, reason ceases but too easily on both sides, and the reign of madness begins.

"If Germany," thus spoke the King of Prussia, after he had shortly explained the situation, "in former centuries has silently submitted to the like violent

injuries of her rights and of her honour, she endured them only because in her divided state she did not know how strong she was. To-day, that the bond of intellectual and just union, which the war of liberation commenced to knit, binds together, the longer the more thoroughly, all German races; to-day, that the preparation of Germany offers no opening to the enemy, Germany carries within herself the will and the power to ward off a new French deed of violence.

"It is no boasting spirit which puts these words into my mouth. The allied governments, as I do myself, act in the full consciousness that victory and defeat are in the hand of the Ruler of Battles. We have clearly weighed the responsibility which, before the judgment-seats of God and of men, rests upon him who drives two great and peace-loving people in the heart of Europe to a devastating war.

"The German and the French nations, both equally enjoying and desiring the blessings of Christian civilisation, and of increasing prosperity, are called to a nobler contest than the bloodthirsty one of arms.

"Nevertheless, the rulers of France have understood how to turn to the use of their own personal interests and passions the justifiable but irritable self-consciousness of our great neighbouring nation."

When were ever truer and nobler words spoken, at the beginning of a great war between two nations, by the head of one of these nations? Never, since the history of the world began; never! But shall we be

obliged later on to revert to these words to remind ourselves that magnanimity and reason disappear as soon as a senseless war has been conjured up between two nations, who both — the nations — wished for peace ?

In the address which the North German Parliament presented to the King of Prussia, it said :—

" We trust in God, whose judgment punishes bloodthirsty crime. From the shores of the ocean to the foot of the Alps, the nation has risen up at the call of its princes, who stand together in unanimity. No sacrifice is too heavy for it. The public opinion of the civilised world recognises the justice of our cause. Friendly nations see in our victory the liberation from the burden of Bonapartic imperiousness, and the expiation of injustice wrought also upon themselves. The German people will at last find upon the battlefield the foundation of a peaceful and free union, which will be respected by all nations."

In the session of the Parliament, on the 20th of July, the Chancellor of the Confederation, Count Bismark, laid before it all the documents which were, with great trouble, to be found about the origin of the war. Among them also was the answer of the 18th of July, which he had been obliged to make to the English ambassador in Berlin, Lord Loftus, in reply to the offer of mediation made by England. In this answer the following passage occurs :—

" France has taken the initiative in this war, and

held fast to it, after the first complication had been materially settled, in accordance also with the opinion of England. An initiative taken by us now in instituting negotiations would be misunderstood by the national feeling of Germany, now that it is deeply hurt and excited by the threats of France. Our strength lies in the feelings of nationality, justice, and honour which the nation possesses; while the French Government has shown that it does not stand in need of this support to an equal degree in its own land."

The troops marched from the east and from the west towards the Rhine. But meanwhile a diplomatic campaign was fought out which we cannot pass over unheeded.

There appeared, namely, in the 'Times,' a communication over the earlier negotiations between Bismark and Benedetti, which were mostly concerning Belgium, the main points of which we have before narrated. This publication aroused in England, in the Parliament and in the nation, stormy excitement. Could it then be the case that, while men had been believing that they were living in the profoundest peace, such transactions had taken place? That while England was assured that the neutrality of Belgium was as firm as anything could be, that the same had come to be in extreme jeopardy? Explanations were demanded.

Bismark wished for nothing better. On the 27th

of July he telegraphed to Count Bernstorff, ambassador of the North German Confederation in London, that the communications of the 'Times' were perfectly correct and true; and on the 29th of July he issued a long circular despatch, in which he diffusely narrated the various negotiations of the French Court with him, and repeated that the project of a treaty, written by Benedetti himself, of which we have before made mention, was in his possession, and that the handwriting of Benedetti had been recognised by the ambassadors of England, Austria, Russia, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Hesse, Italy, Saxony, Turkey, and Würtemberg, at Berlin. The most important passage in Bismark's note seems to us to be the following:—

"I think that the conviction that the French territory would never be enlarged through us, has alone determined the Emperor (Napoleon) to seek it through a war with us.

"Were the project of the treaty not published abroad—I have grounds for believing it—France would, after the completion of the preparations for war on both sides, urge us more than ever to put into execution the former proposals, as we should stand in the view of unarmed Europe at the head of altogether a million well-armed warriors. She would propose to us, it may be before or it may be after the first battle, to conclude peace upon the basis of the project of M. Benedetti, and at the cost of Belgium."

The answer of the Duke of Grammont only appeared, after hostilities had already been commenced, on the 3d of August. The Duke could say but little. He dwelt upon the "impossibility" of Bismark's narrative in some points; he asserted that at all events the Emperor had had nothing to do with the negotiations of M. Benedetti—of his ambassador! He laid all the blame of the projects concerning Belgium upon Bismark, and accused him generally of being desirous of war, bringing forward as an argument in his own favour the peculiar proposition which had been made of a European disarmament.

The English Government meanwhile had not waited for the playing out of this in some part very loitering strife. The neutrality of Belgium seemed to her to be threatened. In the situation of affairs it was perhaps really less so now than at other times. As South Germany joined in complete accord with North Germany, the Germans did not suffer through having a too short frontier (or base of operations) towards France, as might easily have been the case if North Germany had stood alone in the quarrel. As regards the French, the war frontier which circumstances offered them was, with their numerical inferiority, rather too extended than too contracted. Nevertheless England wished to insure the neutrality of Belgium under any circumstances, and moved, therefore, France as well as Germany, to give an assurance in conformity with the treaty that they would respect

this neutrality. The agreement demanded was signed in London on the 9th of August, after strange things had already come to pass, by Lord Granville, the Marquis Lavalette, and Count Bernstorff, for Great Britain, France, and the North German Confederation.

CHAPTER VII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE OPERATIONS—ADVANCE OF THE GERMANS INTO THE VALLEY OF THE MOSELLE.

THE French field army, which was, in the first place, set on foot, consisted of 8 Army Corps and 1 large Reserve of cavalry. The Army Corps were :— 1. The Guard Corps, with 2 divisions of infantry, under Generals Deligny and Garnier, and a division of cavalry of 6 regiments under General Desvaux; Commander-in-chief of the Corps, General Bourbaki. 2. The 1st Corps, Marshal M'Mahon, Duke of Magenta, with 4 divisions of infantry: Ducrot, Abel Douay, Raoult, De Lartigue, and 1 division of cavalry: Duhesme, of 7 regiments. 3. The 2d Corps, General Frossard, with 3 divisions of infantry: Vergé, Bataille, and Laveaucoupet, and 1 division of cavalry: Lichtlin, of 4 regiments. 4. The 3d Corps, Marshal Bazaine, with 4 divisions of infantry: Montaudon, Castagny, Metmann, Decäen, and 1 division of cavalry: Clerambault, of 7 regiments. 5. The 4th Corps, General de Ladmirault, with 3 divisions of infantry: De Cissey, Rose, De Lorencez, and 1 division of cavalry: Legrand, of 4

regiments. 6. The 5th Corps, General de Failly, with 3 divisions of infantry: Goze, De l'Abadie d'Aydrein, Guzot de Lespart, and 1 division of cavalry: Brahaut, with 4 regiments. 7. The 6th Corps, Marshal Canrobert, with 4 divisions of infantry: Tixier, Bisson, Lafont de Villiers, Martimprey, and 1 division of cavalry: Salignac-Fénélon, with 6 regiments. 8. The 7th Corps, General Felix Douay, with 3 divisions of infantry: Conseil Dumesnil, Liébert, Dumont, and 1 division of cavalry: Ameil, of 5 regiments. The Reserve of cavalry was divided into 3 divisions of 4 regiments each: du Barrail, Bonnemains, and de Forton.

These forces altogether would have numbered 260,000 men, infantry and cavalry, if the men on furlough, and the youngest classes of the reserve, had been called in to complete their strength; but most of the regiments had marched out on their peace footing, and had only (when already on the frontier) commenced to complete their establishment. Large bodies of troops from the more distant garrisons had not arrived when hostilities commenced; so that, in the beginning of August, the field forces can at the most be reckoned at 200,000 men.

In addition to this, there took place a yet further dissemination of forces, which might possibly have been avoided. The frontier upon which, under existing circumstances, the two hostile forces could come into collision, forms for France a salient angle, the left

containing line of which, the line from Sierck to Lauterburg, measures 94 miles, and the right side, from Lauterburg to Hüningen, 103 miles. To the left were the two neutral States of Luxemburg and Belgium. The neutrality of the latter was expressly recognised anew by the treaty of which we have before spoken. To the right was Switzerland, also neutral. Belgium had some troops ready to fulfil her neutral obligations. Switzerland had already, on the 15th of July, without any long hesitation, called to arms 5 divisions of militia, partly to watch her frontier along the slopes of the Jura Mountains and on the Rhine, partly to protect Basle and the bridge there from any sudden blow. By the evening of the 15th, Basle was militarily occupied; and on the 18th of July—that is, before the declaration of war was delivered in Berlin—the whole of this levy stood at their posts on the frontier. The Tessiner brigade alone, which had to traverse the long road over the Gothard, arrived a week afterwards.

The watchfulness of the Swiss authorities was justified by some recent questions from France, asking whether Switzerland would be able to defend her neutrality in case of a collision between France and Germany. There had even been some offer made of a French general who was to inspect more closely the Swiss forces, bring them into some kind of order, and do no one knows what besides. These offers were politely declined, and the assurance was given that

Switzerland could fulfil all the duties which her political position in Europe required from her; but nevertheless all these things were carefully registered in the Notice-Book of the Swiss Federation. In addition to this, it came to pass that in 1870, Belfort, close to the Swiss frontier, and in the neighbourhood of Basle, was named as the point of concentration for one of the French Corps.

The positions into which the French Corps with their available forces advanced, after the 12th of July, were as follows :—

On the left side of the frontier, the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) to Thionville; the 3d Corps (Bazaine) first to Metz, whence it was soon afterwards pushed further forward to Bouzonville; the 2d Corps (Frossard) to St Avold; the 5th Corps (De Failly) to Bitche: in rear of these, the Guard (Bourbaki), first to Nancy, then to Metz; and the 6th Corps (Canrobert) to the camp of Chalons. On the right side of the frontier, the 1st Corps (M'Mahon) assembled between Hagenau and Strasburg; the 7th Corps (Felix Douay) at Belfort.

The most concentrated part of the army, where there were on the 1st of August about 90,000 men, stood in the triangle between Metz, Thionville, and St Avold, upon a front of about seven geographical miles, or two good days' march; to its right, distant thirty-three miles, was De Failly, at Bitche; to the left Canrobert, at Chalons, distant eighty miles, or six

days' march. Between Bitche and Hagenau, where M'Mahon's extreme left stood, the distance is about twenty-eight miles; between Strasburg, M'Mahon's right wing, and Belfort (Douay), eighty miles. De Failly had, on the 1st of August, 25,000 men; M'Mahon, 35,000; and Canrobert at the most, 30,000. The corps of Felix Douay was not yet organised, and Belfort was merely a place of passage for troops which were going from the south to the north.

The position taken up by the French is in itself quite inexplicable; to understand it, we must enter upon older, and to some extent personal, ideas.

There were two contingencies which might arise for France. Either she would have to deal with Prussia alone, or South Germany would join with Prussia and North Germany. In the first place, the line from Metz to Mayence was the chief matter. Advancing along this, conquering the fortress of Mayence by a *coup de main*, crossing the Rhine there, and taking up a position on its right bank to check any offensive return of the Prussians, France would content herself for the rest with cleansing the Prussian left bank of the Rhine; Luxemburg and Belgium must afterwards fall of themselves. Under these circumstances the right wing, formed, as we have shown, by the corps of M'Mahon and of Felix Douay, would be altogether superfluous; it would only acquire importance if the South Germans, throwing aside their neutrality, should advance actively against

North Germany, and require the support of some French troops. On the other hand, the left wing would acquire under this supposition a special importance; it would be composed of two elements—of the fleet conveying a large force of soldiers for disembarkation, and of a corps of observation towards Belgium, the latter of which, immediately after the first victory of the centre over the Prussians, would invade that land. This latter fraction of the left is represented, in the first disposition we gave of the French forces, by the Corps of Canrobert. The fleet would, it was calculated, find allies in Denmark, which had everything to regain, and in Hanover, the supposed Prussian Vendée; and it was assumed that the disembarkation force, thus strengthened by Danes and Germans, would be very successful in the rear of the Prussian Army of the Rhine, and make it impossible for it to remain on the river.

Should the second contingency happen—the alliance of the South Germans with the North Germans—the centre and left wing would still retain the same importance; but the right wing would now have a greater part to play than it had in the first case; for the French centre having been victorious on the Metz-Mayence line, the right wing would immediately cross the Rhine in the neighbourhood of Strasburg, and falling upon Southern Germany, roll up its forces. Still, even with this expectation, the reasons for the position of the 7th Corps at Belfort remains

difficult to be explained; they can only be guessed at from historical reminiscences, and from the value which the Emperor Napoleon, owing to his researches in ancient geography, set upon "the gap of Belfort." (*la trouée de Belfort*).

So far we have only spoken of the offensive intentions of the French, and these were in reality the prevailing ones. If France should be obliged to act on the defensive, then the left wing, the fleet, still remained of importance. If it could carry a force for disembarkation, it would, by disquieting the shores of the North Sea and of the Baltic, hinder the development of a too powerful force on the Rhine frontier. The right wing would now, if France were only engaged with North Germany, be quite superfluous. Should she have to deal also with South Germany, it would acquire the value of a corps of observation, and of a corps, in case such should be needed, which would stop the advance of the German left wing along the line of railway from Strasburg to Paris, and also along the line from Mülhausen to Paris. The centre remained always the main point. It must either assume the offensive, advance against and beat the Germans, or stop them in their march on Paris. With this supposition also, we find no justification for the presence of a corps at Belfort. It could only have taken a useful part in the struggle if Austria had joined in the war as an ally of France,

and if the French and Austrian armies had wished to join hands across Southern Germany.

The plan of concentration will generally afford a very clear insight into the strategical ideas for the conduct of a war, and we have given generally the French project. If our short account be studied, it will be found that the necessary clearness and decision of military thought are absent, and that confusion reigns everywhere. All the elements of success—force, time, and space—are neglected.

If it was intended to conquer Germany on land, whence were to come, with the then existing condition of the French army, the troops to be disembarked from the fleets in the North Sea and Baltic?

When the French Government declared war in Berlin on the 19th of July, without having commenced any new organisation, how did it expect to bring a force of anything approaching equal strength against Germany, who, through her organised military institutions, was much more capable than France of mobilising large forces? If, in spite of this, France still hoped for success, how could she possibly attain it if she scattered in such an unaccountable manner the few troops which she had contrived to get together? Certainly there never was a war undertaken with such frivolous and frantic calculations. The behaviour of the French Government towards Ger-

many could only be regarded as sane, if it were true, as the 'Figaro' of M. de Villemessant and the 'Liberté' of M. de Girardin asserted, that one Frenchman was sufficient to drive back five Germans over the Rhine. Then, certainly, the ascendancy of the French would be assured, and then France could also send troops enough in her fleet to disquiet the German shores of the North Sea and of the Baltic.

The Emperor Napoleon himself assumed the command-in-chief of the army against Germany, which was officially named "the Army of the Rhine" (Armée du Rhin); and on the 23d July he issued the following proclamation to the French :—

"Frenchmen! there come in the life of nations solemn moments. The honour of the people, roused by acts of violence, becomes then an irresistible power, prevails over all other interests, and alone takes in hand the fate of the country. Such a decisive hour has arrived for France. Prussia, to whom during and since the war of 1866 we have shown ourselves to be most well-wishing, has taken no account of our goodwill and of our forbearance ; she has rushed into a course of attacks, has awakened every kind of distrust, has caused excessive armaments to be everywhere necessary, and has turned Europe into a camp, in which uncertainty and fear of the morrow prevail. A recent event has shown the instability of all international relations, and the whole difficulty of the situation. In view of the new and arrogant demands

of Prussia, we have on our side made protests; these have been laughed at, and events which show a contempt for us have followed. Our country was roused by them, and instantly the cry for war rang from one end of France to the other. Nothing more remains for us but to commit our fate to the die which is cast by arms. We do not make war against Germany, whose independence we respect; we wish most cordially that the nations which compose the great German people should dispose freely of their destinies. As regards ourselves, we demand the establishment of a state of things which shall guarantee our safety and make our future secure. We wish to obtain a lasting peace, grounded on the true interests of the nation; we wish that this wretched state of things may cease, in which every nation expends her resources in arming the one against the other. The glorious flag, which in answer to the challenge we again unfold, is the same which carried through Europe the ideas of civilisation, of our great Revolution. It represents the same principles, it will call forth the readiness to make like sacrifices. Frenchmen! I place myself at the head of our brave army, which is animated by its sense of duty and by its love of its country. It knows its value, for it has seen victory follow its footsteps in the four quarters of the world. I take my son with me: in spite of his youth, he knows the duties which his name lays upon him, and he is proud to share the dangers of our

warriors. God prosper your endeavours! a great nation defending a just cause is unconquerable."

It is certainly not necessary to analyse this proclamation; we believe that it sounds even better in our translation than in the original. It is always difficult to speak well in a bad cause—much more difficult than crafty advocates imagine.

As a matter of fact, the Emperor took with him his little son, born on 16th of March 1856, whom first in 1870 he named Lieutenant, and for whose sake alone he plunged into this war, the prospects of which always seemed to him gloomy. He issued a proclamation to the army on the 28th of July from his headquarters at Metz (Hôtel de l'Europe), as follows:—

"Soldiers! I place myself at your head to defend the honour and the soil of France. You have to combat with one of the best armies of Europe; but others, which were equally good, have not been able to withstand your valour; so will it be this time also. The war which we are commencing will be long and difficult, for the theatre bristles with obstacles and fortresses; but nothing is too much for the persevering endeavours of the soldiers of Africa, of the Crimea, of Italy, and of Mexico. Once again you will show what a French army can do guided by a sense of duty, maintained by discipline, and animated by a love of its country. Whatever road we take beyond our frontier, we shall find on it glorious traces of our

forefathers; we will prove ourselves worthy of them. All France follows you with glowing eyes, and the gaze of the universe is upon us. Upon our success depends the fate of liberty and of civilisation. Soldiers! do your duty, and the God of Hosts will be with us."

Here also any further explanation would be superfluous.

For his first assistant and counsellor the Emperor had chosen Marshal Lebœuf as Major-General: he was supported by the two generals of division, Lebrun and Jarras; General Soleille commanded the artillery, and General Coffinières de Nordeck the engineers. Among the corps commanders the best known were Marshals M'Mahon and Bazaine. M'Mahon was born in the year 1808, and received his military education at St Cyr; from this he went into the school for the General Staff, and thence into the infantry. A great part of his time of service was spent in Africa, where he became general of brigade; recalled from Africa, he received in the Crimea the command of a division in Bosquet's Corps. The capture and holding of the Malakoff bastion, at the storming of Sebastopol, on the 8th of September, made his name celebrated throughout Europe. The prominent services he rendered in the battle of Magenta won for him the title of Duke of Magenta. In the year 1861, M'Mahon represented France at the coronation of William I. of Prussia, and the surpassing brilliancy which he dis-

played on this occasion was much talked of. After his return, the Marshal received the command of the 3d Army Corps, and was then, in 1864, sent as Governor-General to Algeria. In this position he was not successful; and the bitterest accusations were made against him, which, however, it appears would have been made with greater justice against the general state of things than against him personally.

The Emperor Napoleon was at that time much engrossed with the idea of making out of Algeria an Arabian kingdom, and consequently of driving European colonisation into the background. The attempt to carry out this scheme had caused the emigration of a great number of colonists, and a considerable decline in all business relations; and this was followed, in the year 1868, by the great famine with all its horrors. Then, and then only, did the French Government begin to think seriously of adopting a more reasonable system of administration in Algiers than the heretofore existing one; but only a few steps were taken along the new path when the Marshal was recalled to Europe and placed at the head of the 1st Corps. In the army he always enjoyed the highest esteem and the most thorough confidence.

Marshal Bazaine was born in 1814, and entered the service as a volunteer private in 1831. Fighting in Africa, he was first made an officer in 1835. In 1837 he went with the Foreign Legion to Spain, to fight there with the Christinos against the Carlists,

on which occasion he learned Spanish. After his return in 1839, his promotion was very rapid. At the beginning of the war in the East he was general of brigade, and in 1855 general of division; and as such he commanded the expedition against Kinburn. In 1862 he went to Mexico, and undertook there, in the following year, the commandership-in-chief of the French expedition. His relation to the Emperor Maximilian was so unfortunate, that it was often asserted that Bazaine wished to make himself Emperor of Mexico. In 1864 he was made a Marshal, and in 1867 he led back to France the ruins of the French Army of Mexico. By the nation he was badly received, but in the army he was and remained beloved; for on the one hand he was the only real trooper among the Marshals of France, and on the other he knew how to procure for himself a fit surrounding, and did not treat the same too strictly. And as he was beloved in the army, so also was he beloved at the Court. After he had resided in Nancy for some time as chief of the 3d Corps, he was, at the end of 1869, called to be the head of the Guard Corps; and from there, in 1870, to command the stronger 3d Army Corps of the active army.

His successor in the command of the Guard Corps was General Bourbaki, of Greek family by descent, but born in Paris in 1816. He served in the lower grades of the army in Africa, principally in the Foreign Legion and in the Zouaves; was made gene-

ral of brigade in 1854, and general of division in 1857. He fought with distinction in the Crimea, and in Italy in 1859, and made himself a name in the army by his fiery valour. In the year 1869 he commanded the second series of troops in the camp of Chalons.

Marshal Canrobert, born 1809, was educated at St Cyr, and entered the army in 1828. Excepting in his youth, and more especially after he was, in 1850, promoted to the rank of general of brigade by the Prince President, he was more noted for his attachment to Napoleon than for his military achievements. He played a prominent part in the carrying out of the *coup d'état* in the year 1859, and in the year 1853 he became a general of division. The modesty with which he, in 1855, retired from the command of the Crimean army, was highly commended; and in 1859 he assisted to raise Marshal Niel to so much the greater renown by the late arrival of his feeble support. In more recent times he was commandant of the 1st Corps, or the Army of Paris. In the year 1870 he was given the command of the 6th Corps of the active army, which was to be regarded for the present, as is apparent from the foregoing, as a reserve.

General Ladmirault, born 1808, entered the infantry from the school of St Cyr in the year 1829, and made, as did most officers of this period, his military career in Africa. In 1848 he became general of

brigade. As general of division he took a decisive part in the battle of Solferino, in which he was wounded. In the year 1870 he was chief of the 2d Army Corps (Lille), when he was called to lead the 4th Corps of the active army. In the French service he had especial renown as a tactician, and on this account he was appointed in 1867, when the question of changes in tactics began to be mooted, to the command of the camp of Chalons. His manœuvres there awakened great interest, but, nevertheless, nothing has remained from them to be an eternal possession to posterity.

General Felix Douay is also an old African officer. In 1859 he commanded a brigade in Niel's Corps, and was severely wounded in the battle of Solferino. Before the war of 1870 he commanded a division of the Army of Paris.

General de Failly, born 1810, was educated in the military school of St Cyr. In the year 1854 he was sent to the Crimea as general of brigade. In 1859 he commanded with distinction a division of Niel's Corps, and distinguished himself especially at Solferino. In the year 1867, the command of the expedition for the protection of the Pope against the invasion of Garibaldi was intrusted to him, and he had the misfortune to sign the report of the encounter at Mentana (probably without having read it), in which it was said, "the Chassepots did wonders." This was never forgiven him; and in consequence of

it, he, a brave, straightforward man, who, moreover, was not even present at the encounter of Mentana, was chosen to be the scapegoat for the French disasters of the year 1870. In 1868 he commanded the first series of troops in the camp of Chalons; and from the end of 1869 held the command of the 3d Corps (Nancy) as successor to Bazaine, who at that time was at the head of the Guard.

General Frossard was born in the year 1807, and in 1827 left the Polytechnic School for the engineers. He was present at the siege of Antwerp, and was then employed in Africa, and at the siege of Rome in 1849, after which he relieved Lebœuf as Second Commandant of the Polytechnic School. In the year 1855 he conducted the engineering works against the Karabelnaja; and after the taking of Sebastopol, the building of the lines of Kamiesh. He had already, in May 1854, been appointed general of brigade; in 1856 he was present in Morny's suite at the coronation of the Emperor of Russia; afterwards he received the command of the engineers in Algiers, and was promoted to the rank of general of division in 1858. In the year 1859 he was chief commandant of the engineers in the army of Italy, and conducted the siege-works of Peschiera. On the 15th March 1867 he was made Governor of the Prince Imperial of France; in 1869 he was nominated President of the Fortification Committee, and commanded in 1870 the camp of Chalons, where, as we have related, a great

siege exercise was to be carried out. Latterly he stood in too close connection with the Court, and too far removed from the army, to be able to form a correct judgment of the chances of a war of France against Germany. His opinion was, that sooner or later France would be attacked by Germany—if not during the life of King William, at all events by his successor. The views of the General about war in the open field were not always the most correct, and contact with troops did not seem to be especially pleasant to him.

The German frontier formed, as it existed in 1870, a re-entering angle from France. Directly opposite to France, and with the intention of attacking it, the Germans arrayed three armies.

The First Army, under the General of Infantry, Von Steinmetz, consisted of the 7th Army Corps (General von Zastrow), with the 13th (Glümer) and 14th (Kameke) divisions of infantry; of the 8th Army Corps (General von Göben), with the 15th (Weltzien) and 16th (Barneckow) divisions of infantry; and of the 3d division of cavalry (Lieutenant-General Gr. von der Gröben). Each division of infantry had, as divisional cavalry, 1 regiment of cavalry; the 3d division of cavalry consisted of 4 regiments,—and the whole of the First Army numbered 55,000 men, infantry and cavalry.

The Second Army, under Prince Frederic Charles of Prussia, was composed of the Prussian Guard Corps (Prince August of Würtemberg), with the infantry divisions Holleben and Budritzki, and the

cavalry division (Von der Goltz), 6 regiments; of the 3d North German Corps (Lieutenant-General von Alvensleben), with the 5th (Stülpnagel) and the 6th (Buddenbrock) divisions of infantry; of the 4th North German Corps (General of Infantry, von Alvensleben), with the 7th (Schwarzhoff) and the 8th (Schöler) divisions of infantry; of the 10th North German Corps (General von Voigts-Rhetz), with the 19th (Schwarzkoppen) and the 20th (Kraatz-Koschlau) infantry divisions; of the 12th North German Corps (the Crown-Prince of Saxony), with the 23d (Prince George) and the 24th (Nerhoff) divisions of infantry; of the 5th division of cavalry (Rheinbaben), 9 regiments; of the 6th division of cavalry (Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin), 5 regiments; of the Saxon division of cavalry (Count Lippe), 4 regiments. The Second Army numbered, altogether, 143,000 men, infantry and cavalry.

The Third Army, under the Crown-Prince of Prussia, consisted of the 5th North German Corps (Lieutenant-General von Kirchbach), with the 9th (Sandrart) and the 10th (Schmidt) divisions of infantry; of the 11th North German Corps (Lieutenant-General von Bose) with the 21st (Schachtmeyer) and the 22d (Gersdorff) divisions of infantry; of the 1st Bavarian Corps (General von der Tann), with the divisions of infantry of Stephan and Pappenheim; of the 2d Bavarian Corps (General von Hartmann), with the divisions of infantry of Walther and Gr.

Bothmer; of the Würtemberg division (Lieutenant-General von Obernitz); of the Baden division (General von Beyer); of the 4th North German division of cavalry (Prince Albrecht of Prussia), 6 regiments; of the Bavarian reserve cavalry, 6 regiments. The Third Army numbered, altogether, 140,000 men.

Bavaria and Baden had issued, on the 16th of July, the order for the mobilisation of their troops. On the 20th of July the Bavarian Government announced to the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, that as France had declared war with Prussia, and as French troops (a patrol) had advanced into Germany, she, because of the treaty of alliance with Prussia and North Germany, entered into the war. The King of Prussia answered that he at once undertook the command-in-chief of the Bavarian Corps, and assigned them to the Third Army under the command of the Crown-Prince of Prussia.

On the 22d of July Baden declared herself to be at war with France, and on the 26th of July the King of Würtemberg also gave up the command of his troops to the King of Prussia.

On the 27th of July the Crown-Prince of Prussia arrived in Munich, in order to assume, in the first place, the command of the Bavarian troops, and then that of all the South German forces. On the 28th he went to Stuttgard, on the 29th to Karlsruhe, and on the 30th to Speyer, whence the operations of his army were to commence.

The three German armies to be concentrated on the French frontier had a collective strength of 338,000 men. They were therefore numerically far in excess of the French field forces, even if we estimate these at the highest of the numbers which we have before given. Moreover, there remained in Germany, entirely independent of the reserve and garrison troops, strong mobilised corps, which in the course of events, and according to circumstances, could be at once sent after the operating army—namely:

The 1st North German Corps (General of Cavalry, Von Manteuffel), with the 1st (Bentheim) and the 2d (Pritzelwitz) divisions of infantry; the 2d Corps (General von Fransecky), with the 3d (Hartmann) and 4th (Hann von Weyhern) divisions of infantry; the 6th Corps (General of Cavalry, Von Tümpling), with the 11th (Gordon) and the 12th (Hoffman) divisions of infantry; the 9th Corps (General von Manstein), with the 18th (Wrangel) and the 25th (Hesse-Darmstadt) divisions of infantry, and the 25th (Hesse-Darmstadt) brigade of cavalry; the 17th division of infantry (Lieutenant-General Schimmelmann), with the 17th brigade of cavalry and the garrison division in Mayence (Lieutenant-General Kummer); the 1st division of cavalry (Lieutenant-General von Hartmann), 6 regiments; the 2d division of cavalry (Lieutenant-General Stollberg), 6 regiments; in addition, 4 mobile landwehr divisions

—namely, the landwehr division of the Guard (Major-General von Loën), 4 regiments of 3 battalions each; the 1st landwehr division (Major-General von Treskow), 4 regiments of 3 battalions each; the 2d landwehr division (Major-General von Selchow), 4 regiments of 4 battalions each; the 3d landwehr division (Major-General Schüler von Senden), 4 regiments of 3 battalions each. To each of these 4 landwehr divisions, as to a line division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry (reserve regiment) and a reserve of artillery were added.

These last-mentioned troops gave another mobile mass of at least 170,000 men, infantry and cavalry. And it is evident from our former explanation that these forces by no means exhausted the supply of German soldiers that could be easily and thoroughly mobilised.

For military administration, and for the secondary embodiment of armies against hostile attack, should such by any means become necessary, the whole territory of the North German Confederation was divided on the 25th July into five General Governments—namely,

The 1st	for the district of the		1st, 2d, 9th, 10th	Corps.
The 2d	„	„	7th, 8th, 11th	„
The 3d	„	„	3d and 4th	„
The 4th	„	„	5th and 6th	„
The 5th	„	„	12th Saxon.	

The first of these General Commands was, under the existing circumstances, the most important, or at least

it must at that time have appeared so, even if after the course which events took we may judge otherwise. It was the command of the shores of the North Sea and of the Baltic. If the French Government had been preparing, as was confidently asserted, during a long time for this war, it must have carefully organised a disembarkation force, as being the only way in which it could derive use from the naval superiority of France. This presumption was incorrect; but the German Government had no right to assume that France had plunged into this war so recklessly as she really did.

General of Infantry, Vogel von Falkenstein, was appointed Governor-General of this district, a man who had shown in 1866 that he knew how to conduct the independent command of an army. The general command of the mobile troops in this district was intrusted to the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, who was assisted by a good chief of the Staff, Colonel von Krensky.

As Governor-General of the second district, that of the Rhine line, General Herwarth von Bittenfeld was appointed—the same who, in 1866, commanded the Army of the Elbe, or the right wing of the army invading Bohemia. The district would have become of importance had the Germans been thrown back on the defensive, and thus been obliged to defend the line of the Rhine. And however improbable this eventuality may have been, considering the general situa-

tion and the military strength of the two parties, still, when a war is commenced, it is necessary to provide for every contingency—a maxim which the French, to their cost, neglected to follow.

The fourth General Command, Lieutenant-General von Löwenfeld, and also the fifth, or Saxon, would have become of importance had Austria not remained quiet. It can never be foretold what people may do; and however insane it would have been for Austria to have mixed in the contest, still the chances of war produce great changes in politics, against which it is necessary to be forearmed.

The third General Command was, under any circumstances, but a post of honour, which was handed over to General von Bonin.

The three field armies which Germany arrayed against France were, according to the general plan of operations, to march upon Paris, as the centre of the administration and of the power of France. For the present they were directed along the following lines of advance: The First Army, Steinmetz, from Coblentz, by Saarlouis, through the Trèves district. The Second Army, Prince Frederic Charles of Prussia, from Mayence by Kaiserslautern, through the western portion of the Bavarian Palatinate. The Third Army, Crown-Prince of Prussia, from Speyer by Landau, through the eastern portion of the Bavarian Palatinate.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia arrived, as we stated, on the 30th July in Speyer. Prince Frederic Charles

had already, on the 26th of July, arrived in Mayence, and General Steinmetz still earlier in Coblentz. King William left Berlin on the 31st of July. Before his departure he issued a proclamation to the Prussians, and to the Germans generally:—

"Before leaving for the army to-day, to fight with it for the honour of Germany and for the preservation of our highest benefits, I wish to proclaim, in view of the unanimous uprising of my people, a general amnesty for political offences and crimes. I have directed the Ministry of State to prepare for me an edict in this sense. My people know with me that the breach of peace and enmity are in truth not on our side. But ourselves challenged, we are determined to undertake war, as our fathers did before us, for the deliverance of the Fatherland, with a firm trust in the God of battles."

To the army he addressed the following from Mayence on the 2d of August:—

"The whole of Germany stands with one accord under arms against a neighbouring State, which has declared war against us suddenly and without cause. We have now to defend our threatened Fatherland, our honour, and our hearths. I assume to-day the command over the assembled army, and go forth comforted to a contest which our fathers in former times undertook in a like situation. With me the whole Fatherland looks with confidence towards you. The Lord God will be with our just cause."

By a decree of the 19th of July, King William had revived for this war of 1870 the Order of the Iron Cross, in essentially the same manner as it was founded in 1813—a measure which was calculated to awaken in all minds the remembrance of a great epoch, and to give to the present war also the appearance of a necessary act of justice against a mighty enemy.

A few notices of some of the most prominent leaders of the Germans will be here in their place.

General von Steinmetz, born 1796, entered the army from the Cadet Corps as an officer in 1813, and took an honourable part in the campaigns from that year to 1815; in 1814 he won for himself the Iron Cross; in 1848 he commanded the two musketeer battalions of the 2d regiment of infantry during the campaign in Schleswig, and earned the order *pour le mérite*. In the same year he became commandant of the 32d regiment of infantry; in 1851 he commanded, as colonel, the Cadet Corps; in 1854 he was promoted to the rank of major-general, and was appointed governor of the fortress of Magdeburg; in 1857 he became commandant of the 4th brigade of infantry of the Guard, and in the same year, of the 1st division of infantry. In the following year he rose to be lieutenant-general, was for a time at the head of the 2d Corps, and was called in 1864 to be commander-in-chief of the 5th Corps, with which, as general of infantry, he in 1866 performed many

glorious deeds. He was extraordinarily popular, and the Landtag voted him with pleasure a rich State dotation. In Parliament, to which he was returned in 1867, he was afterwards less successful with his propositions for national economy; but neither his mishaps there, nor his great age, prevented his being called upon to take an active share in the present war.

Prince Frederic Charles was born in 1828, became lieutenant-general in 1856, and in 1860—being then 32 years old—was nominated commanding-general of the 3d Corps. He had served in 1848 in Schleswig on the Staff of General Wrangel, and had been present in the campaign in Baden in 1849 as squadron leader. In 1864 he commanded the combined Prussian Corps in the war against the Danes, and later on, after the retirement of Wrangel, the whole allied army. In 1866 he led the First Prussian Army, won the victories of Münchengrätz and Gitschin, and maintained the battle of Königgratz against superior Austrian forces until the arrival of the Crown-Prince of Prussia. The Prince excited much attention by a pamphlet on the way to conquer the French, which was published without his consent in Germany, and immediately translated into French.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia was born in 1831, and became, in accordance with the traditions of the dynasty, lieutenant-general in 1860. In 1864, during the war against the Danes, he served with the head-

quarters of Wrangel, was made general of infantry in 1866, and as such commanded the Second Prussian Army. Since 1858 the Crown-Prince of Prussia has been most happily married to the Princess Victoria, eldest daughter of the Queen of England. He thoroughly, and rightly so, dislikes war. In France, ambitious designs were attributed to him; at least, not three weeks before the declaration of war of the 19th of July, the author himself heard such remarks in that country as,—"Peace will continue as long as William I. lives; but when the young ambitious Crown-Prince assumes the government, then it will certainly break out." May "the young ambitious Crown-Prince" have the good fortune to find that the chief matter has been settled before he ascends the throne, and may he be able to really maintain an era of peace without boasting, in the full consciousness of the power of Germany in Europe.

General von Zastrow is chiefly known in the military world through his industrious, but in many parts most singular, writings on the art of fortification. These productions have assisted more than a little in bringing about the confusion which at present reigns in Europe over the most simple questions on this subject, and are therefore really remarkable. The General, born in 1801, entered the infantry in 1819 from the Cadet Corps, and began his writings on fortifications as early as 1828. In the year 1848 he was ordered to join the army in Schleswig-Holstein.

There he displayed a character very different from that of the *doctrinaire*—namely, a romantic one. He commanded a brigade, and even a division; but when he returned to Prussia in 1850, he again returned to the rank of battalion commander in the 2d regiment of infantry. Eight years later he became major-general, and in 1863 he was lieutenant-general, and appointed to the command of the 11th division. At its head he went gloriously through the campaign of 1866. At the end of the year he became commandant of the 7th Corps, and in 1868 was in this position promoted to the rank of general of infantry.

General von Goeben, born 1816, entered the Prussian infantry in 1833, became an officer in 1835, but resigned in the following year to fight on the side of the Carlists in Spain. There he rose to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, but in 1840 he re-entered the Prussian army as a lieutenant. Immediately afterwards he was sent to the General Staff, and was soon appointed to it. In the year 1849 he served with the headquarters during the campaign in the Rhenish Palatinate and in Westphalia; afterwards he returned to the infantry, but in 1850 came back again as major on to the General Staff. In 1860 he became colonel, and was sent to the Spanish army during the campaign against Morocco. In 1864 he commanded as major-general the 26th brigade of infantry during the campaign against Denmark, and after 1865 the

13th division, with which, in the Army of the Main, he won for himself a European name by his magnificent generalship. In 1870 he became general of infantry. He has written a very attractive book about his campaigns in Spain during the civil war, and also many pamphlets on those battles of the campaign of 1866 in which his division played the chief part or fought alone.

Prince August of Würtemberg, born 1813, entered the Prussian service from the Würtemberg as captain of cavalry in 1831. He became major-general in 1844, lieutenant-general in 1850, commandant of the Guard Corps (at whose head he fought in the campaign of 1866) in 1858, and general of cavalry in 1859.

General Gustav von Alvensleben, born 1803, entered the army from the Cadet Corps in 1821, was removed to the General Staff as major in 1847, and went through the campaign of 1849 in Baden. In 1858 he was major-general, and in 1863 lieutenant-general, and served during the war of 1866 in the headquarters of the King. After the war he received the command of the 4th Corps, and in 1868 became general of infantry.

General von Voigts-Rhetz, born 1809, entered the army in 1827, became an officer in 1829, and was removed to the General Staff as captain in 1841. In 1847 he was promoted to the rank of major, and as such was present in 1848 at the battle of Xionz, in

the Grand Duchy of Posen. In the year 1858 he became, after he had already had the command of a regiment of infantry and afterwards of a brigade, major-general. From 1859 to 1860 he was chief of the general war department in the Ministry of War, and in 1860 he received the command of the fortress of Luxemburg and of the garrison brigade there. In 1863 he became commandant of the 7th division, lieutenant-general in the same year, commander-in-chief of the garrison of the Diet in Frankfort-on-the Main, and then, in the spring of 1866, first military plenipotentiary of Prussia at the Diet. At the outbreak of the war he was called from this post to be Chief of the Staff with the First Army (Prince Frederic Charles), and after the war was appointed Governor-General of Hanover and chief of the newly-formed 10th Corps. In 1868 he became a general of infantry.

Lieutenant-General von Kirchbach, born 1809, entered the army from the Cadet Corps in 1826, and became an officer in 1827. After long service in the infantry he became major in 1850, and in the following year was removed to the General Staff. In 1863 he was major-general; and in 1866, as lieutenant-general, he commanded with distinction the 10th division of infantry in the Corps of General Steinmetz.

General von Bose, born 1809, entered the Prussian service in 1826, and became an officer in 1829. Employed successively in the infantry, on the General Staff, and in the Ministry of War, he was promoted

to the rank of major-general in 1864, and in 1866 commanded the 15th brigade of infantry, at whose head he served with glory in all the encounters and battles which were fought by the Army of Prince Frederic Charles. The part he played in the battle of Presburg is especially noticeable. After the war of 1866 he became commandant of the 20th division, and at the end of the same year was nominated lieutenant-general.

General von der Tann was born in 1815, entered early into the military service, and went, after he had attained the rank of captain on the Quartermaster's Staff in the Bavarian army, as a volunteer to Schleswig-Holstein to assume there the command of a volunteer corps. In 1850 he was Chief of the Staff of General Willisen; in 1866, Chief of the Staff of Prince Charles of Bavaria. After the war he again took the command of his division; and when, in 1869, the Bavarian army was divided into two General Commands, he received that of Munich.

We conclude here for the present these personal details, intending hereafter to continue them in a few remarks at a fitting opportunity.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE THEATRE OF WAR—SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE DISTRICT BETWEEN THE GERMAN FRONTIER AND THE VALLEY OF THE MOSELLE.

THE theatre of war which was created by the declaration of hostilities of the French on the 19th of July, and by the unanimous uprising of the Germans, comprised the territory of the whole of France, of the North German Confederation, of the South German States, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, the sea in general, and particularly the seas which wash the coasts of Northern France and Germany.

Owing to the fact that the land army of France suffered from such a decided numerical weakness, it came to pass that the war on the coasts—in default of all alliances—could not be carried on, and that the naval war was limited to the capturing of German merchant ships by French cruisers, and to the blockading of German ports, which the German fleet, owing to its comparative weakness, was powerless to prevent. And because of the weakness of the French land forces, and because the declaration of war against

Germany had been hurled forth in a most reckless manner, it also came to pass that the German army was ready to assume a successful offensive much earlier than the French was.

The real theatre of war was therefore, in the beginning, bounded by the northern frontier of France, by the Rhine between Lauterburg and Strasburg, by the railway from Strasburg to Paris, and by the railway from Paris to Brussels. As in this volume we shall not carry our narrative further than to the time when the events happened on the heights between the Moselle and the Meuse, we shall for the present confine our special consideration of the ground to the district which extends up to those heights, and then continue our description in detail as the history of the war leads us into new territory. But before we commence this special work, we wish to make a general remark.

At the commencement of the war a mass of so-called war maps were published, which were sold in the ordinary shops. The French ones were, when compared with the German, extremely badly executed. This must evidently be taken as resulting from the fact that nature and landscape are much less interesting to the French than to the Germans, with whom not unfrequently the love of it degenerates into a sentimental debauchery. The French occupy themselves much more with men and with society; and it has often occurred to us that the French newspaper

reader only employed his map because it afforded him the pleasure of sticking into it little coloured flags, of which an incredible quantity were consumed in the larger towns.

Of people who can read a map there are in Germany incomparably more than in France. And this is very easy to be understood; for the first condition to be fulfilled that a man may be able to understand a map is, that he should be able to compare it with nature; therefore, that he should have observed and considered this latter,—and this, on the whole, Frenchmen are little disposed to do, even when in the country. And he who will not take the trouble to really read a map will be less and less interested as to the manner in which it is executed.

The German maps which appeared in the beginning contained almost always a very considerable portion of their own country, Germany, and only the frontier provinces of their enemy's land, France. The French maps, on the contrary, comprised only a very small corner of their own country, whilst they extended eastward over the whole of Germany, and even beyond it. From this it may be judged, therefore, that, we will not say the North German General Staff, but at all events the general public, regarded this war, which was certainly politically a defensive one, as likely to be such a one also strategically, while in France an offensive war was chiefly contemplated.

The district which we have, in the first place, to

consider, is divided by the Vosges into an eastern and a western part. The Vosges begin in the neighbourhood of Belfort, and run with an average width of about twenty-four miles from south to north, terminating in the Donnersberg, on the Nahe, which separates them from the Hundsrück. Their summits and passes are both of them higher in the south than in the north, growing gradually less as they approach that quarter. In the neighbourhood in which we are at present mainly interested, between the frontier of Rhenish Bavaria in the north and the Strasburg-Paris Railway in the south, there are no important mountains at all; the height of the passes does not exceed 1200 feet above the sea, therefore not more than 700 to 800 feet above the plain of Alsace, and the summit of the chain about 2000 feet above the level of the sea.

To the east of the Vosges the smiling plain of Alsace extends, watered by many small streams which run from the mountains to the Rhine and fertilise the country, which industrious hands, aided by a good soil and a temperate climate, have converted into a fruitful garden. Here, low down on the eastern slopes, are planted thriving vineyards; there, higher up, where agriculture produces less, the numerous streamlets offer their forces to industry. To the west, the Vosges change into the hilly land of Lorraine, which, stretching away as far as the Meuse, has between the Vosges and the Moselle an altitude of 600 to 700 feet above the level of the sea; and

which, even if not equal in fertility to Alsace, also smiles with the tokens of cultivation. On the left bank of the Moselle, between Frouard and Thionville, the undulating ground rises up to a height of 1100 feet above the sea, but only to sink again rapidly towards the Meuse. Of the numerous waters which, flowing down from the eastern slopes of the Vosges, run through the plain of the Rhine in our district, the most important are the Lauter, which in its lower course forms the boundary between the Rhenish Palatinate and Alsace, and to the south of it the Moder and the Zorn. The Brüsch unites first at Strasburg with the Ill, and through it later on with the Rhine below the town.

Much more considerable are the rivers which descend the western side of the mountains. The most important of them is the Moselle. It rises in the highest point of the Vosges in the Ballon d'Alsace, and flows thence nearly northwards by Remiremont, Epinal, Toul, Frouard, Metz, Thionville, and Trèves, to Coblentz, where it joins the Rhine. Below Frouard, as far as Thionville, its waters are shallow, and divided by many islands. It was therefore contemplated to form it into a canal between these two places, and in the spring of 1870 the execution of this work was commenced. This was to join the Rhine-Marne Canal which connects Strasburg and Vitry le Français, and coincides at the most difficult points with the Strasburg-Paris Railway.

The most important tributaries to the Moselle on its right—that is, flowing from the Vosges—are the Meurthe, which joins it at Frouard; the Saar, which, running by Saarburg, Sarralbe, Saargemünd, Saarbrück, Saarlouis, empties itself into the Moselle above Trèves. Further is to be noticed the Seille, because it joins the Moselle in the fortress of Metz itself although it does not rise in the Vosges, but in the hilly country of Lorraine. It flows out of the Etang de Lindre, one of those many lakes (there called *Teche étangs*) which are to be found on the west foot of the Vosges, between Fenestrang and Luneville. The Nied has two tributaries, the German and the French Nied, also in the hill-country of Lorraine, and flows into the Saar. The rivers which run into the Moselle from the west are one and all unimportant. The hill-country of Lorraine, of which we have related that it sinks towards the west, rises again close to the Meuse; and it is from this watershed that the Moselle receives her tributaries on the left. But in the vicinity of the Strasburg-Paris Railway, the Moselle and the Meuse are so close together that these affluents cannot become considerable. More to the north, the two rivers diverge again, and here flows the most important tributary on the left of the Moselle, the Ornes, which joins it above Thionville.

The most noted passes which unite the plain of Alsace over the Vosges with the hill-country of Lorraine, are the following :—

1. The Pass of Bitche.—At Bitche the roads from Weissenburg and from Hagenau over the Bad Niederbronn unite, and then descend as one to Saargemünd. The fortress of Bitche stands to the north of the junction of the roads, upon a projecting rock 160 feet high. It is celebrated in military history as the scene of an attempted surprise which the Duke of Brunswick, on the 16th of November 1793, caused General Wartensleben to make against it, in order to bring his winter quarters round Pirmasenz into better connection with those of the Austrians on the Moder under Wurmser. The enterprise failed, owing to occurrences which were most extraordinary in their details. The town of Bitche has barely 3000 inhabitants. 2. The Pass of Lützelstein (la Petite Pierre), from Hagenau to Saar Union.—The Fort of Lützelstein, quite unimportant for the rest, lies to the south of the road. 3. The Pass of Pfalzburg, from Strasburg by Zabern (Saverne) to Fenestrange on the one side, and to upper Saarburg on the other.—The little town of Pfalzburg, with not quite 4000 inhabitants, fortified by Vauban as a bastioned hexagon, has lately received an undeniable celebrity through the romance of Erckmann-Chatrian. But it has disproportionately lost in military importance, for it lies $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the north of the Strasburg-Paris Railway, and is too small to hold a garrison that would be able by distant sorties to seriously disturb the railway communication. 4. Between the two passes of Lützelstein and of Bitche

lies a much less important one, which leads by the old castle of Lichtenberg from Hagenau to Saargemünd.

Besides the fortresses, for the most part but of small importance, of which we have made mention in enumerating the passes of the Vosges, there remain to be remarked in the district which we are now describing the strongholds of Strasburg on the Rhine, Marsal on the Seille, Toul, Metz, and Thionville on the Moselle. Of Strasburg we reserve the more detailed account until the time when we shall narrate the siege of this ancient city, so celebrated in song and legend. Marsal is an unimportant place, a bastioned heptagon, which in these days of railways, as it does not even lie on one, has lost still more of its original small value. The old town of Toul, with its beautiful churches, is more celebrated for these than for its fortifications. It has scarcely 8000 inhabitants. Its works are planned with a bastion-trace upon a nine-sided polygon; it is totally without detached forts, and can be commanded on all sides by artillery of the present day. Such importance as it has arises from its position close to the Strasburg-Paris Railway. Thionville, with the main part of the town on the left bank of the Moselle, was once a favourite residence of Charlemagne, and is now a city of about 8000 inhabitants, fortified in a more modern manner by Vauban and Cormontaigne. Two larger forts and several lunettes form an important *tête du pont* on the right bank of the Moselle.

But far above all these places in importance Metz stands forth alone. 3000 yards above the town the Moselle divides itself into two main arms, flowing in a north-westerly and a south-easterly direction, which unite again about 3000 yards below the city. A few intermediate arms join these two chief ones, and thus three remarkable islands are formed, called (taken in succession down the river) St Simphorien, the Island du Sauley, and the Island Chambière. Upon the last one lies a small part of the town, but the greater portion is upon the right bank of the south-eastern arm.

For the plan of its more modern fortifications, Metz is principally indebted to the works of Cormontaigne; to him may especially be ascribed the two forts De la Moselle and Bellecroix. The Moselle Fort (Fort de la Moselle), a double crown work, with two whole and two half bastions, lies on the left bank of the north-western arm of the river, towards Plappeville, Woippy, and St Eloy. Fort Bellecroix, equally a double crown work, on the east side of the main part of the town, on the right bank of the south-eastern arm, towards St Julien, Vallières, and Borny. The old Citadel, the building of which was commenced by Marshal Vicilleville in the year 1556, on the south-west end of the town, and finished in 1564, was razed to the ground in 1791. In its place now stand the quarters of the engineers; and the old esplanade has been turned into a pleasant promenade, the only one which the large town of Metz possesses. It would

have been unnecessary to mention this Citadel were it not that reminiscences are attached to it which are significant for the present time.

Scarcely had the old free town of Metz thrown itself in the beginning of the year 1552 into the arms of Henry II., King of France, who was to rule it as a prince of the German Empire, than it repented itself thereof. The French understood but little the pretensions of the citizens of an old German free town. The people of Metz, "les Messins," would even in the same year have willingly seen the Emperor Charles IV. reconquer the town; but the celebrated defence made by Duke Francis of Guise, and the crumbling down of the then existing German Empire, prevented this. After the attack of Charles V. had been repulsed, the people of Metz felt evermore acutely how wrongly they had acted in separating themselves from the German Empire, and yielding themselves to France. The young nobility of France treated them simply as *canaille*, and the free-town spirit rebelled against this. The French saw in Metz absolutely nothing more than a place of arms against Germany; and because the people would not submit to this, and to the suppression of all their privileges, but, on the other hand, ever incited disturbances against the French sway, the building of the Citadel was undertaken. The people of Metz became good Frenchmen with the demolition of the Citadel and with the French Republic, between 1791 and 1793.

Up to that time the old inhabitants had always had a greater tendency, if not to Germany, at all events to the liberty of a free town, than to France.

With its 60,000 inhabitants, with its favourable position, with its fortifications, which at the time of their construction might be called master-works, the town of Metz, until the introduction of rifled guns, always ranked as a first-class fortress, especially in France, where men attached less value than they did in Germany to the building of detached forts, a question which stands in close relationship to that of military organisation.

If even, after the adoption of long-ranging guns, the extension or the conversion of the works of Metz was still not thought of, this must have resulted from the general views which were held of the position of France in Europe while the Empire was culminating, views of which we have before spoken. As soon as —after Sadowa—the French Government had come to the conclusion that now the military balance of power in Europe was completely overthrown, Metz was one of the first (perhaps the first) places the alteration of the fortifications of which was thought of. It was to be at once surrounded, in order to bring it up to the level of the times, and to insure its better defence, with a girdle of detached forts; but these, at the same time, converted it into a great intrenched camp, an offensive place. The execution of the project was begun in the spring of 1868, and four of the

forts, of whose position there could be no doubt, were taken in hand. These were Plappeville (also called les Carrières), St Quentin, Queleu, and St Julien—the first two on the left, the last two on the right bank of the Moselle. All these works were to be masterpieces, and they were so in part, as far as the question of money, which had to be considered, did not impose limits on them.

The ground-plan of the enceinte of each of them is either a closed bastioned square (*carré bastionné*) or a closed bastioned pentagon (*pentagone bastionné*), according to the size which it was judged expedient to give the work. The escarp and counterscarp of the main enceinte are revetted with masonry up to the building level, which was carefully defiladed from distant view. Round the top of the escarp runs nearly everywhere a thin breast-high wall, and between it and the base of the exterior slope of the 24 to 28 feet high rampart, a *chemin des rondes* is left. Casemates are constructed only in some few places in the main enceinte—as, for instance, in the flanks of the bastions—but casemates *en décharge* run along the whole gorge of the work. Within the main enceinte is a cavalier of a very simple plan. It follows the windings of the front in the most obtuse angles possible, and is about 2 metres, and sometimes more, higher than the enceinte. It is a mighty earthwork, which is altogether filled with casemates on its reverse side. These are not for defence; they have no embra-

sures piercing the mass of earth towards the enemy, and therefore no artillery or infantry fire can be obtained from them; they are purely barracks for the garrison, forming magazines for provisions and ammunition, and containing kitchens and cisterns.

The idea of the whole is this. The cavalier, with the heavy guns placed on its high ramparts, will damage the enemy at a distance, and prevent him intrenching himself. But if it fail to do this, and the enemy succeed in spite of it in advancing his works nearer, then the close defence will be undertaken by the main enceinte, with its complete flanking fire. Should the enemy succeed in making breaches, and in advancing to storm them, then the cavalier comes into play again. Connected with the gorge by walls, it forms a last retrenchment, which would necessitate new efforts on the part of the enemy. The garrison will either be relieved by a successful sortie from the body of the place, or it gains time to conclude a favourable capitulation.

Fort St Julien, a bastioned pentagon, is situated upon the road to Bouzonville, with its front opposite the wood of Grimont, and with its gorge removed about 2800 paces from the left wing of Fort Bellecroix.

In front of the right wing of Bellecroix, about 2700 paces from the Mazelle gate, is situated the largest of all the detached works, Fort Queleu, with its front opposite the village of Grigy and the high-

road to Strasburg. It also is a pentagon. To the west of it the Seille flows northwards to Metz. This river, of which mention has been before made, enters the main enceinte of Metz close to the Mazelle gate, and waters the ditches on the east side of the town. Moreover, by means of sluice-works, the valley of the Seille above the town can be inundated.

Fort Plappeville, on the left bank of the Moselle, is essentially a bastioned square, and is situated upon the considerable heights to the west of the town. On these heights also stands Fort St Quentin, exactly on the hill whence the Emperor Charles V. observed the town during the siege of 1552. Fort St Quentin is also a bastioned square, but so small that on the north and west sides the main enceinte and cavalier become one, whilst upon the south and east, where the steep slopes of the hill make the ascent naturally difficult, the defence is confined to a ditch and wall. On the south side only an earthen battery is built, a species of cavalier, to sweep the valley of the Moselle. Originally, Fort St Quentin was projected much larger —its front was to come up to about the same level as Fort Plappeville; but on account of the expense, this idea was for the time abandoned.

In the spring of 1870, Forts Plappeville and St Quentin were both so far advanced that their completion in that year could be looked forward to as a certainty. Queleu and St Julien, on the contrary, were behindhand, for, owing partly to the water-holding

clay foundation on which they stood, and partly to the building having been very hastily pushed forward, the revetment of the escarp had in many places begun to slip; but spite of this, there was reason to hope that these forts also would be completely finished in the year 1871.

In May 1870 the construction of a new work, which, however, had been for some time in contemplation, was commenced—that of St Privat. All the railways which meet at Metz have one common station near the Serpeuoise gate. To cover both this and the approaches to the lines themselves was the destined purpose of this fort. For the present it was only erected in earth, without any sheltered space; and when it is remembered that this was done by the orders of a man who was in very close relationship with the Court of the Tuileries, and carried out in the greatest haste, it is certainly possible that men may be led by it to the belief that, in the beginning of the month of May 1870, the war for the Rhine frontier was already a settled purpose at the Imperial Court. Fort St Privat lies more than 4000 paces distant from the old outworks of the main enceinte.

To connect all these large detached forts, smaller works were projected—Fort St Eloy, between Plappeville and St Julien, on the road to Thionville, on the left bank of the Moselle; and Fort les Bottes, between St Julien and Queleu. Whether these forts

were, at the outbreak of the war, run up in a temporary manner, is at present unknown to us; but it is asserted that such was the case with Fort les Bottes.

The detached forts form a girdle of about 14 miles in length, and all of them stand upon comparative heights. The level of the Moselle at Metz is about 560 feet above that of the sea. The horizon of Fort St Julien 860, of Queleu 750, of St Privat 640, of St Quentin 1200, and of Plappeville 1140 feet above the level of the sea.

While these detached forts were being worked at, the old circumvallation was not forgotten. On the right wing of the Moselle Fort a casemated battery was constructed; for in reality, as long as Fort St Eloy did not exist, this work was exactly in the middle between the two forts of Plappeville and St Julien, and nearly on a straight line with them.

But the greatest care was bestowed upon Fort Bellecroix. Bomb-proof magazines were built, and the two whole middle bastions were to be provided with cavaliers, which were actually commenced. Before the left wing of Fort Bellecroix an extraordinarily high work was constructed, which was to command the valley of Vallières better than the fort itself or than a work of the same date which stood before it could. In order that the new erection might not, if taken, be prejudicial to the defence of Bellecroix, it was mined; and, moreover, in Fort Bellecroix itself, a cavalier was built which commanded it.

The front St Vincent on the right bank of the north-west arm of the Moselle, behind the Fort de la Moselle, was pushed forward further on the river. This was certainly, in the first place, an administrative measure. More space for the town was required, especially for the Imperial Administrative Institute; but in effecting the change, the fortifications of the front were also improved.

Taking Metz as the centre of the railway system which we have to consider in our district, it can be said that from it lines radiate to all regions of the world. The railway to the east runs by Forbach into Germany. It has branch lines to Trèves, to Bingen, thence to Coblentz and to Mayence, and through the Bavarian Rhenish Palatinate by Kaiserslautern to Mannheim and Heidelberg. The railway to the north goes by Thionville and Luxemburg to Liège; from it the line by Sedan westward to Mezières branches off at Thionville. The railway to the south along the left bank of the Moselle joins at Frouard the main line from Strasburg to Paris, and this main line is again joined to Mezières at two points by Rheims and Chalons and by Epernay. The railway to the west, although opened for a small distance in 1867, was not completed in 1870, but it was to be finished in 1871. It was essentially what men are wont to call a strategical line, intended to connect the great exercising camp of France at Chalons with

its great depôt for offensive enterprises, Metz. Its projected route was by St Hilaire, to the south of Mourmelon, on to the line Chalons-Rheims, or from the camp of Chalons by Valmy, St Menehould, and Verdun to Metz. Only the portion from St Hilaire to Verdun was practicable in the year 1870.

CHAPTER IX.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES—THE COMEDY OF SAARBRÜCKEN ON THE 2D OF AUGUST.

COMMENCING on the 21st of July, there had been small outpost affairs continually going on on the German-French frontier. Detachments of French troops had penetrated into German territory, and small bodies of Germans had invaded the French soil, to reconnoitre, to execute some *coups de main*, and to cool their mettle. All Europe waited in breathless expectation for the more serious things which were to follow, and became almost impatient because great battle-dramas were not acted immediately after the 19th of July, the day of the declaration of war. Of such it was certainly destined to witness plenty later on.

France also was impatient; and in truth was she not so with right? With what haste had she plunged into hostilities! Educated Frenchmen not in the army have so little in common with it, that they know nothing of the conditions for the conduct of war—the Empire had fully broken off all connection

between the better-informed classes and the army. Frenchmen are in general very much inclined to value technical knowledge, and to submit to the guidance of men supposed to possess it. Listening to what they had been told, they had become assured that the French army was the first in the world, and that it possessed everything that was necessary for it to operate successfully. Of the fact that their forces had been thrown blindly on the frontier without being fully organised for war, they had not the very faintest suspicion. Why, then, did not the army at once commence hostilities on the 15th of July? Why did they not at once go by the railway to Berlin, which lies close to the right bank of the Rhine? "Mystère," answered Victor Hugo. The official newspapers strove in every way to exhort to patience. About the 23d of July they announced that before fourteen days at the least, hostilities would not be commenced, in order to be able to deal then the heavier blows. That the Germans could assume the initiative was never for an instant supposed.

But when the French army stood on the frontier, then, and only then, the French Generals commenced to calculate and to consider. It is an unexampled fact, and yet wholly true, that the tenders for the supplies of the army were only given in on the 28th of July, and that even then there was no meat-tender which was deemed fair. Doubtless the French could by the 23d of July have crossed into the German frontier States and

have advanced upon the Rhine; they could have devastated the land and routed some scattered bodies of troops, but—then they would certainly have encountered the compact and well-organised columns of the Germans. And now, when on the frontier, the leaders of the French army began to say that which while in Paris they had completely neglected to think of—that an ephemeral success must be bought at the price of a so much the greater defeat hereafter.

The Prussian Staff—that Staff of the 'Figaro' which had moved for years in the highest circles of Paris, in order to learn and to collect intelligence—had always held the opinion at which the French Generals now arrived, that it was possible that the French, by a sudden surprise, might invade Germany and gain a few successes, but that then only the more certainly would their work be stopped, and retribution follow. Therefore throughout the whole of Germany the Prussian principle was strictly carried out—that no detachment should leave the district of their Corps, or even their garrison, to be moved to the frontier, until they were completely mobilised on a war footing.

It is very easy to imagine that the citizens of the German frontier States did not altogether believe that the French had marched to the frontier, and then first begun to place their armies on a war footing. Who except one who had long and specially occupied himself in studying these things could presuppose such insane conduct? Men have never the right to regard

their adversary as quite and utterly foolish; therefore there was in the German frontier States a certain disquietude on account of the supposed slowness of the German armies in the mobilisation and advance against the French; still, on the whole, the confidence in their own strength, and in the superiority of the German military institutions, was very great, and it could be foreseen that the first military success would raise it yet higher.

We have already narrated how the combined German operating force—the First, Second, and Third Armies—was to be thrown at once (in accordance with the general plan of operations) on to the left bank of the Rhine, in order there to assume the military offensive. This gives testimony not merely of great confidence on the part of those conducting the strategy of the war, but also of a correct appreciation of circumstances. We will not enter into a long discussion on this really simple subject, but will content ourselves with reminding our readers that another guidance of the forces might have divided the three armies on the two fronts Saarburg-Lauterburg and Ettlingen-Lörrach, instead of concentrating them upon the one front Saarburg- (or Sierck-) Lauterburg. Had this course been adopted, would the successes of the Germans have been as great as they were?

The whole German operating force was then thrown across the Rhine on the line Coblentz-Germersheim with the intention of assuming the offensive. The lines

of advance which had been assigned to it in the German territory on the left bank of the Rhine prolonged themselves naturally into French territory. The fortress of Rastadt supported the extreme left wing; and in order to show that the Germans did not intend to undertake any offensive movements on the Upper Rhine, the railway bridge over the Rhine at Kehl was blown up on the 22d of July. Was it absolutely necessary to destroy this masterpiece of modern architecture? We believe it could hardly have been so; but perhaps we are too sceptical with regard to the utility of such destructions.

The Strasburg military division was commanded by General Ducrot—a man with whom the idea of a collision between France and Germany had become a fixed one as he conducted his noisy reconnaissances along the banks of the Rhine; and he therefore eagerly set to work to throw a pontoon-bridge over the Rhine in as short a time as possible. In 1868 he had performed the feat in eighteen minutes, and he hoped that with practice it would be accomplished in a yet shorter time, which, judging by our observations of such work, would be very possible. Means of crossing the river, therefore, would never be wanting, with all the rich collection of stores in Strasburg. But we must always ask, Of what use are bridges if there are no troops to throw over them? For these reasons it appears to us that the blowing up of the railway bridge at Kehl was not a necessity; and we are—may

we be pardoned for it—always grieved when a monument of architecture is uselessly destroyed.

On the 2d of August the Emperor Napoleon commenced hostilities with a play which was the first act of the war so senselessly begun, and it is to be hoped will be the last of the French Cæsarian Empire. The industrious town of Saarbrücken on the right, and the large suburb of St Johann on the left bank of the Saar, lie encradled in the narrow valley of this river, whose banks rise up rather steep both to the north and to the south. The town is scarcely two and a half miles distant from the French frontier. The railway from Metz by St Avold and Forbach crosses the Saar below Saarbrücken, and joins on the right bank the line from Trèves. The common railway station of these two lines lies to the north of the town. The heights are not considerable, but still the Kelsch Berg at Forbach is nearly 700 feet higher than the river at Saarbrücken, and in addition to this, the small valleys which run into that of the Saar are all deep-cut and narrow.

The town of Saarbrücken had provisionally only a very weak garrison—one battalion of the 40th Prussian infantry regiment (Hohenzollern fusilier regiment), and three squadrons of the 7th (Rhenish) Uhlan regiment. The whole detachment was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel von Pestel, commanding the 7th Uhlans. Opposed to these 1500 Prussians stood the 2d French Corps, under General

Frossard, which was concentrated mainly at St Avold, having Bataille's division pushed forward on the heights of Spicheren. These heights fall with rather steep slopes on the one side towards the German frontier, on the other side towards the Forbach Railway, and on them Bataille's division had intrenched itself. To the left of Frossard's Corps, and not very far distant, was Bazaine's Corps, in the neighbourhood of Boulay.

It can certainly never be without danger that a detachment of 1500 men finds itself opposed quite alone to two hostile Corps numbering together 50,000 men. The commander-in-chief of the German armies intended, therefore, to retire the Saarbrücken detachment; but the commander of it, Lieutenant-Colonel Pestel, remonstrated against this, and begged to be allowed to remain on his post, urging that the whole behaviour of the French showed that they were afraid; and in truth the French press had magnified the small Prussian detachments on the Saar into a complete army. Lieutenant-Colonel Pestel received, in answer to his application, permission to remain in Saarbrücken; but at the same time two other battalions were pushed forward to Saarbrücken, and further in rear other troops, which in the meanwhile had been made mobile, were posted, in order to receive the detachment from Saarbrücken, in case the French should really attack it.

In order in some degree to allay the increasing

impatience of the French, the Emperor Napoleon ordered, on the 1st of August, that General Frossard should on the following day take possession of the heights on the left bank of the Saar opposite Saarbrücken. The Emperor himself intended to be present at the battle, and also to bring with him his son, Prince Louis, who was but fourteen years old, and who was to be taken into the field to win his spurs under the guidance of his Governor. General Bazaine was to make a demonstration on the same day against Wehrden with one division.

On the morning of the 2d August, General Frossard marched his whole Corps on to the heights of Spicheren. Bataille's division formed the first line; Bastoul's brigade on the right; Pouget's on the left; and on each wing of the division there was also a 12-pounder battery from the reserve of the Corps. Behind the right wing of Bataille's division was Laveaucoupet's division; behind the left wing, Letellier's brigade from Vergé's division. A detachment of one squadron and two battalions was to advance on the extreme left against Gersweiler, to seek to effect communication with Bazaine. Bastoul's brigade was to take possession of the heights of St Arnual (Darlen), opposite St Johann, and then turn to the westward against the exercising ground; while Pouget's brigade, advancing between the Forbach highroad and the Forbach Railway, was to attack the exercising ground in front.

On the 1st of August the Prussian patrols had perceived a great movement in the French camp. On the morning of the 2d, Frossard's Corps broke up its camp, and took up a position on the heights which extend on German territory between Stiring and St Arnual. Upon receiving notice of this advance of the French, three companies of the garrison battalion of Saarbrücken took up a position on the left bank of the Saar, on the heights of the exercising ground to the west of the town; the fourth company remained in the town itself, and the two battalions which had been pushed forward as reinforcements on the right bank of the Saar. The two 12-pounder batteries which Frossard had brought forward, and the three batteries of Bataille's division, including the mitrailleuse battery, opened a heavy cannonade in the direction of Saarbrücken, without, however, doing any injury worth naming to the few Prussians there.

It was 11 A.M. before Pouget's brigade advanced, with skirmishers thrown out, against the front of the exercising ground, and Bastoul's brigade against St Arnual. The three Prussian companies also threw out skirmishers, and a lively though useless firing ensued, the French opening fire at enormous distances. After this musketry contest had lasted nearly an hour, Bastoul's brigade appeared about noon on the left flank of the Prussians. These, never having had any intention of offering resistance, commenced their retreat, as soon

as the French attack became earnest, quietly and in good order, through Saarbrücken, and on to the right bank of the Saar, and were in no way molested by their attackers, excepting by a few shells and mitrailleuse-balls from guns which the latter posted on the position they had taken up near the crest of the heights on the left bank of the Saar. The Prussians bivouacked that night at Püttlingen. Their loss in dead, wounded, and missing amounted to 2 officers and 73 men. The French must have lost at least as many.

General Frossard sent to the Emperor a long official report of this fight at Saarbrücken—if a fight it must be called—the only official report, excepting that of M'Mahon's of the action at Wörth, which exists on the French side of the battles and combats of this war. The private accounts—especially those in the French official newspapers—were superabundant; the Prince Imperial, who after the fall of the curtain returned with his father to the Imperial headquarters in Metz, and the mitrailleuses, were the chief subjects of adoration. The former—the poor boy!—had shown the most wonderful courage and coolness; he had even made most remarkable military remarks, such as, "The bullets whistle very much." In short, through him, and also in some small degree through the mitrailleuses, the Napoleonic dynasty was, according to these accounts, firmly re-established on the battle-field of Saarbrücken. The mitrailleuses were reported to

have worked miracles, and to have exterminated whole divisions of Prussians.

And before a short week had passed, it was destined that it should become manifest to the whole French nation how all this was a swindle of the Empire, and nothing more.

The Battles of WEISSENBURG on the 4th of August, and of WORTH on the 6th of August.

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

POSITIONS AT NOON
ON THE
6TH OF AUGUST 1870.

FRENCH

a. Ducrot's Division.
b. Raoult's ,,
c. De Lartigue's Division.
d. Abel Douay's ,,
e. Conseil Dumesnil's Division.
f. Cavalry.
g. Guyot de Leupart's Division of the V. Corps.
h. The remainder of the V. Corps.

GERMANS

1. II. Bavarian Corps.
2. Schmidt's Division, ½ V. German Corps.
3. Bastert's ,, ½
4. Schachtmeyer's Division, ½ XI. ,,
5. Gersdorff's ,, ½
6. Advanced Guard of the Würtemberg Division.
7. Remainder of the Würtemberg Division.
8. Baden Division.
9. I. Bavarian Corps.
10. Baden Cavalry.
11. IV. North German Division of Cavalry.

SCALE: $\frac{1}{200,000}$

Scale of 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 English Miles.

CHAPTER X.

THE BATTLES OF WEISSENBURG ON THE 4TH OF AUGUST, AND OF WORTH ON THE 6TH OF AUGUST.

On the same day on which the comedy at Saarbrücken was played by the French, or a day later, the concentration of the German armies was completed, and they could now advance southwards in compact masses against the French frontier.

The Third Army, that of the Crown-Prince of Prussia, was to be engaged first. On the 3d of August the Crown-Prince, from his headquarters at Speyer, ordered the advance of his troops towards the Lauter, and away over this, to commence on the 4th of August. His army, which, on arrival at the Lauter, would have to extend along a front of about sixteen miles, was formed in four chief columns.

1. The right wing was formed by the 2d Bavarian Corps (Hartmann's), the advanced-guard of which was formed by Bothmer's division. This was to march at once upon Weissenburg, and endeavour to seize the town. To cover its right flank it was to send a detachment towards Bobenthal. The remainder of Hart-

mann's corps was to follow Bothmer's division by Bergzabern to Ober-Otterbach. 2. The second column, the 5th North German Corps, was to march on the left of the first by Nieder-Otterbach to Kapsweyer and Gross Steinfeld; its advanced-guard was to cross the Lauter below Weissenburg, and push forward outposts along the right bank of the river on the heights towards the town. 3. The third column, the 11th North German Corps, was to advance on the left of the second through the Bienwald, upon the Bienwaldsmühle on the Lauter; it was also to push forward its advanced-guard on to the right bank of the river. 4. The fourth column, lastly, the corps of Lieutenant-General Werder, composed of the Baden division (Beyer) and the Würtemberg division (Obernitz), was directed to advance, in the first place, along the left bank of the Rhine against Lauterburg, to occupy that point, and to place outposts on the right bank of the Lauter.

These four chief columns of the first line were followed in the second line by the 4th division of cavalry (Prince Albrecht of Prussia), which was to advance by Billigheim and Babelroth, as far as the Otterbach, to the east of Ober-Otterbach, and by the 1st Bavarian Corps (Von der Tann), which, moving along the road from Germersheim to Weissenburg, was to bivouack on the evening of the 4th at Langenkandel. The Crown-Prince of Prussia intended to establish his headquarters at Nieder-Otterbach. The troops commenced their march in accordance with these instruc-

tions, and Bothmer's Bavarian division was the first to encounter the enemy at Weissenburg.

When in the last days of July and in the beginning of August the commanders of the French forces came to their senses, and began to say to themselves that perhaps the French army was not numerically strong enough to allow of its being uselessly scattered, Marshal M'Mahon was directed to cover his communications with the 5th Corps (De Failly) in such a way that he might not by any chance be cut off from it. In accordance with these instructions, M'Mahon sent his 2d division, Abel Douay, with two regiments of cavalry, on to the line of the Lauter, and concentrated the remainder of his troops northwards towards Hagenau. General Abel Douay occupied the town of Weissenburg with two battalions, detached a regiment with some cavalry towards Lauterburg, and encamped with the bulk of his division on the heights of the Geissbergs, to the south of Weissenburg, on the right bank of the Lauter. The outpost duty was rather indifferently performed.

The town of Weissenburg, surrounded by a wall and ditch of the middle age, had long ceased to have any value as a fortress, although its enceinte had been strengthened by a few more modern earthworks. But it had always, until the year 1867, ranked as a fortress of the second class, owing probably to ancient traditions, and then it was scratched off the list. In military history it has considerable renown as the

central point of the so-called Weissenburger lines, which, during the Spanish Succession war, extended, in accordance with the cordon system which then prevailed, eastward to Lauterburg on the Rhine, and westward to the upper Mundat-Wald. These lines, which were at that time defended by the French Army of the Rhine, were attacked by the Austrian General Wurmser, who stormed them, and then took a position more to the southward on the Moder, to cover the siege of Landau. In December of the same year he was driven from his position on the Moder by Hoche and Pichegru, and compelled to abandon the line of the Lauter, after fighting a battle at Weissenburg on the 25th of December.

The advanced-guard of the Bavarian division, Bothmer, encountered, to the southward of Schweigen, opposition from the French garrison of Weissenburg, which contained, besides the infantry, sixteen guns served by men of the National Guard. General Douay immediately sent two battalions and a battery to the support of the troops on the right bank of the Lauter. Between the Bavarians at Schweigen and the French in Weissenburg, there then ensued a battle of firearms which could not indeed have appeared to the latter to be very threatening. The Crown-Prince of Prussia on his side, who had arrived at Schweigen shortly after 8 A.M., did not deem it advisable to storm Weissenburg with the Bavarians. He purposed waiting for the advance of the columns which were

to cross the Lauter between Weissenburg and Lauterburg.

The weather was bad, and it rained. Towards 10 A.M. the advanced-guard of the 5th Corps (17th brigade of infantry, Colonel von Bothmer, 58th and 59th regiments) had crossed the Lauter below Weissenburg, had taken possession of the Gutleutshof without much opposition, and was now forming up to attack the Geissberg. The 18th brigade, General Voigts-Rhetz (7th and 57th regiments), was ordered by General Kirchbach, the commander of the 5th Corps, as soon as he heard that the Bavarians were brought to a standstill before Weissenburg, to march upon Altenstadt below Weissenburg, cross the Lauter there, and with its right to join on to the 17th brigade. By about noon, the 17th and 18th brigades had marched up to the eastward of the Geissberg, while artillery had advanced, and had begun a heavy cannonade against the batteries of Douay's division. Three batteries of the 17th and 18th brigades were sent on the south of the Lauter towards Weissenburg, to support the attack which the Bavarian division, Bothmer, was making from the north against the town.

The 11th North German Corps had crossed the Lauter near the Bienwald mill at about 10 A.M., and had marched upon Schleithal. When they heard the thunder of the cannon at Weissenburg, the commander, General Bose, inclined his Corps to its right from Schleithal towards the Geissberg. This hap-

pened at about 11 A.M. The artillery of the Corps was in front, followed by the 41st brigade of infantry (Koblinski, 80th and 87th regiments).

At noon the Bavarian division, Bothmer, from the north, and the three Prussian battalions, of which we before made mention, from the south, attacked at the same moment the town of Weissenburg, and took it after the artillery had battered in the strongly-barricaded gate. Shortly after 12 o'clock, after their artillery had for some time fired on the enemy's position, the 18th and 41st infantry brigades attacked the Geissberg.

General Douay, who in the beginning had faced north, was compelled by the arrival of the 41st brigade, which threatened to take him in rear, to change his front. He had to swing back his right wing. The 18th Prussian brigade, the 7th regiment (Royal Grenadier Regiment) in front, mounted the Geissberg from the east, from Gutlenthof, under a most violent cannon and musketry fire from the French. At 1 o'clock they took the castle of Geissberg, which stands near the summit. At the same time the 41st brigade attacked the enemy on their right flank, so that their position became untenable. They commenced to retreat, making at 1.30 P.M. an offensive rally, but without success. The Prussian artillery and infantry on the Geissberg made any such attempt impossible; but at all events this offensive thrust covered a little the retreat, which, General

Douay having fallen in the fight, did not take place in the best order. On the Prussian side the 4th and 14th regiments of dragoons were sent in pursuit, and made some prisoners; but they could not reap the full fruit of their first advantage, as the French soon found refuge towards the south-west in the Bannwald.

At least twenty battalions of the Germans—that is about 20,000 men—were actually engaged. Douay's division was scarcely 8000 strong, and it was, moreover, completely surprised by the German attack. Only the circumstance that Weissenburg was occupied and attacked before the Prussian columns could cross the Lauter, gave it time to form up. As, in spite of the great numerical superiority of the Germans, and of the circumstances which we have related, the battle lasted nevertheless three hours, and the French lost only one gun, which was surprised by the Prussian Rifles, no conclusion disadvantageous to the French as to the issue of the war can be drawn from the fight in itself. But it was certainly clear that the Germans would be able to bring on nearly every occasion a considerable numerical superiority on to the battle-field.

The mitrailleuse battery of Douay's division was only in action for a short time; a Prussian shell struck its ammunition-waggon and blew it up, wounding a great number of the gunners, so that the battery had to withdraw. The French carried off with

them the greater part of their wounded; of unwounded prisoners they lost about 1000, among them 30 officers. The greater part of these belonged to the garrison of Weissenburg. The German loss in killed and wounded was estimated at about 800 men, among whom were 76 officers. The King's Grenadier Regiment alone had 10 officers killed and 12 wounded —together, 22; that is, much more than a third of its total number. The French loss in killed and wounded was probably not so great as that of the Germans, as the latter were obliged to attack difficult positions.

The German troops who had been engaged in the fight encamped on the south side of the valley of the Lauter. The 2d Bavarian Corps was pushed on to Oberhofen and Steinselz; the 4th division of cavalry, in the course of the afternoon, to Weissenburg-Altenstadt. General von Werder, with his Baden-Würtemberg Corps, crossed the Lauter at Lauterburg without meeting any opposition, and pushed a brigade southwards to Selz, at the same time connecting itself by outposts and patrols with the Corps of General Bose.

On the 4th of August, Marshal M'Mahon had concentrated the greater part of his Corps in the vicinity of Hagenau. He himself, however, was still at Strasburg, where, at 4 P.M., he received by telegraph, first the intelligence of the attack of the Germans on Weissenburg, and afterwards of the defeat of General Douay. It appeared to him more urgent than ever to establish a better connection between his Corps and

that of De Failly, and thereby with the main body of the French army, which was pushed forward towards the Saar, and to cover to this end the passes of the Northern Vosges, especially those by Niederbronn and Lichtenberg. But he did not intend to give up the western slopes of the Vosges, and with them Alsace, without a struggle. In order to strengthen himself for this, he demanded from General Felix Douay, who was posted very uselessly at Belfort, any available organised forces which he might have at hand. After he had received an answer to his telegram saying that these troops would be sent by railway with all possible speed, he hastened on the evening of the same day, the 4th of August, to Hagenau, and there resolved, after he had surveyed the ground, to take up a position on the right bank of the Sauer near Wörth. The Sauer flows in the neighbourhood of Wörth from north to south, and bends below Gunstett from west to east, to flow through the plains of Alsace towards the Rhine.

The remains of the beaten division of Abel Douay, which were now under the command of General Pellé, as well as the troops sent from Belfort, were ordered to assemble in this position. Intelligence of what had happened was also sent to General de Failly, and he was requested to support the 1st Corps by Niederbronn. The position which Marshal M'Mahon took up on the 5th of August was as follows:—

In the first line: On the left wing, the 1st

division, Ducrot, with its right at Fröschweiler, and its left, fronting Neuweiler, resting on the great wood to the north of Reichshofen; in the centre the 3d division, Raoult, with its left on the height before Fröschweiler opposite Görsdorf, and its right wing at Elsasshausen; on the right wing the 4th division, De Lartigue, with its left in front of Eberbach in the Niederwald, and its right on the Eberbach at Morsbronn.

In the second line: Abel Douay's division, now Pellé's, between Elsasshausen and Reichshofen; Conseil Dumesnil's division, the 1st of the 7th Corps (Felix Douay), took up its position between Eberbach and Forstheim, behind the right wing of the first line, having only arrived by the railway at 6 A.M. In the second line also, and in reserve, were placed the cavalry — Septeuil's brigade of Bonnemain's division (from the cavalry reserve) and the Michel's brigade of cuirassiers (8th and 9th regiments). This last brigade, with which the divisional general of cavalry, Duhesme, was present, was posted behind Conseil Dumesnil's division between Forstheim and Griesbach.

On the 5th of August the Crown-Prince of Prussia pushed forward his army from their bivouack on the Lauter against the Sauer: the 2d Bavarian Corps through the Hochwald, between Lembach and Lampertsloch; the 5th North German Corps to Preuschdorf; the 11th to Sulz-nid-dem-wald (Soulz sous forêts); Werder's Corps to Aschbach; the headquar-

ters were moved to Sulz; while the 1st Bavarian Corps and the 4th division of cavalry remained in reserve further in rear.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia had no intention of offering battle on the 6th of August; but as on the 5th he continually received intelligence of M'Mahon's concentration on the right bank of the Sauer, he resolved to push forward his army towards the left bank of that stream. Accordingly the 2d Bavarian Corps was ordered to advance upon Langensulzbach, the 5th North German Corps on to the line from Görsdorff to Gunstett, opposite Wörth; the 11th North German upon Hölschloch and Surburg; and Werder's Corps on Hohweiler and Reimersweiler. Behind this first line the 1st Bavarian Corps (Von der Tann) was to move forward to Preuschdorf, but the 4th division of cavalry was to remain for the present in Schönenburg, where it had arrived on the 5th of August. The Crown-Prince of Prussia purposed also remaining during the 6th in his headquarters at Sulz.

By the evening of the 5th of August, General Kirchbach, acting upon these instructions, had already pushed forward the outposts of the 5th Corps on to the heights on the left bank of the Saar, which overlook the stream opposite Wörth and Gunstett; and early on the morning of the 6th of August, they and the advanced troops of the French divisions, Raoult and De Lartigue, began to fire on one another.

The commander of the outposts of the 5th North

German Corps hastened to the front, and it appeared to him as though his adversary only wished to cover his retreat through the firing. To certify himself of this, he caused a battalion of the Westphalian Fusilier Regiment, No. 37, to cross the Sauerbach and advance against the Niederwald; but this movement met with great opposition from the enemy, and the troops, fighting bravely, were soon engaged in a severe musketry combat. This firing at Elsasshausen in the Niederwald was heard the more plainly by the left wing as the artillery of the 5th Corps became engaged also, and this caused French artillery to be brought forward to reply to it.

General von Schachtmeyer, commander of the 21st division of infantry belonging to the 11th Corps, who, according to the dispositions made, was marching on the morning of the 6th upon Hölschloch, heard, when in the neighbourhood of Weiler, the noise of cannon at Wörth. Presently this subsided. Thereupon the 21st division encamped at Hölschloch, but sent out patrols, who returned with the intelligence that a small Prussian detachment of the 5th Corps occupied Gunstett, and that upon the other side of the Sauerbach there was a French camp.

And now the thunder of artillery began again in the direction of Wörth. Schachtmeyer, following the good old maxim that a general in the neighbourhood of the enemy must march towards the sound of cannon, pushed forward his advanced-guard towards

Oberdorf and Gunstett, strengthened the garrison of the latter place, and sent his detachment of artillery forward towards it, which took up a position on the heights north-west of this place on the left bank of the Sauerbach. Behind this screen the bulk of Schachtmeyer's division then formed up also. General von Kirchbach had also, at 8 o'clock, ordered the advanced troops of his Corps (the 5th) to light their fires, as no fight was intended on that day; but shortly afterwards the noise of the artillery from the south caused him also to renew the musketry fight, so that by 9 A.M. firing was going on along the whole line of the Sauerbach.

At this time the 22d division, belonging also to the 11th Corps, arrived at Surburg, and its commander, General Gersdorff, was at once informed of the march of the 21st division on Gunstett. Directly afterwards, the chief of the 11th Corps, General Bose, came up, and he at once ordered the 22d division to advance. The division, therefore, with the 43d brigade of infantry, Kontzki, and the artillery in front, moved southwards from the Gunstetter Niederwald upon Gunstett to deploy on the left of the 21st division; but it only arrived, as we shall see, at mid-day in Gunstett, and the reserve of artillery of the 11th Corps at 1 P.M.

When General von Werder at Reimersweiler heard of the removal of the 22d division, he pushed forward the cavalry brigade of General Schéler and the infantry brigade of Starkloff, belonging to Obernitz's Wür-

temberg division, by Surburg on Gunstett. The infantry brigade left their knapsacks behind. As can be easily understood, these troops arrived even later than the 22d division on the field of battle.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia, hearing, in the course of the afternoon, of these events on the Sauer, changed his first intention of not offering battle on this day, and resolved now to push all his troops forward into the line. Accordingly, at 12.15 P.M., General von Werder received the order to move forward on Gunstett the remainder of Obernitz's division, Hügel's brigade of infantry, and Beyer's Baden division. Only one regiment was to remain to guard the headquarters on the south of Sulz. The above-named troops of Werder's Corps marched in this order—Hügel's brigade, the artillery of the Corps, and then Beyer's division from Reimersweiler and Hohweiler, through the Gunstetter Niederwald towards Gunstett. At the same time the 2d Bavarian Corps and the 11th Corps received the order to continue the fight, and General von der Tann was directed to hasten the march of the 1st Bavarian Corps on Preuschdorf.

We have now seen how the fight was commenced and carried on on the part of the headquarters of the Third Army—how of the various bodies of troops some were engaged, and others were set in motion for that purpose. By the force of circumstances, and in pursuance of the orders, the army was distributed

as follows: On the right wing stood the 2d Bavarian Corps, in a long line and in a wooded district, having only a small number of the enemy in their front; in the centre, from Görsdorf to Spachbach, was the 5th Corps, opposed to the left wing of M'Mahon; on the left of the Germans there would be concentrated in time a mass of two full Corps upon a small front at Gunstett, to the south of Spachbach; as a general reserve in the centre would be the 1st Bavarian Corps as soon as it should arrive at Preuschdorf.

We will now follow the movements of the 5th Prussian Corps, and then those of the 11th, until about 2 P.M.

Shortly after 8 A.M. General Kirchbach had renewed the combat, and determined at once to direct his attack upon Wörth, instead of keeping up an uncertain fire at long ranges. To this end he ordered the reserve artillery of his Corps, as well as the artillery of the advanced-guard, to take ground to the eastward of Wörth, and to open at once upon the left wing of Raoult's French division. Behind his artillery he formed in first line on the road from Preuschdorf the 10th division, Schmidt; in the second line the 9th division, Sandrart. M'Mahon caused the right wing of the 1st division to advance from Fröschweiler to prolong the position of the 3d division, and to protect it from being outflanked—a manœuvre which, as it was suspected, was intended by the Germans.

By 10 A.M. Kirchbach had in action against Wörth 14 batteries (84 guns). These kept up a heavy fire until 11 A.M., and there can be no doubt that the effect of this cannonade upon the French positions was very great. And just at this time the news was received from the 11th Corps that it also had already achieved great successes. Kirchbach therefore ordered his advanced-guard to storm Wörth, and having taken it, to establish itself upon the heights on the right bank of the Sauerbach. The 20th brigade of infantry, Walther von Monbary, advanced to the attack, took Wörth at about 12.30 P.M., after a most obstinate fight, in which the French General Raoult fell, and supported soon afterwards by the 19th brigade, Henning, took up a position on the crest of the heights which form the right side of the valley of the Sauer. Of the second line the 18th brigade, Voigts-Rhetz, was pushed forward to Spachbach and Elsasshausen. The 1st and 3d French divisions retired along the line Fröschweiler-Elsasshausen.

While General Kirchbach was occupied with the execution of this last-mentioned manœuvre, he received the general order which the Crown-Prince had issued. He immediately resolved upon an advance of his whole Corps against Fröschweiler; communicated, however, before he commenced the movement, his intention to General Bose, and entreated him to push forward at the same time against the enemy's right flank. This the General promised to do.

Schachtmeyer's division of the 11th Corps did not confine itself to carrying on an artillery fire; it endeavoured also to gain ground on the other side of the Sauerbach; and for this purpose a battalion of the 87th regiment was sent forward into the Elsasshausen Niederwald. At the same time Schachtmeyer ordered two battalions to advance against Gunstett, and three others over the ground between that place and Oberdorf.

Lartigue's division of M'Mahon's Corps had concentrated its three batteries, the mitrailleuse battery included, on the heights by Albrechtshäuser Hof (Lansberg) against the batteries of Schachtmeyer's division. In addition two batteries were brought forward to the eastward of Elsasshausen to fire upon the Prussian columns advancing by Oberdorf. Against these last-mentioned guns the fire of the left wing of the artillery of the 5th Prussian Corps was directed from the heights between Dieffenbach and Spachbach.

At 10.30 A.M. General Lartigue ordered a brigade of his division to advance from Morsbronn against Gunstett. Its onset was repulsed by the Prussians. But meanwhile the division of Conseil Dumesnil had deployed behind it to renew the attack. At 11 A.M. General Bose, commander of the 11th Corps, arrived at Schachtmeyer's division, and announced that Gersdorff's division of the Corps was marching up. At 11 A.M. the attack by Dumesnil's division and by the part of Lartigue's upon Gunstett took place.

The French pushed forward into the village, but were repulsed by Schachtmeyer's division, which had been strengthened by the arrival of the 11th battalion of Rifles.

At 12 noon Gersdorff's division arrived at Gunstett and advanced on the south of the village in the direction of Eberbach. A quarter of an hour later the reserve artillery of the Corps came up. General Bose, then, having meanwhile received information of the energetic advance of Kirchbach against Wörth, and having been entreated by him to operate against the right flank of the French, ordered the bulk of his force (two brigades), under General Thile, to cross the Sauerbach and move upon Elsasshausen, covered by the fire of part of his artillery, which remained in position to the north of Gunstett.

Whilst at 1 P.M. General Bose's Corps was crossing the Sauer, the Würtemberg brigades, Schéler and Starkloff, came up on his left wing, and secured him here also against a flank attack. At the same time General Bose received an order from the Crown-Prince, in consequence of which he inclined to his right, and directed his troops upon Wörth.

At 1.30 P.M. Schachtmeyer's division, the 21st, followed by the Würtembergers on the right, the 22d division, Gersdorff, on the left wing, advanced from south to north through the Elsasshauser Niederwald, and the Eberbachthal against Elsasshausen, which was set fire to and taken at about 2 P.M.

Battle of SAARBRUCKEN on the 6th of August 1870.



Positions occupied by the Prussians on the morning of the 6th of August.

Positions of the Prussians at 3 p. m. 1 28th Brigade of Infantry. 2 27th Brigade of Infantry.
3 Artillery of the 14th Division. 4 Cavalry of the 14th Division and Rheinlanden Division.
5 40th Regiment of Infantry. 6 Advanced Guard of the 5th Division of Infantry. 16th Division of Infantry.
8 12th Regiment of Infantry. 9 52d Regiment of Infantry 10 Advanced Guard of the 13th Division.

Lines of the Prussian Advance.

a b c d e f Positions of the French.

Retreat of Frossard's Corps.

Scale: $\frac{1}{200,000}$

Scale of 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 English Miles.

Portions of Lartigue's and Dumesnil's division had been already beaten to the southwards by the attack of the 11th Corps. From Fröschweiler M'Mahon had made desperate efforts to regain connection with his right wing, whilst Nausouty's brigade of lancers, and especially Michel's brigade of cuirassiers (8th and 9th regiments), charged with the wildest fury the Prussians and Würtembergers advancing by Elsasshausen. The two regiments of cuirassiers were so nearly annihilated by the Prussian infantry, and by the artillery supporting them, that only melancholy ruins, barely 150 men, remained of these superb horsemen.

Now the Germans advanced without halt upon Fröschweiler, the 11th Corps from the south and parts of the 5th from the east, and at 3.30 P.M. it was taken. The fight at Elsasshausen, and between Elsasshausen and Fröschweiler, had cost painful sacrifices. On the German side General Bose was twice wounded, so that he had to resign the command to General Gersdorff; and on the French side General Colson, Chief of M'Mahon's Staff, fell.

M'Mahon was forced to commence his retreat. In regard to direction he had no choice. He was compelled to retire by Reichshofen upon Niederbronn, where he was received by Guyot de Lespart's division, which De Failly had sent forward from Bitche. The Germans, wearied by the furious fighting, could not carry out a vigorous pursuit, and thus M'Mahon was

enabled to gain Zabern (Saverne), on the east foot of the Vosges, with the 15,000 men of his centre and left wing whom he had held together. The German horsemen who followed the Frenchmen in pursuit consisted of the Würtemberg brigade of cavalry (Schéler), of the 14th North German regiment of hussars, and of the 14th regiment of dragoons. The first of these captured, to the south of Reichshofen, some guns and stores, and made numerous prisoners.

After the battle, the 5th Corps bivouacked at Fröschweiler. Of the 11th Corps, Schachtmeyer's division between Elsasshausen and Wörth; Gersdorff's division on the Eberbach, to the south of Elsasshausen. The Würtembergers encamped partly by Elsasshausen, partly by Eberbach; the Baden Division by Gunstett; the Würtemberg cavalry by Reichshofen; the Baden cavalry brigade, La Roche, was sent forward towards the Hagenau wood.

The number of M'Mahon's forces engaged is said to be only 35,000; the German troops who really came into action were about 75,000 infantry and cavalry. The losses on both sides were very considerable. The troops of M'Mahon's which had been forced away from him joined him again, some on the east foot of the Vosges, others later on, while others again, retreated to Strasburg. The Germans took 4000 unwounded prisoners, 36 guns, among which were 6 mitrailleuses, and 2 eagles.

CHAPTER XI.

THE BATTLE OF SAARBRÜCKEN ON THE 6TH OF AUGUST.

On the same day on which the left wing of the Germans won the battle of Wörth and routed the troops of M'Mahon, their right wing also was destined to gain a victory, and to bring into disorder another French Corps, that of General Frossard.

The First Army was advancing upon the Saar. It was determined that the advanced-guards should be pushed forward as far as the river by the 6th of August, without, however, any expectation or intention of giving battle.

The 7th Corps, Zastrow, was on the right; the 8th, Goeben, on the left. Of the 7th Corps, the 13th division, Glümer, was directed on the 6th of August upon Püttlingen, and its outposts were to be advanced as far as the Saar, below Saarbrücken, to Völklingen and Rockershausen; the 14th division, Kameke, was to move upon Güchenbach, and push forward outposts as far as Saarbrücken itself, and to the west of it to Louisenthal. The main body of the Corps was not to reach the Saar until the 7th of August. Of the

8th Corps, the 16th division arrived at 6 A.M. on the 6th at Fischbach, five miles to the north of Saarbrücken, and the 15th in rear of it to Holz. The extreme right of the Second Army, Prince Frederic Charles, consisting of the 3d Corps, Alvensleben, and of the 3d division of cavalry, Rheinbaben, debouched from the Western Palatinate, and advanced also in the direction of Saarbrücken. The outposts of the 3d Corps were to reach this town on the 6th; Rheinbaben's division of cavalry had in part already arrived there on the 5th August; the 5th division of infantry, Stülpnagel, was to encamp five miles to the north of Saarbrücken; the 6th, Buddenbrock, around Neunkirchen, a good twelve miles from the former town.

Early on the morning of the 6th of August, General Kameke received intelligence from Rheinbaben's division that the French had quitted the exercising ground of Saarbrücken, and retired upon the heights of Spicheren, and that even the position there seemed to be only taken up with a view of covering a further retreat, assisted by the railway. Somewhat later on, General Zastrow, who was on the march from Lebach to Dilsburg, heard the same news—in the first place directly, and afterwards from General Kameke.

This last-named general now determined to attack and drive in the rear-guard of the enemy. To this end he ordered his division to advance upon Saarbrücken, and hurried on himself to the advanced-guard, where he arrived about 11 A.M., and then

forthwith caused Rheinbaben's division of cavalry to march through Saarbrücken, and the infantry of the advanced-guard of the 14th division to follow it.

In reality, General Frossard was intending to evacuate the position Spicheren-Forbach. Since the first news of the battle of Weissenburg, great confusion had prevailed at the French headquarters. On the one hand, it was admitted that De Failly should endeavour to keep up his communication with M'Mahon, while this last was drawn in towards him, and that Frossard also should seek to reach the hand to De Failly over Saargemünd; on the other hand, it was held that great advantage would be gained by a blow against the Prussian fortress Saarlouis. The Corps-commanders, who were thus swayed hither and thither, cannot be much blamed. The misfortune was that France had undertaken this war without any consideration, and with most insufficient forces. General de Failly was to support M'Mahon on his right, to seek to join communications on his left with Frossard, and during all this was to still maintain his position at Bitche. General Frossard was to keep up his connection with De Failly, cover the space between Bitche and St Avold, and also have troops disposable to support an expedition against Saarlouis. How could all these things be done at one and the same time with 30,000 men?

On the 6th of August Frossard was about to send a strong detachment to Saargemünd; Vergé's division

was to remain for the present on the Spicheren heights; the remainder were to fall back to St Avold, to be ready to act from that place against Saarlouis, in conjunction with Bazaine, Ladmirault, and the Guard. Soon after 11 o'clock in the forenoon, the main body of Kameke's division reached the right bank of the Saar at Saarbrücken, and was then immediately ordered to cross the stream and follow the advanced-guard, which had already occupied the exercising ground, and was now engaged in an artillery combat with the troops on the heights of Spicheren. In compliance with these instructions, therefore, Kameke now advanced his troops along both sides of the road from Saarbrücken to Forbach against this latter town and the heights.

Frossard meanwhile had already withdrawn his headquarters from "the Golden Bream," close to the Prussian frontier, to Forbach, and his troops were preparing to depart. But as soon as he was instructed of the state of affairs, he countermanded this order, and caused his forces to form front towards the Germans, at the same time informing Bazaine, who was the nearest to him, of what was taking place. This change was quickly effected. Frossard's Corps soon occupied the heights of Spicheren, and those of Stiring to the west of them, and thus it came to pass that Kameke's division encountered a very serious opposition.

We have already seen how General Zastrow had

acquired by his own observation a knowledge of the events which were passing. As soon as this was confirmed by reports from Kameke, he, at about 1 P.M., ordered the whole of Glümer's division to advance upon the Saar at Wehrden and Völklingen, to push forward its advanced-guard towards Forbach and Ludweiler, and obtain information of the intentions of the enemy; the main body of Kameke's division, which, as we have related, had already been for a long time engaged, was to push forward to the Saar at Rokershausen, and the reserve artillery of the Corps to Püttlingen. As soon as he received this order, Glümer at once marched off his division. Its advanced-guard came at 2.30 P.M. to Völklingen; the main body started at 3 P.M. from Püttlingen for the same place—nearly three and a half miles—being still ignorant of what was occurring at Saarbrücken, as between them and it there was a thickly-wooded hilly district, and the direction of the wind was not such as to carry to them the noise of the cannon. Troops who stood further to the east heard it, and they at once marched towards it.

At first these troops were composed only of the 16th division of the 8th Corps. Its commander, General Barnekow, at once sent forward his advanced-guard to Saarbrücken, and arrived at 3 P.M. to the south of the town with the 40th regiment of infantry and three squadrons of the 9th regiment of hussars. The van of the advanced-guard of the

3d Corps—the 9th brigade of infantry, Döring—had arrived in the forenoon to the east of Saarbrücken. In a reconnaissance which he made on the south of the Saar, General Döring remarked soon after 11 A.M. that Prussian troops—the 14th division—were engaged about the Spicheren hills. He at once sent the two battalions and one squadron which he had with him to the south of the Saar to support them, and moreover gave orders to advance to all the troops of his brigade, which was at Duttweiler, three and a half miles to the north of the Saar, at the same time informing the chief of the 3d Corps, General von Alvensleben, of his proceedings. Alvensleben received the report at about 2 P.M., and at once set in motion all the troops of his Corps who could by any possible means be yet brought on to the field of battle.

To this end the 12th regiment of infantry of the 10th brigade was to leave Neunkirchen, where it happened to be, by railway for St Johann; the 52d regiment of infantry of the same brigade was directed to march from St Ingbert to Saarbrücken; the 20th regiment of infantry of the 11th brigade (6th division) was to place itself on the railway at St Wendel to hasten to the field of battle; and the reserve artillery of the Corps, which was at Ottweiler, received the order to march to Saarbrücken.

But with all this, Kameke's division was, until 3 P.M., only supported by Rheinbaben's division of cavalry. Fighting thus alone, Kameke directed the

28th brigade of infantry, Woyna, against Frossard's left wing, against Stiring, and the western parts of the Spicheren heights; the 27th brigade of infantry, François, he sent to the left to ascend the steep slopes to the east of the road from Saarbrücken to Spicheren, and caused the artillery to take post on the Folster Höhe, and on the Galgenberg in front of Spicheren. In the hollow to the north of the Galgenberg and of the Drathzug, he placed the cavalry of the 14th division, the 15th regiment of hussars, which had been joined by the 11th regiment of hussars of Rheinbaben's division; whilst in the bottom between the Winterberg and the Spicheren hills more horsemen of the same division formed up. On his right wing Kameke, with the 28th brigade, gained ground, and gradually, though with considerable loss, obtained possession of the wood between the Drathzug and Stiring. On the left wing the state of affairs was worse: there the attack on the Spicheren wood could not be carried through, and there fell the gallant commander of the 27th infantry brigade, General François.

Such was the state of things when, at 3 P.M., the first troops of the 8th Corps appeared on the battle-field: first of all the 40th regiment; and the first troops of the 3d Corps—namely, Döring's brigade—on the Winterberg. Shortly after this General Goeben came up and took command. Without delay he sent the 40th regiment to support the 27th brigade of

infantry, to whose left wing it annexed itself; whilst on its left the troops of the 3d Corps as they arrived came into action; the first of these was Döring's brigade. When at 3 P.M. these troops reached him, General Kameke had no reserve of infantry left; the only troops which he held in hand were his regiment of hussars and the artillery on the Galgenberg, which had been reinforced by two batteries of the 16th division, Barnekow. Before this he had, when completely engaged, sent a report to General Zastrow, in which he had represented the affair as favourably as possible, saying that the infantry of his division was engaged in a violent encounter, but was gaining ground, and that the French batteries were withdrawing from the Spicheren hills.

Zastrow received this intelligence at 3 P.M., and judged it expedient to repair himself to Saarbrücken; but before he reached it he heard cannon thundering there, and despatched an officer to General Glümer to inform him of what was going on. At 4.30 P.M. he arrived on the Galgenberg to the southward of Saarbrücken, and Goeben, as junior officer, gave over the command to him. At 5 P.M. Alvensleben came up, having already directed all his disposable troops in the direction of Darlen against the Spicheren wood, and through this against Frossard's right wing. After much fighting the wood was finally taken; and although the French, reinforced on their left by a division of Bazaine's Corps, again and again assumed

the offensive, they could not succeed in piercing through.

But, on the other hand, the Germans, having won the wood, could not emerge from it. Before ground could be gained on the open plateau, it was indispensable to have artillery on the heights, and at last two batteries of the 5th division succeeded in climbing the steep slopes of the Spicheren hills. These, united to the infantry, kept the French in check, so that their right wing could no longer undertake any forward movement.

Under these circumstances, General Zastrow ordered an offensive blow to be struck against the French left wing, which was posted on the Kreuzberg. The troops of the 3d Corps who had already come up formed a strong reserve of infantry; therefore at 6 P.M. six battalions and two batteries of the 5th division of infantry were ordered to make ready to assume the offensive. But before they could advance, the French left wing itself made, at 6.30 P.M., a countermovement of attack. This was in so far advantageous to the Germans, as it brought their adversaries under the fire of their artillery. After this had played on them for some time, the Prussian infantry attacked, and after a short encounter threw the left wing of the French back towards Spicheren and Alsting.

With this the fate of the day was decided at 7 P.M. The French massed their artillery on the heights by Kerbach, to the south of the field of battle, to cover

their retreat, and a few regiments now and again made offensive rallies; but these had no effect further than to limit somewhat the pursuit of the Prussians. By 8.30 P.M. the fighting had entirely ceased, and Frossard's Corps retired in no very good order. The head of the 13th division also assisted to disturb this retreat. Its advanced-guard had, as we have seen, arrived at Völklingen at 2.30 P.M., without suspecting anything of the fight about the Spicheren heights. At 5 P.M. an officer sent by Zastrow arrived there, and the advanced-guard, two battalions, at once set out by Ludweiler and Rosseln towards Forbach, where it appeared after darkness had set in. The two battalions were very tired, and it did not seem advisable to attempt a night attack with them. But the French discovered them, and taking them to be certainly a whole Corps, immediately evacuated in all haste the town of Forbach, which they still held. The line of retreat of Frossard's Corps ran first by Puttelange, southwards (for the Prussians pushed forwards upon both sides of the road from Forbach to St Avold), so that for some days after the battle nothing was known in the headquarters at Metz of its whereabouts.

In the evening the 16th division also came up in reserve at Saarbrücken, and the commander of the First Army, General Steinmetz, who arrived at the same time, placed it at the disposition of General Zastrow, who, however, did not avail himself of it.

The Prussians had in action 27 battalions, therefore about 27,000 men: Frossard's Corps was of about the same strength; and if, in addition, we reckon one of Bazaine's divisions, which, however, did very little, the numerical superiority was this time on the side of the French. The long-contested victory of the Prussians becomes thus of more significance, especially as they were the attackers, and the French held a position naturally exceedingly strong, and rendered more so by shelter-trenches (*tranchées-abris*).

The losses of the Prussians were great. The 5th division alone had about 2000 men killed and wounded, of which 239 were killed. The loss of the 14th division was certainly not less; the 40th regiment had also suffered considerably,—so that the total number would be at the very least 4000. Among the killed was General von François; and among the severely wounded, Colonel von Reuter, commanding the 12th regiment of infantry. The French must have lost as many in killed and wounded as the Germans; and in addition 2000 unwounded prisoners were taken. The Germans captured also a pontoon-train, many provision-waggons, a magazine in Forbach, and the camp of Vergé's division, which originally held the heights of Spicheren.

The 6th of August was a day of great triumph for the German arms, for two French Corps were defeated and placed for some time *hors de combat*. Parts of

others—namely, of the 7th and 3d Corps—were also more or less cut up. The masses of the three German armies could now unite unhindered on the west foot of the Vosges, and fall with their collected forces on the remaining French Corps.

Before we continue our narrative of the progress of hostilities we must turn our glance upon Paris, and consider the political changes which took place there in consequence of the events at the seat of war, and which again in their turn influenced the course of the campaign.

CHAPTER XII.

RETIREMENT OF OLLIVIER'S MINISTRY—PALIKAO'S MINISTRY.

On the day of the great battles of Forbach and of Wörth, a despatch was posted up on the Paris Bourse announcing a great victory by the French. Its contents were to the effect that the army of the Crown-Prince was as good as annihilated. It was an Exchange manœuvre; but the news spread with lightning speed through Paris, and the Parisians gladly gave credence to an account of that which they so greatly desired. The city was speedily decked with "tricolor" flags, and preparations were made for an illumination in the evening.

But ere long a rumour became current that that intelligence on the Bourse was false, merely an Exchange manœuvre; and suddenly to this was added a report that even some of the Ministers themselves were privy to the deception, and had based a speculation upon it. Hereupon universal indignation was aroused, disquietude and a panic ensued upon the Bourse, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon crowds mobbed the Palace of the President of the Ministry, demanding the official news which he had received.

Ollivier only returned at half-past 3 o'clock from St Cloud, whither he had repaired on the first arrival of the news of the battle of Weissenburg, the only misfortune of which he had as yet heard, in order to have an interview with the Empress Regent. With great difficulty he succeeded in entering his house through the dense masses of people, and then he harangued the crowd from the balcony amid frequent interruptions. He asserted that the Ministry immediately communicated to the journals all the official information that it received. The notice on the Bourse was a vile manœuvre, the originator of which should be discovered, while at the same time every measure should be taken to prevent the like happening again. To close the Bourse, as was demanded, he was unable —at least without previously consulting the Ministry. The true news from the theatre of war was, that a single division of from 6000 to 7000 men had been beaten after it had heroically defended itself against two Prussian Army Corps. But Marshal M'Mahon had taken up a position to revenge the momentary advantage which the enemy only owed to his great superiority in numbers. Should any fresh intelligence arrive, good or bad, it should be forthwith made known to the Parisians. "Have confidence in us," concluded Ollivier, "as we have confidence in you. While our brothers are fighting on the frontier, let us have sufficient command over ourselves to support them by our patience. Let us unite in one common

shout, *Vive la Patrie!* Yes, let us unite in the single cry, *Vive la France!*"

The Parisians are good-natured. After this discourse the crowd slowly separated, but not altogether freed from their depression and indignation by the speech of Ollivier.

On the 7th of August the bad news arrived of the affairs of Wörth and of Forbach. The Emperor telegraphed from Metz that, if the army was to maintain itself there, Paris and France must resolve upon great patriotic efforts. The Empress hurried up from St Cloud. The Government, which had on the 6th already determined to reassemble the Chambers on the 11th of August, now changed the date to the 9th. This they announced to the Parisians in a proclamation in which they appealed to the power and patriotism of all. Two remarkable events followed. In the first place, all the newspapers became filled with indignation because the Germans had invaded France, although the majority of them had declared the invasion of Germany by the French to be a matter of course; and secondly, every one now predicted that Paris would be besieged in the very shortest time, which certainly was by no means a necessary result of three lost battles.

On the 7th of August the provisional Minister of War, General Dejean, brought forward a decree in three articles, which ran thus:—

1. All capable citizens between 30 and 40 years of

age, who did not already belong to the Sedentary National Guard, are incorporated into it.

2. The National Guard of Paris is to be employed in the defence of the capital, and in placing its works in a fit state for defence.

3. The project of a law will be proposed having for its end to incorporate into the Mobile National Guard all citizens below 30 years of age not at present belonging to it.

The necessity for this decree was argued in a long report, of the contents of which we give a short summary, in order to explain a few of its points.

The present circumstances, said the Minister of War, necessitate two things—that the defence of Paris be taken into consideration, and that new field troops be created to unite with those still at the disposal of the Emperor. The outer forts of Paris have already for some time had the armament necessary for their security and the completion of it, so that it may be ready for any emergency, and also the arming of the main enceinte has been commenced. New defensive works are projected, and their execution will be taken in hand on the 8th of August: 40,000 men of the National Guard will assist in placing the guns on the fortifications, and then in manning the lines; these, together with the present garrison, will be sufficient to carry out an active, enterprising defence. The new field army will be created (*a*) out of marine troops; (*b*) out of the yet disposable regiments in Algiers and France;

(*c*) out of the marching battalions (4th battalions) of the 100 regiments of infantry, which battalions will be increased to a strength of 900 men each by incorporating with them men of the Mobile Guard; (*d*) by organising a portion of the gendarmes as *élite* troops—these elements give together, without cavalry, artillery, and engineers, 150,000 men; (*e*) to these come in addition 60,000 young conscripts of the class of 1869, which enter the depots between the 8th and 12th of August, and in one month can be converted into good soldiers; (*f*) for the field army can be reckoned the Mobile Guard and the Franctireurs, who number together 400,000 men. Here we have, therefore, not less than 610,000 men wherewith to reinforce the field army. Finally, the Sedentary National Guard must not be forgotten; so that taking all in all, France has two millions of defenders, for which number arms are forthcoming—so General Dejean asserted; and not for them only, for, said he, after all these men are supplied, there will remain even then a million stands in reserve.

A careful inspection of this report prevents any wonder being felt at the singular mixture of dejectedness, indifference, and presumption which prevailed generally throughout the French nation after the 6th of August; for when the Minister of War on the one hand assumes that the Germans can arrive before Paris very shortly, and on the other hand asserts that he can array two million combatants, 90 per cent of whom, roughly calculated, must be organised from the very outset—

while, according to the supposition, the eastern and northern provinces, the real soldier provinces of France, are overrun by the enemy,—when this is possible, what perception can be expected from citizen or peasant?

The marine troops, by whom the field army on land was to be reinforced, were originally destined for the great expedition on the shores of the Baltic and North Sea, but had been, nevertheless, for the most part kept back in the seaport towns. Their employment in the above expedition was now totally abandoned, and they were sent into the interior of the country, especially into the Camp of Chalons, where we shall find them later on.

The establishment of the 4th battalions of the regiments of infantry had been ordered by a decree of the 20th of July. Each of the 100 regiments had, as we before related, 24 companies. Each regiment was now to be increased by 2 companies, while the companies themselves were to be numerically strengthened by calling in men on furlough, reserves, and the men of the second portion — thus every regiment would have a strength of 26 companies; so that after the departure of the 3 field battalions of 6 companies each, 8 companies would still remain, of which 4 were now to form the field, and the other 4 the depot battalion. All the men of the Reserve and of the second portion were to report themselves at the departmental depots before the 23d of July. But this really required much more time for its execution;

a great portion remained at first absent, and then the work followed of distributing them and despatching them to their regiments, many of which were already on the frontier. Moreover, battalions of 900 men, especially of only 4 companies, each of which, therefore, numbered 225 men, were quite unknown in France; and to establish the *cadres* of them was a task of great difficulty.

If, again, a great part of the *gendarmerie* was taken from the departments to organise it for active work, the service of the public security must, according to the principles of the Empire, suffer greatly—and this exactly in a time of confusion, when it must seem to be most necessary to maintain it intact. Recruiting would also perhaps be affected prejudicially, as the *gendarmes* were much employed in getting together the conscripts. Similar things may be said also of other military formations which were adopted later on, of subordinate *employés* of the administration—custom-house men, wood-rangers, &c.

Further, how in an army in which the rule holds good that the soldier must remain four years with the colours, and that even the second portion must be exercised for five months, could the young conscripts of 1869 be suddenly transformed in one month into perfect soldiers? Where were the good, especially good, officers to be found who were to drill and discipline these and the following new formations? Whence were to come the 400,000 men of the Mobile

Guard, especially if the eastern and northern departments were threatened or overrun by the enemy? Even at the end of August and in the beginning of September, battalions of the Mobile Guard were to be seen which may have numbered 1200 men, but were destitute of officers deserving the name, and provided with, at the most, 200 serviceable firearms. The whole clothing of the men consisted of a linen or cotton blouse, with a red cross sewn upon the arm, and a military cap—certainly not a sufficient uniform for a campaign in weather which was already becoming autumnal. The equipment was altogether wanting; and though there may have been a little drill carried on, yet the greater part of the day was spent by the men in most pernicious idleness. About the Sedentary National Guard we may, after what we have before said on the subject, now keep silence.

It is true that in France there were, in the middle of the year 1870, about four millions of firearms, partly in the hands of the troops, partly in the hands of the National Guard, partly in the magazines. But in this number we include everything: pistols and muskets; carbines for the cavalry, artillery, and marine troops; the ancient smooth-bore firearms, which were still stored up in great quantities; the old muzzle-loading Minies; and even the antiquities and curiosities of the armouries. Of the two adopted systems of breech-loading rifles (the Chassepot and the Fusil à tabatière), there were altogether about one

million and a half. For actual work in the field, it was intended to use only the Chassepots, of which there were about 1,200,000. But if the Mobile Guard and the Sedentary National Guard were to be in any way made use of in the defence of the fortresses, even if the first of them might not perchance be employed in the field, they must at least be provided with breech-loaders, either Chassepots or Tabatières. If it be also taken into consideration that among the Chassepots which were at first ordered abroad and supplied thence, there would be sure to be many useless ones, and that by the advance of the Germans hundreds of thousands of rifles would become their booty in the storehouses of the east; and that, moreover, on actual service, a great diminution in the number of arms always, although perhaps only for a time, ensues, which necessitates a good reserve,—then it becomes apparent that the calculation of General Decaen loses much of its value.

On the 9th of August the Senate and Corps Legislatif reopened. In the first appeared the President of the Ministry of State, Parieu; in the latter the Keeper of the Great Seals, Ollivier. Before the Palais Bourbon, the seat of the Corps Legislatif, dense masses of people had collected, and also on the Place de la Concorde. The Bridge de la Concorde was barricaded by the military, so that even the deputies had to make long circuits to reach the place of sitting. Before the Palais Bourbon scenes took

place during the session which made the interference of armed force seem to be necessary, and this was ordered to be carried out by Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers, who was at that time chief of the Army of Paris, in place of Canrobert. Several charges were made by the cavalry upon the crowds, which each time dispersed, but only to collect together again; and bitter complaints arose that a large body of troops were retained in Paris to subdue the people, instead of being sent to oppose the enemy on the frontier.

At the opening of the session Ollivier spoke first; but the very commencement of his address called forth numerous interruptions.

"Gentlemen," said he, "the Emperor promised that the Empress should assemble you if circumstances became serious. We have not thought fit to delay summoning you until the situation of the country should become dangerous (*fût compromise*)." Hereupon a tumultuous uproar arose on the Left, with the cry "It has already become dangerous!" which was the signal for interruptions which never ceased again. To defend himself a little from these, and to gain a few minutes more for his speech, Ollivier had recourse to the expedient of discoursing upon the insignificancy of the defeats which had been sustained, and upon the heroic courage of the French soldiers, who had only yielded to four or five fold numbers.

To support these glorious efforts of the army, Olli-

vier proposed to lay before the Chamber the project of a law to the same effect as the proposals of Dejean, at the same time asserting once more that which had been before and at the commencement of the war also asserted, that nothing was wanting to conduct the war gloriously for France.

Meanwhile many of the interruptions were directly addressed to the Ministry of Ollivier. Arago, with his voice of thunder, shouted out, "Disappear, ye Ministers, and the army will conquer!" And again, "We will make every sacrifice, but without you!" Jules Favre said, "It is a disgrace that this Ministry dares to appear before the Assembly!" Guyot Montpairoux named the army, when Ollivier spoke of their heroic courage, "Lions led by asses."

These and other speeches were certainly very personal, and might well cause M. Ollivier to put the question of a vote of confidence in the Ministry. Orders of the day were proposed which should decide this. On the one side it was demanded that, first of all, the important, material questions of military organisation should be treated, and not personalities, which could be afterwards discussed. These last were, as is very easy to be understood, not pleasing to Ollivier. Many attempts were made to deal first with these material questions; but each time, amid all the complaints of neglected preparations, the personal question gained the upper hand, and at last it became so prominent that its settlement could no longer be

avoided. After many orders of the day, a truly malicious one of Clément Duvernois came to be voted upon. It ran :—

"The Chamber, determined to support a Cabinet which is capable of providing for the defence of the country, passes to the order of the day" (la Chambre, decidée à soutenir un Cabinet capable de pourvoir à la défense du pays, passe à l'ordre du jour).

Duvernois saw very clearly that he was now in a position to richly requite his adversary Emil Ollivier for the blow received on the 16th of June, and he joyfully embraced the opportunity—out of patriotism! Before the division, Emil Ollivier, who felt the poisonous sting entering deeply, and who knew better than any one else what this order of the day signified, declared that it would be to him especially the most bitter of all offences, and that the Cabinet would not receive it. But the Chamber, in spite of this declaration, divided, and accepted the order by a great majority.

After the division of the house, Emil Ollivier demanded that the session be suspended for a quarter of an hour. The Chamber was adjourned, and reassembled at five minutes past six o'clock in the evening. After the settlement of a few, under the present circumstances unimportant, matters, Emil Ollivier declared that the Ministry had, in consequence of the voting on the question of the day proposed by Clément Duvernois, given in its resignation to the

Empress; that the same had been accepted; and the Count of Palikao had been commissioned to form a new Ministry.

On the 10th of August the Count of Palikao appeared before the Chamber with the new Ministry, which called itself the Ministry of the National Defence. It was composed as follows: President and Minister of War, the Count of Palikao; for the Interior, Chevreau, Prefect of the Department of the Seine since the retirement of Hausmann; for Finance, Magne; for Justice, Grandperret, notorious for the many processes instituted by the police which he had conducted; for Agriculture and Commerce, Clément Duvernois; for the Marine, Admiral Rigault de Genouilly; for Public Works, Baron Jérôme David; for Foreign Affairs, Prince Latour d'Auvergne; for Public Instruction, Brame; President of the State Council, Busson-Billault. The celebrated Ministry of the Fine Arts and Sciences, created by Ollivier for the benefit of Maurice Richard, was not filled up.

Whoever has read, if only these pages, will be constrained to admit that the constitution of this Ministry was at the least singular, when he thus sees that in it sat the two loudest talkers, MM. Duvernois and David, of whom we have already given some particulars. Besides these two, the most important person in it was the Count of Palikao, and of him we must here say a few words.

Cousin de Montauban, Count of Palikao, was born

in the year 1796. As a cavalry officer he went with Beaumont's expedition to Algeria, and remained there many years. In 1851 he became brigadier-general, in 1855 general of division and chief of Constantine's division. Recalled to France, he received the command of the 21st military division (Limoges). In the year 1860 he was intrusted with the command of the expedition to China, whence he returned to France in July 1861. He had there gained a victory over the Chinese at Palikao on the 21st of September, had caused the Summer Palace of the emperor in Pekin to be seized and plundered, and sent many costly and interesting presents to the Imperial Court of France. The Emperor Napoleon had already, at the end of 1860, conferred on General Cousin de Montauban the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, and on the 4th of March 1861 appointed him a Senator. On the 22d of January 1862 he gave him the title of Count of Palikao, demanding from the Corps Legislatif at the same time a large dotation for him. Upon this a great outcry arose in France. It was said that it was not so much the military as the family services of the Count of Palikao which were to be rewarded by this dotation; and it appeared to be so doubtful whether it would be granted that the bill for it had to be withdrawn —an unheard-of thing in those days to happen to a demand of the Emperor. In the year 1865 the Count of Palikao was appointed to command the

4th Army Corps (Lyons), and held that post until the Empress called him to be President of the Ministry.

When the outbreak of the war with Germany was impending, the news of the massacre of French missionaries in China also arrived in France, and the soldiers said, "Nous allons, en Prusse ou en Chine." If Prussia and China are in any way the same, then the nomination of the Count of Palikao to be President of the Ministry in those troubled times gains some grounds and foundation. He had conquered the Chinese, and under the above supposition he might conquer the Prussians also.

That the Cabinet of Palikao should be favourably received by the majority of the Chamber is not surprising; for it would have received anything favourably which came from above—that is, from the Tuileries; the few exceptions would be easily enumerated. But it is more difficult for an impartial but remote observer to understand how it came to pass that Palikao's Cabinet was favourably received, being so singularly composed as it was, by the Parisian public under the existing circumstances. The puzzle is explained when we relate that this Cabinet called itself the Government of the National Defence, and announced in the papers which were devoted to the Government certain revolutionary measures, although it may have been very far from intending to carry them out.

Even the mistrust of the Left was first aroused

eight days after this Cabinet had been ushered into the world. To this we shall return later on. At first the new Ministry seemed fully determined to organise, on the largest scale, the uprising of France against the foreign invasion. All its propositions were adopted—a vote of thanks to the army, which deserved well of its country; the calling in to the colours of all unmarried or widowed citizens of from 25 to 35 years of age who were not employed in the Mobile Guard; the increase of the credit of 4 millions, which had been already voted on the 14th of July, to 25 millions, for the support of the families of soldiers of the army and of the Mobile Guard; the admission of volunteers of all ages, of old soldiers up to the age of 45 years, for the duration of the war, and the calling in of the full contingent of recruits (fixed at 140,000) without any freedom by lot.

The French Bank notes were also declared to be legal currency; but this did not prevent the tradesman, to whom a hundred-franc note was offered from which to take a payment of five francs, saying that he had not change enough in his till; neither did it prevent the money-changers demanding 10 per cent for cashing them. The Bank of France was empowered at the same time to issue bank-notes for 2400 millions instead of the 1800 millions heretofore allowed, and the war loan of 500 millions of francs was raised to 1000 millions. The pleasure of making sacrifices by people

who sacrifice nothing, at the expense of others who have to sacrifice, is truly always most cheering and laudable.

But however pleasant things were made by the Chamber for the Ministry during its honeyweek—of a honeymoon we have no right to speak—still even in those days disagreeable scenes occurred. So soon as the 11th of August M. de Keratry demanded in the Chamber that Marshal Lebœuf (he meant really the Emperor Napoleon), who was to be blamed for all the misfortunes of the war, should be arraigned before a commission of inquiry of the Legislature. The majority threw out this proposition, and the Count of Palikao was able to announce on the same day that Marshal Bazaine now commanded the "Army of the Rhine"; on the 12th he communicated to the Chamber that the Emperor had accepted Marshal Lebœuf's resignation of the post of major-general, and on the 13th that Marshal Bazaine was intrusted with the commandership-in-chief of the army. Upon a question by M. Barthélemy St-Hilaire whether Bazaine was therefore Generalissimo, Palikao answered Yes; and when M. Cochery asked whether the Guard also was under the command of Bazaine, the President of the Ministry answered, "In the army the Guard is as any other Corps. It, as well as the others, stands under the orders of Marshal Bazaine."

We now again leave Paris for the present to return to the theatre of war.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ADVANCE OF THE GERMAN ARMIES UPON THE MOSELLE.

When the French armies after the battle of Wörth and Saarbrücken-Forbach retired along the whole front, it was to be assumed that they would try to concentrate all their forces under the cannon of Metz and its forts, and, drawing in all their defeated and remaining fractions, offer a pitched battle. And such, in the first moments, seemed to be their intention, for they took up in the following days a position behind the Nied. But there was in reality one great impediment to the execution of this plan—namely, their numerical weakness.

The Germans, with their superiority of numbers, could easily outflank the French army, could hinder the junction of the already defeated Corps with those in Metz, could throw large bodies of troops across the Moselle above or below Metz, and then, having beaten the French on the Seille, shut them up in Metz.

As soon as Bazaine assumed the command-in-chief at Metz, he formed the plan to intrust its defence to

a suitable garrison, and to the Mobile Guard of the neighbourhood, together with the Sedentary National Guard, and to retire with his whole disposable army by Verdun, to reach the Champagne country, uniting there with the defeated troops, and with such reinforcements as could be drawn in. The retreat of the "Army of Metz" was to be conducted as slowly as possible, so that the troops elsewhere might have time, some to form in the Camp of Chalons, others to reorganise themselves.

The Paris journals, which, although they wrote much nonsense, were yet in some degree the echo of the views which prevailed at headquarters, said now among other things: "The Germans hitherto have always crawled along in the woods, so that we have never been able to see and fire at them properly; they have only come sneakingly out of their forests to fall upon and surprise the French, after having wrought great damage upon them from their lurking-places. But on the treeless plains of Champagne, in the dreary neighbourhood of Chalons, this system of warfare will be put a stop to. Then first will be developed the true power of the Chassepot and of the mitrailleuse."

Therefore a great fight on the plains of Champagne was looked forward to by the French, and for this all their available forces were to be concentrated there.

Historical reminiscences also assisted men to arrive

at these conclusions. It was at St Ménéhould and Valmy, on the road by Verdun to Chalons, that the German invasion of 1792 found its sad end. Why should not the like happen again? The French did not call to mind that in 1792 the nation had just begun to resist with energy the ignominy of an infamous government, and that the ardent fire of a revolution was blazing within it; whilst in 1870 nothing of a revolutionary spirit was to be seen even in the accredited revolutionists: and that again, on the other side, there was a great difference between the dynastic German army of invasion of 1792 and the German national army of 1870. The German Government of 1792 challenged France; the German nation of 1870 had been challenged by the French Government, and by its literary hirelings, in a most frivolous manner—disturbed out of a peace which it loved, and forced to undertake a war which it did not desire.

As a matter of fact, the French "Army of the Rhine" was now composed of two parts: 1. Of the "Army of Metz," under the immediate command of Bazaine; and, 2. Of the "Army of Paris" under M'Mahon. The latter general must necessarily retire at first westwards, along the Strasburg-Paris Railway, with the 1st Corps from Saverne, to gain rest from the pursuing enemy, and time to reform his troops. De Failly's Corps naturally joined him, for, prevented by the advance of the Germans from concentrating at Metz, it was compelled to fall back also along the

west foot of the Vosges to the south, on to the Strasburg-Paris Railway; further, M'Mahon could draw to himself the parts of the 7th Corps (Felix Douay) which were yet in the neighbourhood of Belfort, and then commence the new organisation, which would be carried out partly in the Camp of Chalons, partly in Paris. We shall return later to the composition of M'Mahon's army, as for the present it does not play any vital part in the operations of the campaign.

Let us imagine the Army of Paris (M'Mahon) at Chalons. Then the strategical game of the two armies, of Paris and of Metz, is reduced essentially to two contingencies; either Bazaine can get out of Metz, or he cannot. In the first case, he would join M'Mahon in the triangle, Chalons, St Ménéhould, Réthel, either by way of Verdun or by Stenay. In the second case, M'Mahon must, having gained time to reorganise his army, march by some way or other to the relief of Bazaine. A union of the two armies must unquestionably be striven for, considering the numerical weakness of the French, in order that they might have any chance of winning a battle. The course of the next operations would, according to this view, be essentially determined by the answer to the question, Would Bazaine be able to quit Metz, or would he not?

There was certainly still another plan to be considered, and it is impossible to pronounce it to be unconditionally false. It ran thus: that Bazaine should remain by himself in Metz, while M'Mahon, in the

neighbourhood of Paris, and without shutting himself up in the town, operated with a view to strengthen himself as much as possible from all sides; endeavouring to form of the old regular troops which he had at his disposition the nucleus of a large army of relief, and at the same time gain time for the organisation of the new formations of the Loire, the Garonne, and the Rhone. We have grounds to suppose that this was the original idea of M'Mahon, and that he even returned to it in the course of the later operations; but of this we shall have to speak further on.

When Marshal Bazaine was named Generalissimo of the Army, he chose, as Major-General, General Jarras. Marshal Lebœuf retired completely for the time being from all management of affairs; while General Lebrun went to the Camp of Chalons, where we shall find him again in M'Mahon's army. Bazaine's army at Metz consisted of the 4th Corps, Ladmirault; of the 3d Corps, which Bazaine, on being named Generalissimo, gave over to General Decaën, who up to that time had commanded the 4th division of the 3d Corps; of the 2d Corps, Frossard, which, forced originally from its line of retreat upon Metz, succeeded afterwards in gaining the Moselle (General Lichtlin, commanding the cavalry division of the Corps, had requested, owing to discontent and to ill-health, permission to quit the army, and had been succeeded in the command of the division by General Marmier, but we shall find him again

serving in M'Mahon's Army); of the Guard, Bourbaki; and, lastly, of portions of the 6th Corps, Canrobert, who, as soon as he heard of the defeats suffered by the French army, hastened to the Moselle with the divisions Tixier, Lafont de Villiers, and Lavassor Sorval, which last division, up to this time, had been retained in Paris for the preservation of order. Of the 1st division, Bisson, only the generals and the 9th regiment of the line arrived in Metz. The trains which were conveying the remainder of the division by Frouard to Metz were fired upon when at the first-named place by the Germans, who had occupied it, and turned back to the Camp of Chalons. Of the cavalry division of the Corps, Fénélon, the brigade of cuirassiers remained to preserve order in Paris; the other two brigades made, from the 7th to the 9th of August, a great reconnaissance to St Ménéhould, where naturally they found no Germans, and returned for the present into the Camp.

When the German armies arrived on French soil, the King of Prussia issued a general order from his headquarters in Homburg, in which he especially urged upon the soldiers the preservation of good discipline in the enemy's territory, as he was not waging war against the peaceful inhabitants of the country. Afterwards, when he himself repaired to France, he issued from St Avold the following proclamation to the French people:—

"We, William, King of Prussia, make known to

the inhabitants of the French territory occupied by the German armies the following: After the Emperor Napoleon has attacked by land and by sea the German nation, which wished and still wishes to live in peace with the French people, I have assumed the command-in-chief of the German armies to repel these attacks. I have succeeded, owing to military events, in crossing the frontier of France. I wage war against the soldiers of France, and not against her citizens. These will henceforth enjoy perfect security for their persons and for their property as long as they do not themselves deprive me of the right of protecting them by hostile undertakings against the German troops. The generals who command the several Corps will determine by special regulations, which will be made known to the public, the measures which will be adopted against communities or individuals who act contrary to the usages of war; they will regulate, in like manner, every thing appertaining to the requisitions which may appear to be necessary to supply the wants of the troops; they will also determine the rate of exchange between the German and French currency, to facilitate private business between the troops and the inhabitants."

After the entrance of the German forces into France, the First Army, Steinmetz, marched to the north of the railway from Forbach to Metz upon Metz, and upon the Moselle below the town. It was

reinforced about the 12th of August by the 1st Corps, Manteuffel, which, with many others which had remained behind in Germany, had been called to the theatre of war after the mobilisation of the reserve and garrison troops, especially as it had become known that the French fleet would not be able to effect any great deeds. To the south of the railway Prince Frederic Charles advanced upon Metz and upon the Moselle above the town.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia detached the Baden division from his army, and ordered it to march upon Strasburg. With it went General Von Werder, who up to this time had commanded the Baden and Würtemberg divisions together. He was to take command of the army investing Strasburg, which was to be composed of Prussian landwehr divisions, in addition to the Baden division. On the 8th of August the Baden cavalry appeared before Strasburg, and occupied itself in closing the communications of the place. On the 9th the Baden infantry appeared, and the commander of the division, General Beyer, summoned the governor of the fortress, General Uhrich, to surrender. As this was, as can be easily understood, refused, siege operations, which we shall later on consider, were commenced.

Meanwhile the greater part of the army of the Crown-Prince wheeled to its right out of Alsace, and crossed the Vosges, to join communications with the left wing of the army of Prince Frederic Charles.

The main body moved along the road from Hagenau to Saar-Union, with detachments on parallel roads.

Already on the 10th of August the cavalry divisions of all three armies spread themselves out, connecting with one another, and forming a line from Les Etangs, Foligny, Falquemont, Grand Tenquin, and Saar-Union, screening the movements of the Corps following them, and spying out those of the enemy.

In crossing the Vosges, the army of the Crown-Prince had to deal with the small fortresses there. Bitche refused to surrender, and had to be watched by a few hundred men. Litchenberg was invested on the 9th of August by two and a half battalions of Hügel's Würtemberg brigade and a detachment of field artillery. As it would not surrender, it was bombarded, and after a part of it had been set on fire, it capitulated on the 10th : the garrison consisted of 280 men. Lülzelstein was evacuated by its garrison before the Germans arrived. Pfalzburg, well garrisoned, refused to capitulate, and an observation detachment had to be left to watch it.

It may have been at first intended to unite the army of the Crown-Prince with the others against Metz, but as the Prince crossed the Vosges the German headquarters acquired the information that the Corps of M'Mahon and of De Failly had retired southwards, not having been able to join the troops at Metz. Under these circumstances, it was clear that the two armies of Steinmetz and of Prince Frederic

Charles, especially as they had already received some, and were expecting still further reinforcements, particularly the 2d and 9th North German Corps, would be by themselves perfectly sufficient to shut up Bazaine in Metz, or to overpower him should he attempt to break out; for within the course of a few days these two German armies numbered at least 220,000 infantry and cavalry, while Bazaine, exclusive of the necessary garrison of Metz, had at the most 120,000 combatants.

The army of the Crown-Prince therefore marched towards the line of railway from Strasburg to Paris by Nancy, to follow up M'Mahon and De Failly, to observe them, and to hinder as much as possible their union with other troops, or any attempt which they might make to march upon Metz.

By the 12th of August detachments of Prussian cavalry occupied Nancy without opposition, on the 13th they destroyed the railway at Frouard, and on the 15th they had already made raids as far as Commercy on the Meuse. The headquarters of the Crown Prince were, on the 15th, at Lüneville, on the 16th in Nancy.

On the 15th also, Bothmer's Bavarian division forced the fortress of Marsal to capitulate. When Bothmer appeared before the place, which was garrisoned by 600 men and armed with 60 guns, he summoned it to surrender. This was refused, and as the messenger was withdrawing, he was fired upon from

the walls—an event which often happened during the war. In some cases the blame of such proceedings may be ascribed to the ignorance of the Mobile Guard who formed the garrisons; but in others it must be laid upon the want of discipline even among the troops of the line, and upon the rage against the Prussians with which they were filled. The first attack of the Bavarian advanced-guard of infantry upon the weak outwork was unsuccessful, but soon afterwards the artillery arrived, came into action at once, and commenced to bombard the place. The firing had scarcely continued for half an hour, when the powder magazine in the town blew up. The German infantry were at the time again advancing to the attack, and soon made themselves masters of some of the outworks. The commandant of the garrison wished now to capitulate, but Bothmer demanded that, as his messenger had been fired on, the surrender should be upon mercy or no mercy, and to this the defenders were obliged to accede.

In Paris there arose a storm of discontent that a weak detachment of cavalry had been allowed to occupy the large town of Nancy without the slightest opposition, and that the municipal authorities themselves had even exhorted the citizens to submit quietly and resignedly, and had afterwards received the Prussian Staff most respectfully and cordially. Similar events were destined to be henceforth repeated almost daily on the road of the Crown-Prince to

Paris; and it must be confessed that they were but little in accordance with the great national war which the Parisian newspapers had promised.

From this time also may be dated the great spy mania of the French. The most innocent people were evilly entreated, and some poor wretches were even shot by martial law. Any one at all acquainted with the subject must involuntarily ask himself whether the French would have had a single man more under arms if not a single Prussian spy had existed throughout France? Moreover, what was there to spy out? The books which appeared in France were perfectly sufficient to acquaint any one with the composition of the French army. Equally could the French have acquired a knowledge of the German organisation from the even more numerous writings which were printed in Germany on the subject. French officers were admitted as freely into German camps and German fortresses as German officers were into French. Why, then, could not those know Germany as well as these knew France? The explanation is very simple. The Germans took the trouble to learn French, and to see thoroughly what there was to be seen. The French, on the contrary, only looked at what pleased them; and in spite of the numerous Alsacians who had entered the French army, but proportionately few officers were to be met with who could speak or understand German. It excited wonder and astonishment in France when the Ger-

mans proved that they understood so thoroughly the geography and statistics of the Empire. And yet this should have been no cause for astonishment; and the attaining to such understanding did not require the use of spies. The French ordnance map can be procured through a bookseller just as Reymann's map of Germany and the topographical works of the Prussian General Staff can be. It is the same with regard to the numerous publications in the domains of statistics and of public works which explain buildings, water supply, roads, &c., and in the discussion touch on or relate a mass of details. He, then, who earnestly seeks into and studies these things, which neither are nor can be secrets, will know something about them; and when he makes a journey into those localities will certainly, if he looks about him intelligently, still further increase that knowledge. He also who, on the other hand, has never troubled himself in the slightest about such matters, will necessarily but walk in darkness even on his own soil. Now the French took but little heed of such matters either in Germany or in their own country.

"Cesarism" certainly requires both civil and military bureaucracy; but in France it had ruined these. The bureaucracy had grown old with the Cesar. The strife for favour, and with it for the pleasures of life, had driven out the honest workers, and their places were supplied by those who knew best how to suit themselves to the modern Byzantism.

Naturally, the former became continually less in number, and the latter greater, without the honest French people being aware of it. This people, under the Empire, troubled itself, day by day, less and less about affairs in general. In military matters it was told, "How does that concern you? We have our army, which will dominate over military Europe; work on, then, peacefully under its protection, and take care only that there is enough money forthcoming to maintain it." The miserable condition of Germany until 1866, the victories of the French in the Crimea, and in Italy in 1859, supported in the eyes of the people this bad theory. The peasant and the burgher fell into an ever-increasing apathy as to the affairs of the country, and each occupied himself more and more with his own private interests; so that in reality the highest centralisation produced the highest decentralisation, until the year 1870 roused the French from their sweet slumber. Naturally, the thorough awakening could not be the work of a moment.

The Prussians, on the other hand, had not allowed themselves to go to sleep after their successes against Austria and the South Germans in 1866. They had improved what there was yet to improve. Whoever has followed the history of the times will remember that in 1866 the bad employment of their cavalry and infantry was much criticised. Now, the conduct of both these arms was faultless. Besides the regular

divisional cavalry, more or less strong divisions were formed, which, to a certain degree, manœuvred independently; and instead of being dragged after the Corps or army, to play perhaps on the field of battle a not very brilliant part, they now pushed on in advance, occupied towns and large fronts of country, carried the dread of the German arms to great distances on the right and left of the lines of operations, and created, by their gallantry and activity of movement, the appearance of a general occupation of the invaded territory. Gradually it came to this, that it was only necessary for a bare twenty of these bold riders to show themselves to obtain possession of large towns.

"At first it seems to have been Uhlans who thus brought such confusion among the French, and then gradually any German horsemen who carried out a daring enterprise were called Uhlans, so that Uhlans seemed to appear everywhere. The Paris newspapers gave wonderful explanations about them. According to them, these German cavaliers were not regular troops, but pirates on land, enlisted for the period of the war, but receiving no pay, being directed to live by plunder; and after the war they were at once, with all possible haste, disbanded, as they might otherwise continue their comfortable robber life in their own country. The more reasonable papers which strove to refute these legends by the simple narration of the truth were simply no longer read in Paris,

but everybody believed firmly in the Uhlans of the 'Figaro' and of the 'Gaulois.'

The artillery in 1870 was always on the spot. It was no longer dragged among the baggage, but marched in advance of the foremost infantry, took up positions in battle in masses, as was shown in the battles of Wörth and Forbach, and, firing at moderate ranges, prepared the field for the infantry, who, being opposed to the Chassepot, no longer felt the necessity of acting alone.

The quiet recognition of errors which have been committed, perhaps without any peculiar fault, is in itself a victory.

We leave here for a while the Crown Prince, to consider more minutely the battles which the First and Second German Armies fought against Marshal Bazaine before Metz, from the 14th to the 18th of August.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ENCOUNTER AT BORNY ON THE 14TH OF AUGUST, AND THE BATTLE OF VIONVILLE (MARS LA TOUR) ON THE 16TH OF AUGUST.

On the 13th of August, Marshal Bazaine determined to evacuate Metz with his army, and to leave behind him only a garrison sufficient for the fortress.

The marching out was to commence on the afternoon of the 14th. The Emperor Napoleon left Metz at noon of that day, and repaired to Longeville, on the river above the town. Before leaving, he addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants, in which he said that he departed from them to fight against the invasion, and intrusted the defence of their walls to their patriotism.

On the German side, the cavalry had seized the passages of the Moselle above Metz as far as Frouard, a length which also includes the important point of Pont à Mousson. A French battalion sent from Metz by railway came too late to prevent the capture of this latter passage, and had to return without having accomplished its object.

The army of Prince Frederic Charles was marching upon the Moselle, to cross it in masses at the points which the cavalry had already secured, intending then to close for Bazaine the road to the west.

Steinmetz's army stood with its three Corps in observation to the east of Metz. Opposite to it were encamped the 3d French Corps, Decaën; the 4th, Ladmirault; and parts of the 2d, Frossard, covered by the forts St Julien and Queleu.

On the afternoon of the 14th the Prussian outposts announced that there was a great movement in the French camp, and that the enemy seemed to be about to march away from Metz. This, as we know, was really the case; and were Bazaine to succeed in decamping, he would even now gain two days' march on the army of Prince Frederic Charles, which, according to all calculation, could hardly be on the left bank of the Moselle, ready to attack, before the 16th.

This consideration caused General Steinmetz to order, at 4 P.M., a reconnaissance in force against the French position to the east of Metz; and for this he sent forward Bentheim's 1st division of infantry of Manteuffel's Corps, and the 13th division of infantry, Glümer, of Zastrow's Corps. The 1st division advanced along the Saarbrück highroad; of the 13th division, the 26th brigade, under Goltz, was nearest to the enemy, the 25th brigade much further to the rear, at Pange; the 14th division was encamped to the left

of it at Domangeville; the artillery reserve of the 7th Corps at Bazoncourt; the 1st division of cavalry, Hartmann, which had come up with Manteuffel's Corps, and was attached to the First Army, was at Frontigny, to the west of Domangeville.

The 26th brigade attacked at once, with great violence, Decaën's rear-guard at Colombey. In consequence of this, Decaën caused his troops, who were already marching off, to front again. Bazaine, being informed of what had happened, suspended the departure of the other Corps, and repaired himself to the field of battle.

On the part of the Germans, the two generals commanding, whose troops were engaged, caused the remainder of their Corps to push forward in support; and thus while the 26th brigade was fighting at Colombey, the 2d brigade of Bentheim's division, Gm. von Falkenstein, advanced against Montoy, and soon came into action also. These brigades alone could not gain any ground, and were themselves sorely pushed by the superior numbers of their adversaries — so much so, that even the first reinforcements did not change the state of things.

The German artillery which came up posted itself, after Gayl and Noisseville had been taken by the 1st brigade, upon the slopes to the north of Montoy, where finally fourteen batteries were collected, which directed a concentrated fire upon the French.

It was 7 P.M. before parts of the 2d (Pritzelwitz)

and of the 14th division (Kameke) could take part in the fight. On the left wing the 18th division (Wrangel) also joined in the combat. The 9th Corps, to which this division belonged, had only lately arrived on the theatre of war, and had been attached to Prince Frederic Charles's army, with which it was advancing upon the Moselle. As, however, it heard the cannon thundering on its right, and it was not too far from the battle-field, it marched forthwith to the aid of the troops before Metz. These considerable reinforcements to the German side decided the day. It was in vain that towards dusk General Ladmirault endeavoured, with a part of the 4th Corps, to make an attack on the right wing of the adversary by pushing forward upon Servigny and Noisseville; for there Manteuffel with the reserves which had come up was able to oppose him vigorously. After the failure of the attempt, the French retired behind the forts. The losses on both sides were considerable. The French report that the left wing of the Germans, pursuing hotly and incautiously, came under the fire of fort Queleu, and fared very badly; while German accounts make no mention of the occurrence. General Decaën was severely wounded, and Marshal Lebœuf now took command of the 3d Corps in his place.

The German troops remained on the battle-field till 10 P.M.; the 7th Corps bivouacked on the same, with their arms in their hands, and only withdrew

on the morning of the 15th into a more retired position.

The attack of the Germans on the 14th of August had fulfilled its purpose in a greater degree than was to be supposed. The 3d and 4th French Corps could not march during the whole of the 15th, for they were occupied all day in distributing ammunition, and in performing other necessary work.

On the 15th Bazaine sent off the 6th Corps, the Guard, and following them, the 2d Corps. These marched along the more southerly of the two roads leading from Metz to Verdun, which runs through Gravelotte and Mars la Tour; the northern road bifurcates from this at Gravelotte, and runs through Doncourt, Conflans, and Estain. Along this latter highway were to march the 3d and 4th Corps, leaving Metz on the 16th of August; but the Guard, the 6th and 2d Corps, were to remain on the 16th in the neighbourhood of Mars la Tour and Vionville until the 3d and 4th Corps came upon a level with them—that is, until they arrived in the vicinity of Doncourt. The Emperor Napoleon also quitted Longeville on the morning of the 16th to proceed to Verdun.

The army of Prince Frederic Charles stood on the 15th of August with its main body on the road from Han an der Nied to Pont à Mousson, and in part already on the other side of the Moselle. The most forward was the 5th division of cavalry, Rheinbaben, at Thiaucourt, famous for its excellent red Moselle

wine; behind it were the advanced-guard of the 10th Corps, between Thiaucourt and Pont à Mousson, the 10th Corps itself (Voigts-Rhetz) being at Pont à Mousson; the 3d Corps (Alvensleben II.) was at Cheminot and Vigny; the 9th Corps (Manstein) at Buchy; and south of it the 12th Corps (Crown-Prince of Saxony) at Sologne; the 2d Corps (Fransecky), which had only just arrived on the theatre of war, was at Han an der Nied.

A northern neighbouring group was formed by the 6th division of cavalry (Duke William of Mecklenburg) of the 3d Corps, on the right bank of the Moselle, pushed forward towards Metz. A southern neighbouring group was formed by the Prussian Guard and by the 4th Corps. The main body of the Guard was at Dieulouard on the Moselle, and had its advanced-guard to the south-west, on the left bank of the Moselle, at Les Quartre Vents; the dragoon brigade of the Guard, Count Brandenburg II., was at Rogéville. The 4th Corps, Alvensleben I., had its headquarters at Marbach, on the Moselle above Dieulouard; the main body was further back on the right bank of the river, towards the Seille.

This southerly group, which was to be joined also by the Saxon Corps, had, it is probable, already the duty assigned it of supporting the advance of the Crown-Prince upon Paris, and more immediately upon Chalons, and the troops which were being collected there. This task they were not for some days called

upon to fulfil, but it devolved upon them immediately after the battle of Gravelotte.

The intentions of Bazaine were not fully and clearly known in the Prussian headquarters up to the evening of the 15th, on which day the headquarters of Prince Frederic Charles were at Pont à Mousson, those of the King in the Castle of Herny, whence he, on this day, visited the battle-field of the 14th.

Early on the morning of the 15th, Prince Frederic Charles ordered Rheinbaben's division of cavalry, reinforced by the dragoon brigade of the Guard, to advance northwards from Thiaucourt towards the southern Metz-Verdun road. To support them, the head of the 10th Corps was to advance on Thiaucourt, while a detachment of the same Corps was to march down the left bank of the Moselle. In the afternoon it was further ordered that the 3d Corps should cross the river, and move by Gorze upon Mars la Tour; while the 12th Corps was to march from Sologne to Noméný upon the road to Pont à Mousson, in order to draw nearer to it. These orders had in view a great reconnaissance to ascertain whether Bazaine was about to retreat upon Verdun or not. In case he meant to do so, the necessary troops were to be at once placed in readiness to check his march.

As even on the afternoon of the 15th news came in which made the departure of Bazaine seem to be very probable, further orders were given which would

render possible a powerful attack on his flank on the 16th or 17th of August. By these the 3d Corps and the 5th division of cavalry were, after they had crossed the Moselle, to march through Novéant and Gorze upon Vionville and Mars la Tour on the southern Metz-Verdun road. To the left of these troops, the 10th Corps and the 5th division of cavalry were to advance towards the same road, being directed upon St Hilaire. The 9th Corps was to march towards Sillegny; on the 17th it was to follow the 3d Corps, across the Moselle, and through Gorze. This order was so worded that it could at once be altered if necessary, by commands and communications from the headquarters of the King. It stated, namely, that the 7th and 8th Corps of the First Army would take up a position to the south of Metz on the line Arry - Pommerieux, between the Moselle and the Seille; that this rendered it superfluous that the Second Army should leave behind a Corps opposite the south side of Metz, on the right bank of the Moselle; and that therefore the 9th Corps now received the order to continue its march during the 16th, and to follow the 3d Corps as far as possible on this day, to cross the river on the 17th of August with the remainder, and to take the direction of Mars la Tour, as the 3d Corps had done. The 12th Corps was directed on Pont à Mousson, with its advanced-guard on Regnéville en Haye. It formed thus a reserve for the 10th Corps, as the 9th did for the 3d. The Prussian

Guard was also thrown forward in a direction which would bring it upon the Metz-Verdun road. It was to march westward from Dieulouard upon Bernécourt, and push on its advanced-guard toward Rambucourt. The 2d Corps, which was the most rearward, was to march on the 16th to Buchy, and to cross the Moselle on the 17th at Pont à Mousson.

Whilst, as the above narrative shows, the main body of the Second Army was directed, during the 16th and 17th of August, upon the Metz-Verdun road—that is, upon the left flank of Bazaine—under the supposition that he would be marching from Metz to Verdun, the 4th Corps received a special destination. It was ordered to concentrate on the 16th on the left bank of the Moselle between Le Saizerais and Marbach, and to push forward its advanced-guard to Jaillon, on the road to the fortress of Toul.

A battle on the 16th was evidently never calculated on at the headquarters of Prince Frederic Charles on the 15th. In fact, the most advanced Corps had at noon on the 15th nearly 19 miles to march to reach the southern Metz-Verdun road. But the cavalry, which would undoubtedly be able to fall upon his columns, especially the left one, in time, would assuredly detain Bazaine on the 16th, and then on the 17th the battle would be fought which was to drive him back into Metz. But the ardour of the German Corps was destined to bring about a result on the 16th which laid the foundation for the completely

decisive battle of the 18th. Nevertheless the 16th of August would not have ended so favourably for the Germans as it did but for the wretched slowness of the French army leaders, who even at this hour did not recognise the true state of affairs, but continued wilfully to deceive themselves.

We have now, in the first place, to relate the movements of the most advanced German Corps, the 3d and the 10th, and of the divisions of cavalry attached to them.

The 3d German Corps crossed the Moselle on the evening of the 15th of August at three points—by the two permanent bridges of Novéant and Pont à Mousson, and by a field bridge thrown across the river by the Prussians at Champey between these two places. At Novéant, the 5th division of infantry (Stülpnagel) and the 5th division of cavalry (William of Mecklenburg) crossed; at Champey, the 6th division of infantry (Buddenbrock); at Pont à Mousson, the artillery of the Corps.

By 3 A.M. on the 16th of August the advanced-guard of the Corps was at Onville, the 6th division at Pagny and Arnaville, the division of cavalry behind it, and still further in rear stood the 5th division. The division of cavalry was ordered to be by 5.30 A.M. on the 16th on the left bank of the Moselle, and was then to march through Gorze upon Vionville; the 5th division of infantry was to follow.

Buddenbrock's division had commenced its march

at 5 A.M. on the 16th in a northerly direction upon Vionville. According to intelligence received from the advanced-patrols, the French outposts were at this latter place and Tronville, while behind them were extensive camps. At 8 A.M. it was reported that the French appeared to be moving off in a northerly and westerly direction.

Hereupon Alvensleben ordered Buddenbrock's division to move upon Mars la Tour and Jarny to stop the enemy's march, if he really intended to retreat. To the right of Buddenbrock's division, the 6th division of cavalry reached at 9 A.M. the heights to the southward of Flavigny, drove in the French cavalry posts, and sent forward detachments as far as the southern Metz-Verdun road. These found that Vionville and Rezonville were strongly occupied, and that behind them were deployed masses of the enemy. Alvensleben now ordered Buddenbrock's division, which had arrived at Tronville, to turn to its right, and to advance to the attack of the heights of Vionville and Flavigny. Complying with these instructions, Buddenbrock brought his artillery into action on the height of Tronville, and after it had fired for some time, sent forward his infantry shortly after 10 A.M. It was only after an obstinate fight that the Prussians succeeded in gaining the heights, but these once won, they took the villages of Vionville and Flavigny without much opposition. Meanwhile the reserve artillery of the Corps, which had come

up, took up a position to the south-east of Flavigny against Rezonville.

Stülpnagel's division, to the right of Buddenbrock, and of the 6th division of cavalry, began, towards 10 A.M., to mount the heights near Anconville from the valley of Gorze. The detachment of the 10th Corps which, under Colonel Lyncker, had been pushed forward on the 15th along the left bank of the Moselle to Novéant, had joined this division. This reinforcement consisted of 2 battalions and 1 battery. Pushing forward into the wood of Vionville, Stülpnagel encountered French battalions, which had been advanced into it from Rezonville. After a long combat he drove them out of the wood, and also out of the wood of St Arnould, which lies to the north of it, and thus, by mid-day, the 3d Corps was in complete possession of the front, which stretches from the north corner of the wood to St Arnould to Vionville; Stülpnagel on the right, Buddenbrock on the left, and between them the division of cavalry. The French made several offensive attacks against this position, but were energetically repulsed. In repelling these the cavalry also assisted, penetrating forwards to the other side of the Metz-Verdun road, where, however, they came upon unshaken French infantry, and suffered serious losses.

The 5th division of cavalry, Rheinbaben, had rested during the night from the 15th to 16th August at Xonville, south of Mars la Tour. Early in the morn-

ing it set out for this latter village, and came upon the head of the enemy's troops there. At 9.30 A.M. its leader informed General von Alvensleben that he would support his attack upon Vionville from Mars la Tour, and at the same time give information to the columns of the 10th Corps, which were on the march of the real position of the enemy. The division of Rheinbaben itself was reinforced for the 16th by 2 battalions of horse-artillery from the reserve of the 10th Corps.

The principal direction given to the main body of the 10th Corps was from Thiaucourt upon St Hilaire, which lies about 8 miles to the west of Mars la Tour on the Metz-Verdun road. This movement was, therefore, viewing the real position of Bazaine, a very widely-sweeping one. A flank detachment, the 37th brigade of infantry, Lehmann, which was still 4 battalions strong after the departure of Lyncker's detachment, and was, moreover, reinforced by 2 squadrons of cavalry and 1 battery of artillery, marched with a less extended sweep upon Chambley, south of Mars la Tour, to support Rheinbaben there. This detachment started from Thiaucourt at 4.30 A.M. At 5 A.M. the remainder of the 19th division of infantry (Schwarzkoppen), namely, the 38th brigade of infantry (Wedell), and 2 batteries of artillery, left the same place for St Hilaire. The dragoon brigade of the Guard also joined this force. The 20th division of infantry (Kraatz-Koschlau), and the reserve artil-

lery of the 10th Corps only, marched at 4.30 A.M. from Pont à Mousson for Thiaucourt. Lehmann's brigade arrived in due time at Chambley, and hearing when there the sound of cannon, marched at once towards it to Tronville, where it arrived at 11.30 A.M., and placed itself at the disposal of the commander of the 3d Corps, Alvensleben.

Schwarzkoppen only received the order to march on to the battle-field at mid-day when he was near St Hilaire. The dragoon brigade of the Guard, which formed part of his force, had already gone forward thence towards the thunder of the artillery. Schwarzkoppen himself arrived at 3 P.M. between Sponville and Bois la Dame. Kraatz-Koschlau hurried from Thiaucourt northwards, over Xammes and Chambley, and at 4 P.M. the heads of his column reached the vicinity of Tronville. Half an hour earlier the reserve artillery of the 10th Corps had arrived there, preceding the division.

As will be seen from the foregoing, the 3d Corps received no reinforcement of infantry from the 10th Corps until 3.30 P.M., excepting Lehmann's brigade; but later on, parts of the 8th and 9th Corps came also into action, and in this way: The 16th division of the 8th Corps (Barneckow's) had arrived at noon in Arry, on the right bank of the Moselle, from Frontigny, and was to encamp there; but hearing the thunder of the cannon, Barneckow, at 1 P.M., marched upon Novéant, crossed the river there, and arrived at

3.30 P.M. with the head of his column at Gorze—that is, a good 2½ miles from the battle-field. The 11th regiment from the 9th Corps had joined him, and had been attached to the 32d infantry brigade, Rex.]

In Pont à Mousson, Prince Frederic Charles received at noon the first news of the engagement of the 3d Corps. Before he repaired to the field of battle, which he reached at 3 P.M., he directed the commander of the 9th Corps, General von Manstein, to cover the right flank of the 3d Corps, and generally to support it as much as possible. Manstein upon this sent the 49th brigade of infantry and 1 regiment of cavalry from the Hessian Division, under Prince Louis, to Gorze. These troops crossed the Moselle at Novéant at 4 P.M., and the head of the column reached Gorze at 5.30 P.M.

Now that we have related what troops took part in the fight, and at what time they severally came into action, we will return to the field of battle.

We quitted it soon after mid-day, when the 3d Corps, in its position between the wood of St Arnould and the village of Vionville, was sorely pressed by the repeated offensive thrusts of the French.

After a new attack on Vionville had been repulsed at 1.30 P.M., Buddenbrock was directed to hold with his right wing that village and Flavigny, but to penetrate with his left wing, in as much force as possible, into the woods to the north of Vionville.

To do this Buddenbrock sent forward first the 24th regiment of infantry, and this was gradually supported on the left wing by the four battalions of Lehmann's brigade. Buddenbrock had now in reserve only two battalions of the 20th regiment (11th brigade of infantry).

The wood-fighting was excessively murderous; and as it went on a new danger presented itself to the Germans. Up to this time only the Corps of Canrobert and of Frossard had been engaged; the Guard was in reserve, in the vicinity of St Marcel, while the Corps of Lebœuf (late of Decaën, and before that of Bazaine) and of Ladmirault were halted on the road to Estain; but now Lebœuf moved forward with his Corps from Jarny and Doncourt on to the height of Bruville. To oppose him, the artillery reserve of the 10th Corps and the greater part of its troops were sent forward as they arrived on the scene of action. The artillery took up a position to the north of Tronville on the road from Vionville to Mars la Tour; Kraatz-Koschlau's division, on its arrival, threw five battalions into the western part of the woods lying to the north of Vionville, and kept back in rear of them three battalions in reserve. Three other of its battalions were sent to support Alvensleben's right wing, Stülpnagel's division.

The French had massed their artillery in the wood between St Marcel and Vionville, near the old Roman road, and cannonaded with great effect the western

parts of the woods to the north of Vionville, and also the Prussian batteries near that village. The Prussian infantry, coming out of the wood, turned against this artillery, and compelled it to abandon temporarily its position, capturing also a gun. At about the same time Alvensleben caused another French battery upon the heights to the north-west of Rezonville to be attacked by the 12th brigade of cavalry (Bredow), 17th Cuirassiers, 16th Uhlans, and 13th Dragoons. The German cavalry charged into the battery, sabred the gunners, and rode on against the French infantry standing in rear. But they were obliged to yield to the fire of the Chassepots, and returned, having suffered fearful losses.

When Wedell's brigade of the 10th Corps arrived on the battle-field, it was first allowed to rest an hour after its long march, and was then sent to the eastward of Mars la Tour in a northerly direction against Bruville and the Corps of Lebœuf in position there, but, decimated during its advance by the shell-fire of the French, which also set Mars la Tour in flames, it could not withstand the attack of the enemy's infantry, and was compelled to retreat.

As Wedell's brigade commenced its forward march, the artillery reserve of the 10th Corps, covered by the 2d regiment of dragoons of the Guard, had posted itself upon the ridge of heights to the east of Mars la Tour to support the movement of the brigade; while on the west of it General Rheinbaben had

of his own division Barby's brigade (4th Cuirassiers, 13th Uhlans, and 19th Dragoons), the 13th regiment of dragoons of Bredow's brigade, and the 10th regiment of hussars of Redern's brigade. When Wedell was obliged to retire with very heavy losses, the reserve artillery of the 10th Corps covered his retreat with their fire, and the Prussian Dragoons of the Guard and Rheinbaben's division did the same by repeated charges, which were executed with the greatest gallantry, but not without entailing great sacrifices. The dragoons of the Guard charged Lebœuf's infantry, whilst Rheinbaben's rode against five regiments of French cavalry of the Guard, who were to cover the extreme right of Bazaine's position. The hand-to-hand fighting was furious, but the artillery and musketry fire wrought more destruction among both bodies of cavalry than the sword. Voigts-Rhetz also, when he became aware of the continued retreat of Wedell's brigade, ordered General Kraatz-Koschlau to bring back on to the height of Tronville as many of his troops which were engaged in the combat in the wood as possible, so that Wedell, covered by them, might be able to re-form.

While these things were taking place upon the left wing of the Germans, Stülpnagel's division had on the right steadily and firmly maintained itself against repeated and violent attacks, although perhaps not so furious as those which Buddenbrock's division had to sustain. When Barneckow's division of the 8th Corps

arrived, it sent first three batteries of artillery and three squadrons of the 9th Hussars to the direct support of Stülpnagel. Prince Frederic Charles directed also Rex's brigade to proceed by Côte Mousa through the wood of St Arnould upon Rezonville, emerging from which place the French had penetrated, or were seeking to penetrate, on Stülpnagel's right flank, partly into the wood of St Arnould, partly in the wood Des Ognons. Rex's brigade, three regiments strong, as we have seen, pushed forward as far as the northern edge of the woods of St Arnould and of Des Ognons, but could not debouch from the same against Rezonville, for Bazaine led there the infantry of the Guard, kept until then in reserve. Nevertheless the movement of Rex's brigade was very useful, as it prevented the French throwing still stronger forces against the left wing of the Germans.

Still more to the right than Rex's brigade, the 49th (Hesse-Darmstadt) brigade, which had sent two batteries to the direct support of Stülpnagel, came into action, advancing through the woods De Chevaux and Des Ognons, and driving the French out of the latter.

Only total darkness put an end to the battle here, as well as on the left wing of the Germans. Lebœuf and Canrobert, at 6.30 P.M., again assumed the offensive against this latter; but they were repulsed, and detachments from Kraatz-Koschlau's and Budden-

brock's troops debouched again from Mars la Tour and Vionville, and advanced against the northern woods. At 7.30 P.M. the French reopened a heavy cannonade, but this was only to secure the retreat of their right wing on to the northern Metz-Verdun road. When this firing ceased, Prince Frederic Charles, at about 8 P.M., advanced the 6th division of cavalry from Flavigny upon Rezonville. Rauch's brigade, the 3d and 16th regiments of hussars, made on this occasion many prisoners.

By 9 P.M. all was over. Both parties bivouacked upon the battle-field. The Prussians had won little ground, but still something; the southern road from Metz to Verdun was now, under any circumstances, denied to Bazaine, and was fully in the power of the Germans.

The day had cost both sides great sacrifices. The Prussians give their loss in killed and wounded at 17,000, among whom were 650 officers—that is, 1 for every 26 men. As the French acknowledge 15,000 wounded, and as they lost 3000 unwounded prisoners, their total loss must be estimated at 23,000 men. For the rest, the trophies gained by the victors were inconsiderable, which speaks for the obstinacy of the fight on both sides.

The number of combatants may be taken as about equal on both sides. Of the French side, about 12 divisions came into action, but they had been for the

most part weakened in previous encounters. On the German side, about the equivalent for 3 Corps came on to the battle-field, but they also had already suffered; so that it may be calculated that on each side about 80,000 men actually took part in the fight.

CHAPTER XV.

THE BATTLE BEFORE METZ ON THE 18TH OF AUGUST, KNOWN ALSO AS THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE, OR OF ST PRIVAT LA MONTAGNE.

EVEN on the evening of the 16th of August, Marshal Bazaine did not relinquish his intention of retiring westwards, in order to effect a junction with M'Mahon. Let us consider the circumstances in which he stood.

Bazaine must wish to accomplish his march to join M'Mahon, if possible, without fighting. This was no longer practicable if he moved along the southern highway to Verdun, for it was altogether in the hands of the Germans; it was also very improbable that he would gain his end if he took the northern road, as it runs very near to the southern one, and the active cavalry of the Prussians could show themselves upon it, between Estain and Doncourt, by the 17th of August at the latest.

There remained, then, two other routes—the one by Briey and Montmédy to Stenay or to Sedan, and the other by Thionville, Longwy, and thence again to

Stenay or Sedan. The two roads by the Meuse are much longer than the two first mentioned to Verdun, for going by them a great circuit is made. This would have been but of small importance had they offered complete security from an attack by the Germans; but this condition they in nowise fulfilled.

In order to be able to issue from Metz with a force worth carrying away, Bazaine could only leave behind in the fortress a weak garrison, besides men of the Mobile Guard and of the Sedentary National Guard. To watch these, a single Prussian Corps would have sufficed. The whole main body of Steinmetz's army and of the army of Prince Frederic Charles could, as soon as they should be informed of Bazaine's retreat, have instantly followed, and have easily overtaken him before he reached the Meuse. The more northerly the direction of Bazaine's retreat, so much the more surely would this interception be effected. It is true that the road by Thionville to Longwy increased at first greatly his distance from the Germans, but after passing Longwy he was compelled to bend southwards, and come again towards them.

For these reasons Bazaine kept for the present to his intended line of retreat along the Briey-Longuion road. The only question still to be answered was, When could it be commenced? Naturally, the sooner the better; but Bazaine was obliged to admit that he could not think of starting on the 17th of August. The wounded must be to some extent carried away;

Map for the Battles and Encounters about Metz from the 14th of August to the Capitulation on the 27th of October 1870.



POSITIONS AT FIVE P.M. ON THE 18TH OF AUGUST 1870.

the ammunition, of which enormous quantities had been expended on the 16th, and the supplies of provisions, required to be replenished. The earliest date at which the retreat could be commenced was the night from the 17th to 18th of August; and again, unless the start were postponed until then, it would be impossible to make forced marches, as the soldiers, even those who were unwounded, were very much exhausted by the sanguinary work of the 16th.

If the Prussians did not move on the 17th or 18th August, Bazaine could, if he succeeded in setting out on the night of 17-18th, reach Longuion by a forced march on the latter day, and then he would have gained not only a considerable start, but also free communications with M'Mahon, who, being informed of his movements, could come to meet him from the Camp of Chalons, marching north by Vouziers. The operations after the union had been effected would depend upon circumstances. But certainly the hope that the Germans would remain quiet on the 17th and 18th was a very faint one, that was not to be lightly acted upon. Bazaine appreciated this correctly, and took up consequently at earliest dawn of the 17th a position which appeared to him to be a favourable one in case he should be attacked before he could depart. This position, fronting about west, extended from north to south between the water-courses of the Mance and of the brook of Chatel St Germain. Its right rested on Roncourt and St Privat

la Montagne, extended thence by Amanvilliers, Montigny la Grange, the farm-houses of Leipzic and Moscou, the public-houses of St Hubert and Point du Jour, to Rozerieulle and Jussy, and then to the Moselle. In front of the position the Mance runs into this latter river at Ars la Moselle, behind it the brook of St Germain at Moulins-les-Metz.

On the right of the main position were concentrated the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) and the 6th Corps (Canrobert); on the left, the 2d Corps (Frossard) and the 3d (Lebœuf); the Guard being in reserve. The principal advanced-posts in its front were, Ste Marie aux Chênes, Vernéville, Gravelotte, and the Bois de Vaux. The advantages which this position afforded were the following: 1. It was not too near the places at that moment occupied by the Germans; so that, unless they were unreasonably eager to fight, they were not directly provoked to engage on the 17th, and perhaps also not on the 18th of August. 2. It was not too long even for the comparatively weak force at Bazaine's disposal. Its lateral extension was about 16,000 paces; so that, assuming Bazaine's disposable force to be 96,000, he had six men for every pace of his front. 3. The front of the position was naturally strong. The heights east of the Mance rise up in terrace-like form to the Plateau St Privat, Amanvilliers, St Hubert, and so are admirably adapted for shelter-trenches (*tranchées-abris*), the use of which had been especially recommended to the French in-

fantry in the instruction of Marshal Niel of the 9th of August 1868, and in making which they had been afterwards exercised in the Camp of Chalons; and such shelter-trenches were largely dug in the position on the 17th of August. 4. The right wing kept for the present possession of the road of retreat, by Briey to Longuion. 5. The left was especially strong: immediately in front were woods, which are never favourable to the rapid advance of the attackers, and behind it were Forts St Quentin and Plappeville. Assuming that the Prussians attacked only the left wing of the French, it would retire after a moderate resistance behind the above-named forts, and it would be then not improbable that the French could effect their retreat.

We must at the same time remember that the French, even at this time, greatly underrated the forces of the Germans. Thus Bazaine believed, although quite falsely, that on the 16th of August he had a considerable numerical superiority opposed to him; but he was ignorant of the terrible fact that the Germans would in the following days be able to oppose him with a much larger number of fresh troops than had fought against him on the 16th; whilst he, with the exception of Ladmirault's Corps, had no more untouched reserves. But whatever fault may be found with Bazaine's measures on the 17th, it must be admitted finally that, under the given circumstances, they were the best that could

have been taken, especially if it be remembered that in war something must ever be left to chance or to an omnipotent fate.

Let us now look into the German camp. On the evening of the 16th of August, after the battle of Vionville, the German troops who had come into action on that day encamped in the following order, from the right to the left wing: The troops of the 25th (Hessian) division in the woods Des Ognons and De Chevaux; those troops of the 25th division who had not taken part in the battle of the 16th also marched into their bivouacs, early on the morning of the 17th; the 16th division, Barneckow, at Côte Mousa; the 5th division, Stülpnagel, to the west of the Bois de Vionville; the 6th division of cavalry, Duke of Mecklenburg, to the south of Flavigny; the reserve artillery of the 3d Corps to the south of the 6th division of cavalry; the 6th division of infantry, Buddenbrock, between Vionville and Tronville; the 10th Corps and the 5th division of cavalry to the west of Tronville. Prince Frederic Charles established his headquarters at Gorze, where he arrived at 9 P.M. Before this, advices of the events of the 16th had been sent to King William, who was at Pont à Mousson.

The result of the battle which had been that day fought could not be exactly ascertained at the head-quarters of Prince Frederic Charles, but it was clearly recognised that Bazaine would either still try to effect

his retreat westward, or would deliver a battle before Metz to prevent being at once shut up within it. And it was also certain that the German troops which had been engaged on the 16th of August had suffered severe losses, and were much exhausted, and that it was therefore of great importance to relieve them, and to bring up as many fresh troops as possible. Consequently, by an order given at 11 o'clock on the evening of the 16th, all those Corps were called up which would probably be able to reach the battle-field on the 17th.

Of the 9th Corps, Manstein (of which we have already seen the 25th (Hessian) division engaged), the 18th division was on the evening of the 16th on the Madbach at Onville and Arnaville, and to the north of it, in the Lower Gorze valley, the artillery reserve of the Corps, while Manstein's headquarters were at Novéant. There he received the order to place himself, if possible, by daybreak of the 17th of August, upon the plateau 12 miles to the N.W. of Gorze. As a matter of fact, the head of his Corps advanced at 6 A.M. on the 17th to a rendezvous to the north of Anconville, and to the west of the wood of Vionville.

The Prussian Guard Corps stood, on the evening of the 16th of August, with its main body at and about Bernécourt, and its advanced-guard at Rambucourt. It was directed to march at once through St Benoit en Woëwre upon Mars la Tour, and place itself on the left of the 12th North German (Saxon) Corps. Prince

August of Würtemberg, Chief of the Guard Corps, had already, upon his own responsibility, after the first intelligence which he received of the battle of Vionville, ordered that his divisions should concentrate at Richecourt and Flirey—that is, in a direction towards the north. He received the instructions of Prince Frederic Charles only at 3 A.M. on the 17th of August, commenced his march with his Corps at 5 A.M., and soon after 3 P.M. was in bivouacks between Mars la Tour and Hannonville au Passage.

The 12th (Saxon) Corps had its main body on the evening of the 16th at Pont à Mousson, with its advanced-guard at Regniéville en Haye, on the road to Thiaucourt; and there it received orders to march by Thiaucourt to Mars la Tour, to the east of the Guard Corps. The King of Prussia had already, on the evening of the 16th, instructed the Crown-Prince of Saxony at Pont à Mousson of the events which had occurred at Vionville, and had directly ordered him to set out. When now the Crown-Prince was apprised of the commands of the Prince Frederic Charles from Gorze, he at once caused the alarm to be sounded, and, starting at 2 A.M., arrived about 2 P.M. between Mars la Tour and Puxieux.

Upon the presence on the scene of immediate operations of the 4th Corps, which was between Le Saizerais and Marbach, with its advanced-guard at Jaillon, it was impossible to reckon. Prince Frederic Charles, therefore, allowed the orders issued at noon

of the 16th to remain in force, which prescribed for it a route by Boucq upon Soncy, and perhaps an attempt at a *coup de main* against the fortress of Toul, should the opportunity present itself.

The 2d Corps, also, which was to the east of the Moselle at Buchy, and still further in rear, was obliged to be left out of the reckoning for the 17th of August, and therefore it likewise did not receive any new order on the evening of the 16th. The former one directed it to march to Pont à Mousson on the 17th.

On his side, King William, as soon as he had given his directions to the Crown-Prince of Saxony, had commanded the 8th Corps—at least such part of it as had not already passed over the river—the 7th Corps, and the 1st division of cavalry, which all belonged to the First Army, to cross to the left bank of the Moselle. Prince Frederic Charles was informed about midnight at Gorze of this arrangement.

The 7th and 8th Corps threw several bridges over the Moselle during the night, began their march early on the morning of the 17th, and between 1 and 2 P.M. stood thus: the 8th Corps to the south of Rezonville, behind it the division of cavalry; the 7th Corps south of Gravelotte, extending rearwards towards Ars la Moselle. The two Corps were in communication in the Bois des Ognons.

Prince Frederic Charles left Gorze on the 17th of

August at 4 A.M. for the scene of action, where, at 6 A.M., the King also arrived.

The German troops who were on the battle-field were under arms early in the morning. The French troops, which were still arrayed facing the Vionville-Rezonville road, marched eastward into their new positions under cover of skirmishers, and were seen to arrive in them about noon.

As the fresh German Corps, as we have seen, only came up in part towards 3 P.M., after having made such long marches that it was necessary to give them some repose, it was no longer possible to think of attacking the French position on the 17th; and at 1 o'clock, therefore, the outposts were organised, and placed on a line extending from the Bois des Ognons, over the heights south of Rezonville, through the wood to the north-west of Vionville, to Ville sur Yron. Meanwhile the troops which were already on the battle-field had lighted their cooking-fires as soon as the march of the French eastward was certified; but strong detachments of cavalry were sent out in the afternoon northwards, beyond the line of outposts, to observe the road by Estain and Briey, and any movement the French might make along it. Towards 2 P.M. the King issued, through General Moltke, the following dispositions for the 18th:—

"The Second Army will form up to-morrow, the 18th, at 5 A.M., and advance in echelon between the Yron and the Gorzebach (in general between Ville

sur Yron and Rezonville); the 8th Corps will join this movement on the right wing of the Second Army; the 7th Corps will have the task of securing this movement from any hostile attacks from the side of Metz. The further dispositions of the King will depend upon the measures taken by the enemy. Reports to his Majesty are, for the present, to be sent to his Majesty on the height to the south of Flavigny."

As it had been determined not to fight before the 18th, it was now possible that the 2d Corps, which was to reach Pont à Mousson on the 17th, could also be brought into action, perhaps even at the last decisive moments. At 1 o'clock, therefore, the order was sent to it to march from Pont à Mousson at 4 A.M. on the 18th, and to advance on Buxières by way of Arnanville, Bayonville, and Onville. It was there to cook and rest, and there to form up in mass. This march was about seventeen miles, and could therefore, allowing for the time consumed in marching off and in halting, be accomplished in nine or ten hours.

The general dispositions given above were only calculated to place the Second Army and the 8th Corps upon one front, which would extend along a line almost parallel to the road from Metz through Doncourt and Estain. By the time that this movement could be completed, it would be seen whether the enemy still intended to retreat either by Doncourt or

by Briey, in which case the German army would still have to advance northwards to the attack. But should the French army remain in the position, Amanvilliers-Rozerieulle, in which as we know it stood, the German army must continue the wheel to the right which it had commenced, and in which the 7th Corps served as the fixed pivot, in order to attack the French there.

The King of Prussia returned after 2 P.M. to his headquarters in Pont à Mousson, and Prince Frederic Charles established his at 3 P.M. in Buxières, south of Tronville.

Very early on the morning of the 18th, Prince Frederic Charles gave verbal instructions for the day to the generals commanding the Corps of the Second Army,—to those of the Corps on the left, the 12th, Guard, and 10th at 5 A.M., to the south of Mars la Tour; to those of the Corps on the right, the 9th and 3d, at 5.30 A.M., to the west of Vionville. According to these, it was the task of the Second Army to march forwards to shut off definitely the retreat of the French army to Verdun, and to fight it wherever it found it. Its advance was to take place in two lines, the first formed, enumerating from left to right, by the 12th, Guard, and 9th Corps, the second made up principally of the Corps that had been most engaged on the 16th of August, the 10th and 3d Corps.

In the first line, the 12th (Saxon) Corps was to advance on the extreme left upon Jarny; on its right,

and next to it, the Guard Corps upon Doncourt; and to the right of this the 9th Corps between Vionville and Rezonville, to the eastward of St Marcel; and according to the general dispositions, the 8th Corps of the First Army would then join on to its right. In the second line, the 10th Corps, with Rheinbaben's division of cavalry, was to follow the 12th Corps; the 3d Corps, with the 6th division of cavalry (Duke of Mecklenburg), was directed upon the interval between the Prussian Guard and the 10th Corps. For a third line there remained, then, the before-mentioned 2d Corps, which could only come up late. The Corps were not to advance in columns of march, but each division was to be in a formation capable of being quickly developed, and therefore always ready for action.

The 12th Corps, which formed the wheeling flank, and had therefore the longest way to march, was to start immediately upon receiving the orders at 5 A.M.; the rest were to follow, from left to right, at intervals proportionate to the distances they had to traverse. The Guard had, owing to the position of its bivouacs, about as far to march to reach Doncourt as the 12th had to arrive at Jarny; the 9th Corps, on the contrary, had only half as far to go to reach the road over Doncourt in the neighbourhood of Caulre. Prince Frederic Charles placed himself at the head of the 3d Corps, which formed the right of the second line. The King of Prussia came upon the battle-field at 6

A.M., and remained at first on the heights to the south of Flavigny.

At 8.30 A.M. the 9th Corps had reached Caulre and halted there; but the Prussian Guard and the 12th Corps had not yet arrived at Doncourt and Jarny. From the intelligence which up to this time had reached Prince Frederic Charles, it seemed to be most probable that the French had not marched off through Doncourt upon Estain, or through Briey, but that they had taken up a position on the plateau of Amanvilliers. Still nothing could be ascertained with certainty from these reports; for they said that Gravelotte was not occupied by the French, but that behind the place, and to the east of it, there was a camp; that the camps at Bruville and St Marcel had been evacuated, and that in those which had been pitched on the plateau near the farmhouses of Moscou and Leipzic, great movements were observed. Being thus in doubt as to the proceedings of his adversaries, Prince Frederic Charles sent orders at 8.30 A.M. to the Guard and 12th Corps to halt as soon as they reached Doncourt and Jarny, until a greater certainty as to the intention of the French could be arrived at, for it seems that the Prince had been led very much astray by the report of the striking of the camps of Bruville and of St Marcel. Could the troops who had been there till the morning of the 17th have now marched away to the north?

The 3d Corps had as yet made no movement from

Vionville, but the 10th Corps, which had commenced its march, was now directed to halt at Bruville. By 10 A.M. it appeared to be more probable that the French were remaining on the plateau; but still this was even yet not a certainty. The Prince, therefore, now ordered the 9th Corps to march through Vernéville upon La Folie, and at 10.15 A.M. the Guard to follow the 9th Corps upon Vernéville. In planning this movement, the Prince assumed that, if the French were in position, their extreme right wing would be somewhere by La Folie (in reality it was, as we know, much more to the north); and when the 10th Corps came upon the enemy there, it was at first to engage with him in a musketry combat, while the Guard from Vernéville was to reconnoitre towards Amanvilliers and St Privat la Montagne, and send in prompt information of what it discovered. The 12th Corps (Saxon) was all this time to remain halted at Jarny, ready to march northwards when required.

Meanwhile the Staff of the King had received about 10.30 A.M. further and more correct intelligence. From this it appeared that the main body of the French was between Montigny la Grange and Point du Jour, and that four French battalions were advanced into the Bois des Genivaux. Accordingly the King held it to be expedient that the Guard and 12th Corps should be directed upon Batilly. Thence they could, in case Bazaine should still take the Briey road, march upon Ste Marie aux Chênes, or, in case

he should remain in his position at Amanvilliers, attack him there on his right flank; while, simultaneously, the 9th Corps would advance against the Bois de Gènivaux, and the 8th and 7th Corps against Gravelotte, and through the wood De Vaux.

These directions reached Prince Frederic Charles soon after 11 A.M., and by that time he also had received similar information. The error into which he had fallen as to the position of the right wing of the French had been nearly completely rectified; but, on the other hand, he did not wish to bring confusion into the advance of the Corps which were already on the march by giving now entirely contradictory counter-orders; and these two sets of feelings must be considered in judging the dispositions which the Prince made at 11.30 A.M., after he had received the instructions of the King. To carry out these, orders were at once simultaneously sent to General Manstein (9th Corps) and Prince August of Würtemberg (Guard). Manstein was to halt in his advance through Vernéville by La Folie, but not to engage the enemy there seriously before the Guard attacked from Amanvilliers. The Prince of Würtemberg was to march by Vernéville to Amanvilliers, and thence attack in the flank Bazaine's right wing, which was supposed to be posted there. A quarter of an hour later, the Crown-Prince of Saxony (12th Corps) received the order to march from Jarny upon Ste Marie aux Chênes, to secure his left wing on the

roads to Estain and Briey, to send forward cavalry towards Woippy in the Moselle valley, and, as far as possible, cut the railway and telegraph communications from Metz to Thionville. A quarter of an hour later still, at noon, General Voigts-Rhetz (10th Corps) was directed to support the Saxons by advancing upon St Ail. At the same time an order was sent to General Fransecky, commander of the 2d Corps, the head of which began to draw near to the battle-field, to march from Buxières upon Rezonville, to serve as a support to the right wing of the general line. At the same time, the commander of each Corps was advised of what the other Corps were ordered to do.

The 8th Corps received from the King at noon the order to advance from Rezonville by Gravelotte upon Moscou; the 7th Corps was to hold the Bois de Vaux, keeping still its character as the fixed pivot, and only taking part in the action with its artillery—an order which two hours later was repeated. With the 3d Corps Prince Frederic Charles intended to advance himself, into the neighbourhood of Vernéville, and no precise instructions were given to it.

Thus we have seen how, by about noon, the preparations for the attack of the French position on the plateau of Amanvilliers were completed by the Germans. We will now follow the movements of the separate Corps, and first those of the Second Army, until 5 P.M.

The 9th Corps, Manstein, had finished its cooking at

Caulre, and was ready to set out when it received the orders which Prince Frederic Charles had issued at 10 A.M. At 10.30 A.M. it marched off in the following order: 18th division (Wrangel), reserve artillery of the Corps, and 25th division (Prince Louis of Hesse) taking a direction between the wood of Doscuillons and the wood of Bagneux, direct upon Vernéville, which was occupied by Wrangel's advanced-guard. To the north of the road from Vernéville to Amanvilliers lies the wood De la Cusse, to the south the wood Des Genivaux. The gap between these two is about 2000 paces wide, and through it Amanvilliers and Montigny la Grange can be distinctly seen from Vernéville; but La Folie, which lies more to the south, and against which the 9th Corps was specially directed, is hidden from view by the latter wood. The Germans, then, arriving at Vernéville, and looking up this vista, saw French camps upon the heights of Amanvilliers, and remarked some of the enemy's battalions, which were just then marching thence towards Vernéville, with the intention of occupying it.

Manstein, therefore, at 12 noon, caused the artillery of the 18th division to push on to Champenois, and soon afterwards sent the reserve artillery of the Corps into position on its left, with its own left considerably thrown forward, while at the same time that the divisional artillery was advanced, two battalions of the same division were sent into the wood De la

Cusse, with instructions to occupy and hold its eastern edge opposite Amanvilliers. On the French side, batteries, and with them mitrailleuse batteries also, came into action at Amanvilliers and Montigny la Grange against Manstein's artillery, and soon afterwards others further to the north, towards St Privat la Montagne, began to cannonade it. This fire, as well as that from the French Chassepots, proved especially destructive to the advanced left wing of Manstein's artillery; but still, by 5 P.M., this had gained considerable advantages, although it had suffered great losses, having 15 guns completely disabled.

We have already seen how two battalions of Wrangel's division had been thrown into the wood De la Cusse, on the north of the road from Vernéville to Amanvilliers. These were in the course of time reinforced by the 49th brigade of infantry from the Hessian Division, while the 50th brigade and the Hessian cavalry were formed up in the vista between the wood De la Cusse and the wood Des Doscuillons as a reserve for Manstein's left wing. The battalions in the wood suffered very severely from the artillery-fire of the French.

Whilst these things were going on on the left, Wrangel, on Manstein's right wing, held firm at Chantrennes, and in the north-east corner of the wood Des Genivaux, with the bulk of his division, and repelled repeated attacks which the French

directed against him from La Folie. Such, then, was the state of affairs with the 9th Corps at 5 P.M.

The Prussian Guard, when it quitted its bivouacs on the morning of the 18th of August, had, as disposable troops, the 1st division of infantry of the Guard (Pape), the 2d division of infantry of the Guard (Budritzky), the reserve of artillery, but only the Cuirassier brigade (Count Brandenburg I.) of the division of cavalry of the Guard, for the Dragoon brigade of the Guard (Count Brandenburg II.), which had been assigned on the 16th August to Rheinbaben's division, only came up later in the day, and the Uhlan brigade (Rochow), which had been sent forward to St Mihiel on the Meuse, took no part in the battle. Of these troops Budritzky's division marched on the right from Doncourt towards Vernéville, Pape's division and the reserve of artillery on the left by Tonaville to Habonville; but about 1 P.M. Prince Frederic Charles repaired personally from Vionville to Vernéville, and seeing there clearly that the French right extended much further to the north than it had originally been supposed, directed Budritzky's division, which had not yet reached Vernéville, also to bend northwards towards Habonville.

Meanwhile the advanced-guard of Pape's division had occupied St Ail, to the north of Habonville, shortly after noon, and it was followed by the main part of the division. The divisional artillery took

up a position between St Ail and Habonville. To it Prince Hohenlohe, chief of the brigade of artillery of the Guard, joined the reserve of artillery of the Corps as soon as it came up, and then led this mass of fifty-four guns into an effective range for firing against the French position at St Privat la Montagne. Towards 2 P.M. Budritzky's division, turned northward as we have seen by Prince Charles, arrived at Habonville; and at the same time the mass of artillery under Prince Hohenlohe was increased by two batteries of horse-artillery of the division of cavalry of the Guard, and somewhat after 2.30 P.M. by three batteries from Budritzky's division; so that now a total number of fourteen batteries—that is, of eighty-four guns—were in action on the heights to the west of Habonville.

Towards 2 P.M. Prince Frederic Charles left Vernéville and repaired also to these heights. On arrival he ordered Prince August of Würtemberg to confine himself for the present to this artillery fight, and to withhold the attack of the infantry until the time when the 12th (Saxon) Corps, having completed its wide-sweeping movement, should be in a position to support effectually the fight in which the Guard was engaged. Consequently the fire was continued —Prince Hohenlohe moving up at 4 P.M. his guns gradually into a yet more forward position, from which the artillery duel raged for another full hour.

But at 5 P.M. Prince August of Würtemberg deter-

mined, as it had already become late, to lead his infantry to the attack of St Privat le Montagne, although the wide out-flanking movement of the Saxons was not yet accomplished.

The 12th (Saxon) Corps marching from Jarny reached the neighbourhood of Batilly with the head of its column at 2 P.M. Here the Crown-Prince of Saxony prepared to attack with his right wing the 24th division of infantry, Ste Marie aux Chênes, the advanced-outpost of the right wing of the French, whilst his left wing, the 23d division of infantry, leaving Ste Marie on its right, and passing through Coinville and Roncourt, was to outflank their extreme right. Of these preparations he informed Prince Frederic Charles.

"At 2.30 P.M. the 24th division of infantry, with the 47th brigade, Leonhardi, at its head, deployed between Coinville and Ste Marie, for the attack on the latter. It was supported by the advanced-guard of Pape's division of the Guard, which pushed forward from St Ail northwards simultaneously with it. At 3.30 P.M. Ste Marie aux Chênes was in the hands of the Germans; so that now the greater part of the 24th division of infantry was also available for the encircling movement upon Roncourt. But the march of the 23d division had been so delayed that it was only at 5 P.M. that the whole of the 12th Corps was deployed upon the line from Ste Marie aux Chênes to Joeuf, facing Roncourt.

At 4 P.M. two squadrons of Saxon horsemen had been detached from Coinville, and sent down the Ornes into the valley of the Moselle to break up the railway and cut the telegraph to Thionville. They had found the ways in the wood barricaded, and met with great difficulties, but nevertheless succeeded in accomplishing their errand.

Of the second line of the Second Army, no single Corps came into action until 5 P.M. The 10th Corps arrived at 2 P.M. at Batilly, and remained halted to the north of the village awaiting orders. The 3d Corps marched out of Vionville after Prince Frederic Charles had quitted the village, reached Vernéville at 3 P.M., and halted there. Later on it received an order to send forward its reserve of artillery to support the 9th Corps between Vernéville and the wood Des Genivaux. The 2d Corps, after cooking at Buxières, arrived some time about 5.30 P.M. to the east of Rezonville.

Of the troops which formed the First Army, the 8th Corps advanced about noon, when the fight with the 9th Corps was developing itself, with the 15th division of infantry, Weltzien, to the east of Rezonville upon Gravelotte. It was there received with a heavy fire from the guns and mitrailleuses of the 2d French and Guard Corps, who held the positions of Moscou and of Pont du Jour; but notwithstanding this, it succeeded in obtaining possession of the southern part of the wood Des Genivaux, and made many

endeavours to debouch from it against Moscou. In these it was until 5 P.M. unsuccessful, and had to content itself with holding the eastern edge of the front. When the commandant of the 7th Corps, Zastrow, remarked the advance of the 8th Corps, and saw how the French opened a heavy artillery-fire upon it, he at 1 P.M. brought up, in order to silence this to some extent, four batteries of the 14th division of infantry on to the heights between Gravelotte and the wood Des Ognons; and thence they commenced to cannonade with great effect the position of Pont du Jour, so that thereby some of the pressure was taken off the 8th Corps. Half an hour later, Zastrow sent three batteries more of the 13th division, and at 2 P.M. other two, from the reserve of artillery, into the same position; and after the united fire of these nine batteries (54 guns) had played upon them for half an hour, the fire from the French at Pont du Jour became perceptibly weaker. The artillery of the 7th Corps advanced now gradually in echelon towards the north-east. Zastrow, although he had been ordered to engage only with artillery, held that in its forward position it was too much exposed to be left without the protection of infantry, and he therefore brought forward, into sheltered positions, the 25th brigade of infantry, Osten Sacken, upon the right, and the 27th brigade, now Conrady's, upon the left wing of the artillery.

After 3 P.M. nothing more was heard on the right

of the fighting on the left and centre of the Germans, which may have been owing to a change in the wind, or perhaps to an actual lull in the battle in which the centre, the 9th Corps, was engaged. Be that as it may, Zastrow had certainly the right to assume that the French right had been completely routed, and that only the left at Pont du Jour remained firm. In this case an offensive thrust by the First Army, and especially by the 7th Corps, as the 8th was still vainly endeavouring to emerge from the wood de Genivaux, would be very effective, as it would render the retreat of the French very difficult. Zastrow therefore, towards 4 P.M., ordered the 25th and 28th brigades of infantry to push forward against Pont du Jour; three batteries were to follow them; the 27th brigade of infantry was to march in reserve to Gravelotte; while the 26th brigade of infantry had the independent task of holding the extreme right of the German army between Vaux and Jussy, and was already engaged there.

As, then, the two brigades of infantry debouched from the wood Des Vaux, they were received by a furious fire from the French shelter-trenches; and so heavy was it, that they were obliged to retreat and seek shelter some 800 yards to the south of Pont du Jour, behind the folds of the ground and in the thickets. The three batteries which were to support the attack of the above-named brigades advanced, followed by the 4th regiment of Uhlans from the 1st division of

cavalry, between the woods Des Vaux and Des Genivaux, across the Mance, and came into action about 1500 paces to the south of and facing St Hubert. In this position they as well as the Uhlans were much cut up by the fire from the French infantry and mitrailleuses. The Uhlans retired quickly into a covered position behind the infantry on the east edge of the wood De Vaux, but the batteries remained firm, although they were suffering great losses; and Zastrow therefore sent forward two fresh battalions of the 27th brigade of infantry to cover them. Still at 5 P.M. there could no longer be any idea of assuming the offensive with either the 7th or 8th Corps, and the the battle was here completely at a standstill.

We will now shortly sum up the state of affairs at 5 P.M.

We find on the German right (7th and 8th Corps) and centre (9th Corps) a continuous artillery and musketry combat going on, in which the Germans enjoy the cover of the borders of the woods, the French that of their shelter-trenches and of their commanding position. On the German left, the Prussian Guard Corps and the 12th (Saxon) Corps are preparing for the first decisive attack on the right wing of the French at St Privat la Montagne and Roncourt. The reserves, the 2d, 3d, and 10th Corps, have not yet been employed.

The movements of the 9th, the Guard, and of the 12th Corps must now be considered in connection with one another. The losses of the 9th Corps,

especially in the wood De la Cusse, were at 5 P.M. so considerable, that Prince Frederic Charles kept back, when Prince August of Würtemberg was preparing to attack decisively St Privat, the 3d brigade of infantry of the Guard (Knappe von Knappstadt), the Rifle battalion, and a battery of the artillery of the Guard, all specially to support it. The woods in this neighbourhood are not as a rule thick; they consist of numerous groves, which are separated from one another by small vistas; but the several groups consist of but proportionately few trees, and between them an entangled undergrowth, which explains the great losses which the Germans suffered in the wood De la Cusse.

The Guard became now the centre of the decisive manœuvre. Shortly after 5 P.M. Prince August of Würtemberg advanced the 4th brigade of infantry of the Guard from Habonville against St Privat, and a quarter of an hour later to the left of this the main body of Pape's division from Ste Marie aux Chênes, which was held by the advanced-guard of the division, also against St Privat. St Privat was most obstinately defended by the French; in spite of all the bravery displayed by the battalions of the Prussian Guard, they were forced to retire. The artillery of the 10th Corps was called up from the reserve; but at the same time, at 6 P.M., the Prince of Würtemberg resolved to delay the storming until the Saxons should be in a position to support him.

Meanwhile the 23d (Saxon) division of infantry

had reached Roncourt at 6.30 P.M., and advanced thence with the 45th brigade of infantry, Craushaar, at its head against St Privat. When Prince August heard the thunder of their cannon after he had carried on the action on his side for half an hour solely with the artillery of the Guard and of the 10th Corps, he pushed forward again the infantry of the Prussian Guard from the south and from the west against St Privat.

Thus at 6.45 P.M. the Saxon and Prussian Guard advanced simultaneously from all sides, the latter supported on their left wing by portions of the Kraatz-Koschlau's division of the 10th Corps, which had just come up and penetrated into St Privat. The French were obliged to yield at 7 P.M., and retired slowly towards the woods of Jaumont and Saulny.

As Prince August was making his first attack upon St Privat, General Manstein, with a Hessian brigade, with a part of Wrangel's division, and with the 3d division of infantry of the Guard, supported by the reserve of artillery of the 3d Corps, pushed forward against Amanvilliers and Montigny la Grange; but he could not get possession of them, and had finally to content himself with holding the eastern edge of the wood De la Cusse, whilst Blumenthal's brigade of Wrangel's division held upon his right wing Chantrenne and the N.E. corner of the wood Des Genivaux.

In the wood De la Cusse the French artillery at Amanvilliers and Montigny la Grange wrought great

destruction. Towards 7 P.M., therefore, Prince Frederic Charles ordered General von Alvensleben to place one brigade of his Corps, the 3d, at the disposal of General Manstein, and support him with the rest of his Corps according to circumstances. Alvensleben was about to advance the whole of Buddenbrock's division, when about 7.30 P.M. considerable masses of French troops appeared towards the Bois des Genivaux; he judged, therefore, that he must keep back his troops to be prepared for an offensive movement on the part of the French.

On the right wing of the Germans the battle remained stationary, as we have seen, since 4.30 P.M. At 6 P.M. the King ordered the 2d Corps, Fransecky, which had arrived at Rezonville, to support the First Army, the 7th and 8th Corps, by Gravelotte. The head of the 2d Corps reached Gravelotte at 6.30 P.M., and advanced along the highroad through this place against St Hubert. Shortly afterwards Zastrow received orders to march with the 7th Corps on the right of the 2d against Pont du Jour, while to the left of the 2d Corps the 8th Corps was to debouch out of the Bois des Genivaux. Zastrow advanced at once the 28th and 25th brigades of infantry and two battalions of the 27th, while four battalions of the latter brigade remained in reserve at Gravelotte.

But even this joint attack was not sufficient to drive the French from their position at Pont du Jour. While the right wing was in retreat from St

Privat, while the centre stood firm at Montigny la Grange, Bazaine directed all his disposable troops to move through Leipzic towards his left wing, to cover there the most important roads of retreat; and only at 6 A.M. on the 19th of August, when the 2d Prussian Corps renewed the attack against it, did the French rearguard leave its position at Pont du Jour.

The real battle was finished by 8 P.M. The German Corps bivouacked in the positions they had taken, and were directed to cover themselves well with outposts, to be able to meet any desperate stroke which the French might make. The 12th Corps was repeatedly directed to push forward if possible a strong detachment to Woippy on the railway to Thionville. The King of Prussia established his headquarters at Rezonville, after which place the battle is therefore sometimes called.

The German loss is given at 550 officers and 14,000 men; that of the French was probably, owing to their favourable position, not much greater.

The losses, therefore, were less than on the 16th. This may be partly explained by the fact that the artillery played a proportionately greater part on the 18th than on the 16th, and that furious infantry and cavalry encounters were more frequent on the 16th than on the 18th. But besides this, it is said that the French on the whole did not fight with the same tenacity on the 18th as on the 16th August. A certain despondency had instinctively entered their

hearts, and this feeling was increased by the great numerical superiority of the Germans on the 18th. On the 16th the forces were, as we have seen, about even. On the 18th the French had about 100,000 men, infantry and cavalry, on the battle-field; the Germans numbered, in the eight Corps on the left bank of the Moselle, and in the divisions of cavalry attached to them, at least 200,000. The French had about 450 guns, mitrailleuses included, the Germans 720; so that even if the Germans did not actually bring all their forces into action, still their apparent superiority in troops present must have made a disturbing impression on the French.

CHAPTER XVI.

RESULTS OF THE FIRST THREE BATTLES BEFORE METZ, FROM THE 14TH TO THE 18TH AUGUST.

On the 20th of August Count Palikao declared in the Chamber:—

"Gentlemen the Deputies! the Prussians have circulated reports which would cause a belief that on the 18th they gained a very important advantage over our troops. I will narrate the facts. I cannot enter into details. You will understand my reticence. (Yes, yes! Very good! very good!) I have shown despatches to many members of the Chambers, and from which it appears that, so far from obtaining an advantage on the 18th, three Corps which united against Bazaine were—according to intelligence which seems to be worthy of belief—thrown into the stone quarries of Jaumont."

The Gentlemen the Deputies naturally did not know where the quarries of Jaumont were, or what they were. The newspaper editors racked their brains for eight days about the matter, owing to scarcity of anything like good maps in France; but the Gentlemen

the Deputies asked no questions; it was sufficient for them to know that three Prussian Corps had been thrown into the "well-known" quarries of Jaumont. These quarries, which supply the inhabitants of Metz with an excellent building material, are situated to the east of Roncourt. We know that, on the 18th, only the left wing of the Saxons came to that village, that it experienced no opposition there, and advanced thence in concert with the Prussian Guard against St Privat la Montagne, where indeed the French made some stand, but were unable to assume a successful offensive. From whom then had Count Palikao received this intelligence? Certainly not from Bazaine; and yet he had already heard from him, for Bazaine was at 8.20 P.M. on the 18th still able to telegraph to the Emperor Napoleon at Chalons. In the despatch which he then sent, and which was written at 7 P.M. on the battle-field before Fort Plappeville, he only says that the attack had been very violent; that now, at 7 P.M., the fire was subsiding, that the 60th Regiment had suffered very much at St Aubert, and that the French troops had maintained their position,—a statement which at that time was in the main correct of the right wing, and perfectly so of the left. This telegram Count Palikao also received from Chalons on the night of the 18th-19th of August.

On the 19th Bazaine could no longer telegraph, but he sent a woodsman, who pledged himself to find his way through the forests, and through the midst

of the Germans, with further intelligence to Verdun, whence it was to be telegraphed to the Emperor at Chalons, and to Count Palikao at Paris. This letter runs thus :—

"BAN ST MARTIN, the 19th.

"The army fought the whole day yesterday between St Privat and Rozereuilles. The 4th and 6th Corps alone made a change of front, drawing back their right to check a movement towards the right,* which masses † of the enemy were about to make under cover of the darkness. This morning I retired the 2d and 3d Corps from their positions.‡ The army is again formed up on the left bank of the Moselle, from Longeville over the heights of Ban St Martin, behind the Forts St Quentin and Plappeville. The troops are fatigued by the continued fighting, which has prevented their material wants being supplied, and has not allowed them to take any rest. The King of Prussia was to-day with Moltke in Rezonville, and from everything it may be concluded that the Prussian army intends to surround Metz. I still hope to get away in a northerly direction towards Montmédy, and thence on to the St Ménéhould-Chalons road if it is not too strongly occupied. Should this be the case, I shall go to Sedan, and even to Mezières, in order thence to gain Chalons. In Metz we have 700 prisoners, who incommode us. I shall propose an exchange to General Moltke."

* Seen from the French side.

† The Saxons.

‡ Leipzic, Moscou, St Aubert, Rozereuilles.

Bazaine said the truth in this despatch of the 19th; he had on the morning of that day also withdrawn the Corps which had held their ground, and placed them in a concentrated position under the protection of Forts Plappeville and St Quentin, a position with a main front of 5000 paces, extending from Le Sansonnet on the right to Longeville les Metz on the left wing. On the right wing he had advanced-posts at Woippy and at the Maison-Rouge, on the left wing at Sey, Chazelles, Moulins les Metz; his centre was sufficiently covered by the two forts Plappeville and St Quentin.

Bazaine had allowed himself to be shut in. Why? Certainly not because he held himself to be the victor on the 18th of August, for he had been obliged to retire his right wing, and thereby his position had undoubtedly lost an advantage. That he could on the 19th or even on the 20th of August deliver another battle in the position Amanvilliers-Rozereuilles with any prospect of success he did not believe. His greatest need was to procure rest for his men. Certainly he expressed the hope that he might be able to get to Montmédy after his troops had rested, perhaps on the 22d. But he only said, "I still hope." He did not speak with certainty. And the hope was undoubtedly one which he might reasonably allow himself to entertain.

The Prussians might commit mistakes in their investment—spread themselves out too far, weaken themselves by detachments elsewhere. Why, then,

should it not be possible to break out and gain Montmédy? Without a battle it was certainly not to be thought of. But even in Bazaine, who could not be expected to know thoroughly all the circumstances of the case, this hope was weak. As a rule, continued misfortune does not raise the spirit of an army; and what he had failed to do with 120,000 fighting men, he could scarcely hope to achieve with 80,000, or at the highest 90,000, effective combatants. Therefore the despatch assuredly did not contain good news for France.

The brave woodsman kept his word, but was only able to arrive at Verdun, having made his way through the middle of the German troops, on the morning of the 22d of August. The commandant of this fortress at once telegraphed the despatch to the Emperor and to Count Palikao. The latter received it at 10 A.M., and on the afternoon of the 22d he stood up in the Chamber and said:—

"Gentlemen the Deputies! you could this morning have read in the 'Journal Officiel' a paragraph which the Government caused to be printed. This paragraph was then the expression of the truth, which we published in order to keep our promise of proclaiming the whole truth, whatever excitement it may produce in the public. (Very good.) Since the publication of that paragraph, I have received reports from Marshal Bazaine. (Excitement.) These reports are good. I cannot here communicate them to you. You will understand why." (Yes, yes! Very good! Very

good!) Count Keratry asked, "Of what date is this news?" Palikao answered, "Of the 19th." Keratry asked again, "Are these despatches from Bazaine himself?" "Yes," replied Palikao, and continued: "Gentlemen, these reports show on the part of the Marshal a confidence which I share, as I know his worth and his energy. I must add—without, however, entering into further details of the events of the war—that the preparations for the defence of Paris are being actively pushed forward, and that we shall shortly be ready to receive any one who may be desirous of showing himself before us." (Lively signs of assent.)

It may well be asked, what harm would have been done if Count Palikao had read the despatch of Bazaine word for word? Certainly, every one could not have drawn from it the same confidence which he did; many would not have taken an uncertain hope for a firm persuasion, and consequently would not have esteemed the news of the 19th as good; but still it was not absolutely bad.

In the German headquarters the state of affairs was properly appreciated; and it was felt that Bazaine was now shut up with his army in Metz, and that he could be kept there until he and it surrendered. And the German leaders went further still, for they purposed keeping him there with a smaller force than had been collected for the battle on the 18th. Under this conviction, and also reckoning upon further re-

inforcements which could shortly be brought up, a new army, the Fourth, was definitely formed on the 19th, the components of which were taken from the Second Army.

The Fourth Army, composed of the 4th, 12th, and Guard Corps, was under the command of the Crown-Prince of Saxony, and was destined to operate in concert with the army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia against M'Mahon and against Paris. In the next chapters we shall be occupied chiefly with the operations of the two Crown-Princes.

Before Metz and against Bazaine there remained behind the First Army, Steinmetz, 1st, 7th, and 8th Corps, and the Second Army, 2d, 3d, 9th, and 10th Corps—that is, in all 7 Corps, a force which numbered, including the divisions of cavalry, spite of the losses sustained in the recent battles, 180,000, or at the least 170,000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 630 field-guns.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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